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ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 218-221

[Text] THE TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF CPSU AND TASKS CONFRONTING SOVIET ORIENTAL STUDIES

G.F. KIM

In the light of the decisions of the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the Soviet oriental scholars were assigned new tasks. The article deals with the most important of them.

First of all, the problems analysed by Soviet scholars demand further study. These problems have to do with finding a correct correlation between general patterns and specific features of the historical development of the East. They also pertain to identifying the typological distinctions of Eastern countries. The article emphasises the importance of the traditional factor in the East and the inadmissibility of a Eurocentric approach. It notes the significance of an in-depth analysis of the theory of social and economic formations with a special reference to the developing world. It also points out the importance of a dialectical approach to such problems, as the historic role of colonialism, evolution of capitalism before and after Independence, essence of the national-liberation movement, contradictions of mass movements in the East. The article characterizes the role of newly-liberated states in the world capitalist economy, changes in their economic development and their contradictions with imperialism. It also notes that it is essential to prognosticate economic, social and political development of the East and substantiate comprehensive programmes of economic, scientific and technological cooperation of developing countries with the USSR and other socialist states.

The article highlights problems relating to the analysis of the socialist orientation and the emergence of a socialist formation in some Eastern countries. It points out that it has become ever more important to examine international affairs.

The article pays special attention to the promotion of classical oriental studies, use of new methods of investigation and coordination of oriental studies.

SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING SOCIALIST ORIENTATION

V.F. VASILIEV

The article deals with the problem that touches on the prospects of social development of a number of the Third World countries. Despite certain successes made by researchers of the problem of socialist orientation it has not been sufficiently worked out. It has not been sufficiently worked out. It is noted that among all the terms offered to define this phenomenon--the most commonly used designation "socialist orientation" seems to be the best. On the one hand, it clearly states the general objective of the development ("socialist"), on the other, it implies the initial stage and the general trend of development ("orientation"), whose completion is unpredictable due to the complicated conditions of social development (a break in social orientation, a reverse course and even re-embarking upon the path of capitalist development are in principle possible). To assess the socialist orientation quantitatively, the article undertakes an approximate calculation of the countries which are or have taken the path of socialist orientation. Methodologically, it is important to consider the phenomenon of socialist orientation in the developing world in broad terms. It is not correct to confine it to the countries which officially declared the acceptance of the scientific socialism. The socialist orientation, like many other social phenomena, may be described in terms of polyformism. The polyformism is seen in specific forms of internal development and it concerns ideology, political organisation and economic policy. There is dissimilarity also in the foreign policy of these countries. In other words, in considering the socialist orientation, as a whole, the article argues for a broad concept of "unity in diversity" (or "in polyformism"). Though the ideology of socialist orientation is rather complicated and contradictory, the scientific socialism is still the most influential factor in its formation. There is a difference between the declaration of acceptance of the scientific socialism and actual policies that are being pursued. It is suggested that the socialist orientation may not be a pure Marxist development, but if it assumes an anti-Marxist garb it stops being socialist. Special attention is paid to the economic aspect of the socialist orientation. It is emphasised that only after having developed its productive forces, can the country of socialist orientation implement the declared socialist ideals. The duration of the period of socialist orientation will be rather longer than was previously contemplated just because of the underdevelopment of socio-economic forces of the countries concerned. The present transitional period of the countries of socialist orientation is not to be called a definite socio-economic formation (system) in Marxist terms. But in view of the long duration of this transitional period of the developing countries the article suggests that these countries may be regarded as belonging to the specific category of "metaformation" ("metasystem") or "quasiformation" ("quasisystem"), meaning that, wherever you attribute them, their specific complicated structure and prolonged state of evolution are all the same well acknowledged objective facts of life. The article maintains that this attribution is very important

methodologically, as it draws attention to the pluralistic, "polyformed" and contradictory aspects of the structures and gives a deeper insight into the developing world of these societies, in general, and the trend of socialist orientation, in particular.

TRADITIONAL EXCHANGE IN THE SAVANNA OF THE NIGER RIVER

V.R. ARSENYEV

The relations of economic exchange and their social forms and implications are of special interest, for they constitute the interaction of the basis and superstructure phenomena, as reflected in social processes.

Drawing on his personal experience of work in West Sudan among Bambara, the author interprets the relations of exchange as a factor integrating various sources of aggregate social product (agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting, crafts, etc.) into a uniform economic system. The reproduction of this system is subject to unity of production, distribution/redistribution and consumption.

In the basic region under review the subsistence economy and commodity-money relations, being two basic types of economic structure, operate and mingle simultaneously within the framework of a uniform traditional economy. The principal taxonomic unit of the natural exchange operations is kafo, a group of villages (dugu) with a uniform "local market." This system oriented towards the interests of local producers is regarded as the internal exchange.

The external exchange had been oriented towards the Mediterranean from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries. It has been oriented towards Europe since the late seventeenth century.

The product here takes the form of commodity and calculation and exchange are carried out in conformity with their value in terms of money. Due to the gap between the value of the internal and external markets, the exchange and transactions produced a specific kind of surplus product. It ensured the interests of the trade groups diula and served largely as a precondition and source of economic activity of the primitive political units of the region.

In the present-day context the exchange acts as an agent of commodity-money relations and establishes these relations in all spheres of production.

CASTE AND MARRIAGE IN SOUTH INDIA

A.A. GENDIN

The article is an attempt to analyse statistically matrimonial advertisements published in the South Indian English-language newspaper "Hindu" (Madras) in the early 1980s. The information an advertisement includes (caste, age, education, religion, employment, income etc.) allows to ascertain the impact of the caste factor on marriage in modern India.

The evidence presented in the article demonstrates that in terms of education, income and some other characteristics those giving matrimonial advertisements are better off by far as compared to an average Indian. It makes it all the more important to take into account the role played by the caste factor in selecting a would-be husband or wife, for 97.5 per cent of Hindus thought it proper to indicate their caste.

Christians also observe caste hierarchy in their matrimonial advertisements. The bulk of advertisers mention this or that stipulation regarding the caste. Only 12.1 percent of males and 4.4 percent of females state that caste does not matter.

The article discusses in greater detail the manifestation of the caste factor in traditional social groups (Brahmans, Non-Brahmans, Untouchables) and among Christians and Moslems. It is suggested that joint political activities of various castes expand the potential pool of future marriage partners. The information gathered does not confirm the widespread view that modern education erodes the traditional scale of values in a caste society.

The article also touches upon the methodology of investigating matrimonial advertisements as a source of study.

GENERALIZATION IN THE CHINESE CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY

A.I. KOBZEV

The article defines the classical Chinese philosophy as naturalistic in substance and that of belles lettres in form. It is based on the numerological methodology, operates a rather compact and well structured number of symbolic categories and is integrally linked with science. Numerology, as a methodological foundation and alternative to the formal logic of the West, is a universal theoretical system of a specifically interrelated geometrical and numerical structures.

The article gives preference to the central epistemological procedure, i.e. to a generalization which assumes specific characteristics within the framework of the numerological methodology. It implies a quantitative ranging of generalized objects and singling out the major object, the representative (a representative abstraction), without specifying its ideal characteristics. The act of representation entails an evaluation and selection, i.e. it implies a subsequent axiologization of the entire system of notions and terminology, which is a distinctive feature of the Chinese philosophy. The article examines at length such notions as chi (ultimate) t'ai chi (great ultimate), tao (way), kung (common), kung-l (general) to illustrate these phenomena.

The axiological generalization found its natural expression in symbolic categories and in the fact that the Chinese classical philosophy had acquired the form of belles letters. The symbol, like the image in arts, is always concrete and unique. But at the same time, it manifests itself as a representative of the whole multiplicity of similar phenomena, representing them individually (cf. a literary character, common noun, etc.). Fundamentally, the polysemy of the Chinese philosophical symbols accounts

for the fact that they have formed a numerically limited but a well organized group of categories.

MYTHOLOGICAL PROTECTOR OF PRIMEVAL CULTIVATORS IN THE EAST

Ye.V. ANTONOVA

The article offers interpretation of the Middle Eastern anthropomorphic statues of primeval cultivators. They are often believed to be statues of Gods. It is especially common to treat them as figures of a female God, or "Mother Goddess." The article, however, maintains that these statues have to do with family and clan patrons which largely had the features of deceased relatives. Spirits of the dead related to the world of nature, including earth, socially were taken by those related to each other by birth as helpful in all walks of life. These spirits "helped" people to multiply, took care of their fields and cattle, kept evil spirits away and acted as mediators in their relations with spirits of nature.

At the same time, the spirits inhabiting the world of nature were never depicted as statues. They were worshipped locally in their own image. The rituals associated with water were performed by the waterside, those with earth in fields and at crevices in the ground and so forth. Artifacts of the first civilisations are evidence of the fact that the figures of Gods are of late origin. In Mesopotamia they date back to the second half of the third millennium B.C. when the state was at least one thousand years old. In the later period the statues of Gods were not too numerous either. The anthropomorphic statues, bas-reliefs and drawings included rather images of mortals, praying people, kings or priests performing rituals.

The copious ethnographic data, primarily the one coming from the Central Asia, allow to judge as to the actual forms of the ritual use of the primeval cultivators' statues. They were used in family rituals in which the principal part was played by women.

CHINESE IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA: INVESTIGATION INTO THE ETHNIC AND CULTURAL SITUATION

S.R. LAINGER

The article deals with the ethnic situation in the South East Asia with a special reference to the Chinese immigrant community. It is emphasised that the investigation into the situation in the region and its genesis implies an analysis of ethnic and cultural stereotypes, notably the traditional Chinese attitude to the emigration as an undesirable and hence temporary phenomenon. Each individual, due to the predominance of the clan and family relations, regarded himself as a member of his clan in China. This had a bearing on his subsequent social behavior and his negative attitude towards assimilation.

The emergence of the Chinese overseas community was accompanied by the formation of a system of group preferences. These preferences had to do with all walks of life of the immigrant (relations within the family, religious situation, employment). Considerations of social prestige has a great say in

social matters. They determined the selection of a spouse; incidentally, the interests of a group rather than those of an individual were primarily taken into account in this case.

The article draws the conclusion that the Chinese immigrant community has grown into a factor of integration and anti-assimilation. Moreover, it has become capable of assimilating indigenous ethnoses which come under its influence.

Raising the problem of community's heterogeneity, the article reaches the conclusion that different dialects spoken within the community do not affect adversely the consolidation of the community, as a whole.

The article also refers to the secret societies operating within the community, specific traditional corporations, as factors fostering ethnic and cultural integration.

The article touches upon the problem of marginal elements as regards the Chinese overseas community and notes the adverse effect of certain ethnic stereotypes. It underlines the fact that the community and the individual are success-oriental. The diversified nature of the community in social, economic and cultural terms enhances its vitality.

The article also discusses the position of the half-breeds (Baba, etc.) and the specific features of their assimilation.

In conclusion the article highlights both the impact of the Chinese cultural tradition and the social environment upon the ethnic and cultural situation within the community. The mingling of these two influences (of the Chinese cultural tradition and that of the social environment) gave rise to a peculiar cultural synthesis of the Chinese and Non-Chinese elements, which not only endowed the Chinese overseas community with new characteristics but produced a specific population, a new ethnic and social entity.

P. YA. CHAADAYEV'S LETTER DEALING WITH INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The letter of the prominent Russian philosopher Peter Chaadayev (1794-1856) to the French Catholic scholar Baron Ferdinand d'Eckstein (1790-1861), dated April 15, 1836, deals with the analysis of d'Eckstein's views on the ancient Indian philosophy, notably the "Katha-Upanishad."

Assessing highly the philosophical thought of ancient India, the Russian philosopher regards its achievements as an indication of the substantially uniform aspiration for truth which manifests itself in its own way in different civilisations and underlies the human morality and culture.

The letter suggests that the acquaintance with the Indian philosophical tradition would be beneficial for the further evolution of the European philosophy.

The commentary accompanying the letter is an attempt to probe into the P. Chaadayev's attitude towards the Indian civilisation. It tries to identify

his views on the subject and place them in the context of his metaphysical and historical ideas. The commentary also attempts to draw a parallel between the philosophical ideas of P. Chaadayev and the evolution of the Indian philosophical and historical thought of the nineteenth century.

Up until now the letter was believed to be lost. It is published both in the original French and in the Russian translation.

Translation from the French and Introduction by M.I. Chemerisskaya
Commentary by Ye.B. Rashkovskiy

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KIM OUTLINES AREAS OF RESEARCH FOR SOVIET ORIENTALISTS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 3-12

[Article by G.F. Kim: "The 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of Soviet Oriental Studies"]

[Excerpts] An innovative and truly revolutionary approach to urgent problems and trends in the development of human society, clearly expressed in the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress, and the development of a scientifically based program for the accelerated socio-economic development of our country based on the modern scientific and technical revolution--all of this places enormous tasks before Soviet science, including Oriental studies. "At the focal point of party theoretical thought today," said M.S. Gorbachev at the congress, "is a complex group of problems arising out of the modern and critical nature of the development of our society and the world overall. The multifaceted tasks of acceleration and its interconnected aspects--political, economic, scientific and technical, social, cultural, spiritual and psychological--are in need of further deep and all-embracing study." (Footnote 1) (Materials of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1986, pp 84-85.)

New and fundamentally important tasks in this regard arise before Soviet Oriental studies as well.

As is well known, Oriental studies comprehensively studies a specific group of world countries. Historically, the delineation of Oriental studies into a separate realm of knowledge in the last century was aided by the extreme scarcity of knowledge on the Orient among Europeans. At the same time as a process of differentiation into various narrow realms of knowledge and special disciplines was typical of human sciences overall, Oriental studies preserved their primordial integrity, since only basic material was being accumulated, becoming a particular and specific subdivision of social science. Oriental studies has currently still not dissolved into other areas of study. Having obtained the opportunity of being based on the achievements of other ("differentiated") sciences, it has preserved therein the historically extant integrity of the view of social processes.

It should be acknowledged, however, that the high potential implicit in mutual supplementation, comprehensiveness and differentiation is still not at all

utilized completely by our scholars. The assimilation and employment of methods of research that organically combine the depth of concrete analysis with the breadth of an interdisciplinary approach is a topical task for Orientalists in light of the requirements advanced by the party. The creative development of Marxist-Leninist methodology for studying social and political processes, on the one hand, and the accumulated baggage of concrete analysis, on the other, make it possible to place great tasks before Soviet Oriental scholars. In this article, I touch on the most important of the topical problems of historical research and the modern situation and economy of the countries of Asia and North Africa.

* * *

In the realm of the history of the Oriental countries, the principal theoretical problems that remain in dispute and unresolved are associated with finding the correct correlation of the general laws and the specific features of the historical development of the region under study.

The fundamental thesis of the unity of a worldwide historical process is one of the cornerstones of Marxist historical study. At the same time, to the extent that knowledge is being accumulated, it is becoming ever more clear that the Asian countries have had certain, moreover substantial, typological distinctions from the countries of Western Europe at all stages of their history.

In addressing the methodological problems of Asian history, Soviet specialists proceed from the necessity of a deep analysis of the materials of the Asian countries of the Marxist study on formations--the foundations of historical materialism that are today subject to especially furious attack on the part of bourgeois scholars. Along with this, it is exceedingly important to study attentively the effect of traditional factors on the current situation in the Afro-Asian countries, the unique "determinative nature" of many substantive features of the life of Eastern countries in their history and past.

The topicality of Orientalist research is not determined, of course, by "chronology." It does not signify an orientation exclusively toward events or processes that are current or close in time to them. The fact is that in the actual life of the East, it is impossible to understand, the more so to explain, "the modern" without a deep study of history.

In studying, for example, the formational development of Eastern countries, specialists on the ancient Orient have recently uncovered a series of substantive features of the societies under analysis compared to the ancient ones. Without refraining from ascribing the ancient Eastern societies to the slave-holding formation, the Soviet scholars have at the same time demonstrated that in the ancient Orient, the labor of free producers predominated, and slave-holding was just one form of socio-economic structure; furthermore, the substance of the concept of "slavery" itself was different and distinct from ancient slavery. The process of accumulating data and interpreting it has not yet been finished, and much thoughtful analytical work remains to be done in this area.

The specific features of the social order of the Orient in the Middle Ages ("Oriental Feudalism") has been studied to a much greater extent. These specific features reduce to a different relationship between private and state (centralized) exploitation, a different structure for the ruling class, a different role for the commune and the like than in Western Europe. Nonetheless, an integral concept of "Oriental Feudalism" has still not been created. The fundamentally important question of what stage of feudalism the Oriental countries were at in the 17th century, that is, the extent of schism in the formational development of the West and the East and the potential for the independent conversion of the Asian countries to capitalism, is unclear.

With the advent of the era of capitalism, the position of the East in the world changed, and the independence and endogeneity of its development were sharply reduced. The problem of the relationship of the general and the specific, however, stands before the Eastern historian as it did before. How did the establishment and development of capitalism as a worldwide historical formation occur? What are the general laws of the "secondary" and "tertiary" appearances of capitalistic relations under the effect of an external factor--the influences of the capitalistic West on the Afro-Asian countries? By the way, the question, cardinal for the new and latest history of the Orient, of the historical role of colonialism, is connected with these issues.

Capitalism is distinct from preceding formations in that it creates a world system in which the division of the center and the periphery is reproduced at every stage of its development. Colonialism in this sense should be considered as a mechanism for advancing capitalism overall.

A dialectical approach to studying the "mother country--colony" system is essential. Theories of the "dependent development of capitalism" in the Afro-Asian region try to find an answer for the question of how this system arose and is operating in these countries. The active role of the "dependent" periphery in it is frequently underestimated, however, as is the circumstance that this system does not stand still and in its reproduction at the highest level changes the very substance of the concept of "dependence."

The role of colonies should not be understood simplistically, seeing them only as the source of raw materials and resources pumped to the mother country. The flow of the population to the colonies, which created a favorable demographic situation for industrialization in Europe, had no less significance in the establishment and development of Western capitalism. It must also be kept in mind that however "dependent" capitalism was in the colonies, not all of their economies were rigidly tied to the mother country and the world capitalist order. Processes of synthesis of colonial and precolonial structures occurred in the colonies. The concrete study of these processes is just beginning today.

The national-liberation movement overall is the outcome of the development of capitalist relations in the colonies and is, in the most general form, a bourgeois phenomenon. Various trends, however, often coexist and are oddly interwoven in this movement. As regards the past periods, similar situations have been studied quite well. A "feudal nationalism," for example, was typical of the ideology of anticolonial movements in the 19th century, which

came out under the banner of a return to the old precolonial order. It is also well known that the ideologies of a number of national-liberation movements combined democratic and conservative features. These movements overall were progressive for the period, when strictly national-liberation movements using democratic slogans had not yet taken shape.

Currently, however, it is impossible to ignore the fact that in several anti-imperialist movements the relationship of progressive and conservative factors has been altered in favor of the latter. Anti-imperialism in these movements frequently coexists with anticomunism and antisovietism, and an appeal to religion is used to incite the masses to battle, not for democracy, but for the establishment of a theocratic regime. A strengthening of the activeness of obscurantist forces in liberation movements is the reverse side of the penetration of the progressive ideas of our times into the countries of the Orient. Internal reaction, frightened by this, fights for the expulsion of everything "Western"—from the intervention of the Western states to Marxism.

The specific nature of mass movements in the countries of Asia and Africa testifies to the fact that in order to understand them, and the more so to forecast their development, a deep study of their history is essential. This is also especially important because the presence of specific features both in the ancient and middle-ages and the modern societies of the Orient are frequently utilized as the basis of a thesis of the supposedly inapplicable nature of formational analysis to the Orient, as well as that historical materialism could supposedly serve as a tool for understanding the general laws of historical development in European countries alone.

For the further development of the theory of the historical development of mankind overall, it is essential to renounce Eurocentrism in formulating the essence of the stages that mankind passes through in the precolonial period, as well as transferring the general laws of purely European history to worldwide history. Not only a diachronic division of the historical process (into stages of development, formations), but a synchronic and regional one as well (by types, lines of development), are theoretically well founded. The study and analysis of the specific features of development that occur within the framework of universal general laws should be the direction of further theoretical work in the realm of the history of Oriental countries. As far as can be determined today, typical of Oriental countries were:

- the extensive development of productive forces, an increase in the productivity of the land without growth in the productivity of labor and a different role for human labor in the system of productive forces than in Europe;
- comparatively low rates of socio-economic change;
- a very gradual nature for the transition from stage to stage, the "lubricating nature" of the periods of social revolution, and the prolonged retention of remnants of the old formation in the new one;
- a lag in the results of the noted specific features (compared to the West) of reaching the line of the genesis of capitalism;

--the imposition of various stages on each other characteristic of the "classical" development of capitalism, an imbalance of transformations in various spheres of social life and an enclave nature of new relations under conditions of a society that is overall not transformed;

--the expansion of possibilities for the transition of comparatively poorly developed countries onto the path of socialism or a socialist orientation.

Research demonstrates that in the 1970s the role of the developing countries in world production increased. In the course of the structural energy and raw-materials crisis, the dependence of the imperialist states on raw-material supplies from the former colonial periphery was strengthened. Many foreign companies and concessions were nationalized, prices for raw materials were raised, the role of the liberated countries that were industrial exporters grew, and the group of oil-exporting countries came to hold a monopoly on income and be a major exporter of capital to the West. The developed capitalist world was forced to begin a dialogue apropos of a new international economic order. All of this seriously undermined the system of neocolonial exploitation.

According to the aggregate of qualitative indicators, however, the lag of the developing countries from the centers of capitalism did not decline, and their situation as the dependent periphery of the world capitalist order was preserved. Moreover, as early as the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, a new situation began to take shape in the world capitalist order. The slowing of the economic growth rate in the center of the world capitalist order and the weakening of its dependence on supplies of energy and raw-material resources and some types of industrial products from the developing countries as a consequence of the incorporation of resource-conserving technology led to a substantial worsening of the external conditions for reproduction in the developing countries, a relative drying up of export income and colossal growth in foreign debt, a strengthening of instability and in the end result a slowing of their economic development. Imperialism was able to organize its own form of counteroffensive against the developing countries. The current negative trends will apparently be preserved in the future, and this will lead soonest of all to a slowing of the growth and structural rebuilding of the economies of the developing countries.

The establishment of capitalism in the countries of Asia and Africa also has a socio-political aspect. The concept developed by Soviet scholars of a synthesis of the traditional and modern at various stages of history is of substantial importance for the further development of study of social and economic formations and can serve as a tool for researching the process of modern formational transition in the East. Within the framework of these concepts, the transitional phases of development, distinguished by the interweaving and coexistence of formally heterogeneous structural elements at all "stories" of society--from the foundation to the superstructure--are subjected to comprehensive analysis. Such a methodological approach has made it possible to explain many features of the modern stage of socio-political evolution of the countries of the East. It should be emphasized that the concept of synthesis in social development can, we are convinced, be useful in

the analysis of a series of disputed issues that are not subject to resolution if we proceed from conditions typical of the mature phase of formational development. In this regard, the various classes and segments of modern Oriental society are subject to special study: the proletariat, the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the lowest urban segments, the ruling elite and the peasantry. An important step forward was taken in researching the influence of Islam, as well as Buddhism, on the social life of the modern Orient. Our knowledge of the specific nature of the party and political structure of the states in the zone of the national-liberation movements has become considerably deeper. The completion of a major work on problems in the development of the communist movement in the countries of Asia and Africa was a substantial contribution to the fulfillment of the tasks posed to Soviet Oriental studies by the party.

As is well known, many countries of the Orient are rocked by ethnic and international conflicts. The interests of various classes and the opposition of world systems are reflected in them to a certain extent, of course, but their essence is defined by the struggle for privilege by this or that community (caste, creed or ethnic group), a struggle in which there is a large element of the Middle Ages. In the political sphere of the countries developing along the capitalist path, parties coming forth with programs that claim to express the interests of these or those social class coalitions battle among themselves. Upon close inspection, however, the political parties frequently turn out to be conglomerates of groupings with the most varied and most often narrowly selfish interests, in the activities of which the definition of feudal methods of ensuring truth are retained.

Much has been done in studying the socio-political aspects of the modern development of the Orient and its general and specific laws. The complexity of the object itself, however, along with the dynamic nature of the situation and the necessity of taking into account the latest events, places ever newer tasks before researchers. It is essential, in particular, to set about developing the criteria of social progress when employed with regard to the modern conditions of the Oriental countries. This is a basic task which has serious theoretical and practical significance. A comprehensive social class analysis of society overall should follow the study of individual classes and segments.

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We spoke above of how material it is to take into account the enormous role of traditions in all spheres of life in modern Oriental society. It is essential to dwell specifically on this issue. The "tradition factor" is an extremely capacious and multifaceted concept. It also includes the level of social well-being, the level of public consciousness, and the retention of obsolete forms of exploitation of a pre-capitalist type in the Asian and African countries, tribal structures, elements of pre-bourgeois political culture, stereotypes of traditional consciousness (religious beliefs, cults, moral proscriptions, values etc.). It can be said that one of the axes of ideological struggle in these countries is associated with the problem of synthesizing the traditional and the modern.

Much attention has been devoted lately to the tradition factor in the works of Soviet Orientalists. Works have come out on the traditional sectors in the economy, Eastern religions and ideological tendencies for which an appeal to the legacy of the past is typical. (Footnote 4) (See, for example: "Traditsionnye strukturny i ekonomicheskiy rost v Indii" [Traditional Structures and Economic Growth in India]. Moscow; 1984; L.B. Alayev. "Selskaya obshchina v Severnoy Indii" [The Rural Community in Northern India]. Moscow, 1981; "Sovremennyy natsionalizm i obshchestvennoye razvitiye zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [Modern Nationalism and Social Development in the Foreign East]. Moscow, 1978; V.G. Khoros. "Ideynyye techeniya narodnicheskogo tipa v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh" [Ideological Tendencies of a Nationalist Type in the Developing Countries]. Moscow, 1981; L.S. Vasilyev. "Istoriya religiy Vostoka" [History of Religion in the East]. Moscow, 1983; et al.) It seems nonetheless that an underestimation of the tradition factor is still frequently encountered in our research. This is manifested, for example, is somewhat of an exaggeration of the extent of socio-economic and class differentiation in Eastern societies, in an approach to the analysis of the political institutions of the modern Orient--parties, parliaments, state institutions etc.--according to the standards and prototypes of the developed countries, and in the unilateral evaluation of the tradition factor as being just a brake on the modernization of the Afro-Asian countries.

These problems have more than academic significance. They are part of that ideological, and not just ideological, "struggle for the third world" that is being waged in the Western countries, a struggle against the revolutionizing influence of the world socialist system on the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies. In the works of bourgeois sociologists and political scientists, "traditionality" in the liberated states is a constituent element of "development models" that are proposed for these countries and are described both as a "stabilizer for the modernization process" (S. Eisenstadt) and "the direct agent of bourgeois development" (F. Riggs, R. Bella). Neocolonialism is ready to accept any forms of "cultural originality" for Asia and Africa, as long as they do not interfere with the establishment of the bourgeois order, on the one hand, and serve as a spiritual tool against "the communist threat," on the other. Our Orientalists are called to oppose these concepts with deep objective Marxist analysis of the exceedingly broad, complicated and dialectically contradictory problem of the tradition factor in today's Orient.

First and foremost, the study of traditional attitudes and ideas and cultural attributes should be deepened substantially. The cultural-studies aspect in the research of Eastern cultures and civilizations is becoming a vital requirement of science not only on a historical plane, but for a sounder understanding of modern times as well. Without including the cultural context in research, it is impossible to consider the development of the Oriental countries in the channel of Marxist-Leninist theory of socio-economic formations. Any formation takes shape from a group of preconditions: economic, social, legal, political, ideological and cultural. Culture therein is not simply a realm of spiritual production, an added-on phenomenon, but rather one part of the framework of the base order, a unique form of "ground floor" for the social building. In the sphere of culture, the basic values

and incentives for the labor activity of man as the most important component of productive forces, along with the motives for peoples' behavior, are being worked out.

We will touch on religion, for example, which has long had an enormous effect in Oriental civilizations and to a certain extent continues to retain its position today as well. Thus, during the Iranian revolution of 1979-80, the clergy from the beginning stimulated the anti-monarchical and anti-imperialistic aspirations of the broad masses, and then facilitated the ratification of power of the Islamic theocracy and regressive trends in the economic, political and cultural life of the country. Aside from a dependence on a final evaluation of the role of the Shiite clergy in the Iranian revolution, it can be said that its history has demonstrated the necessity of a serious study of the dialectically contradictory role of the "tradition factor" (including religion) in the development process in the liberated countries. And this relates not only to Islam, but to Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions as well.

Or take the problem of using community structures in the process of non-capitalist development. K. Marx and F. Engels considered this at one time. This idea is current among a number of modern national leaders and ideologists in Asia and Africa. Our literature expresses differing points of view apropos of the synthesis of community solidarity and socialist collectivism in non-capitalist development. But there is still no serious research on this theme that thoroughly analyzes historical experience. This work would have great significance, moreover, for understanding the prospects for national democracy in the liberated countries.

In light of the synthesis of the traditional and modern, it can be said that the search for solutions to the problems of social progress in the East, the theoretical interpretation of the essence of national-democratic revolutions and a considered and realistic evaluation of the opportunities of their outgrowth in popular-democratic revolutions are acquiring new facets. In order to understand the essence of the struggle for social progress in the Orient, an analysis of the historically changing relationship between revolution and reform in social life is exceptionally important. Without this, an adequate evaluation of the role of the liberated countries in the world revolutionary process is impossible.

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The region of foreign Asia includes one developed capitalist country--Japan. Its study has, of course, particular problems. Analysis of the socio-economic development of this country has been conducted largely along two major interconnected directions: the mechanism of the functioning of the state-monopoly capitalism of Japan and the problems of realizing the achievements of scientific and technical progress have been studied. Research on the forming of the socio-economic structure of the modern Japanese village has been completed at the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The task of comprehensively studying the transition process of Japan from an extensive to an intensive development model on both a macro- and a micro-economic level has already become a topical one. The study of problems in

training personnel and organizing labor at Japanese enterprises, as well as the changes that are occurring in the social-welfare system under the conditions of the "aging of the nation," is projected. Taking into account the reinforcement of the positions of Japanese imperialism in the world arena to the extent that its economic might has grown, as well as the activation of reactionary tendencies in the domestic and foreign policy of Japan, the researchers have devoted attention to an analysis to the sources of the motive forces and the specific features of Japanese militarism and revanchism. The problem of nationalism was studied herein not only as a factor of domestic policy, but from the angle of foreign ideological expansion. Under conditions of a strengthening of militaristic tendencies in the domestic and foreign policy of Japan, the study of the process of the resurrection of Japanese militarism and an evaluation of the role and place of Japan in the global system of international relations is of undoubted topicality.

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The study of countries that adhere to a socialist orientation has great scientific and practical significance. The path of socialist orientation, as emphasized in the new version of the CPSU Program, "meets the genuine interests and aspirations of the popular masses, reflects their striving for a just social order and coincides with the main direction of historical development." (Footnote 5) (Materials of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p 136.) The criteria for the maturity of the social processes occurring in these countries on both objective and subjective planes is an exceptionally important theoretical problem on which the attention of Soviet scholars is riveted.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism, as is well known, did not exclude the possibility of the appearance of mass movements of social protest and political upheavals under conditions of the insufficient maturity of the subjective factor, especially of the necessary consciousness and level of organization of the revolutionary classes. This specific feature of the social-liberation struggle has been reflected today in the political practice of post-colonial societies. The dramatic lessons of the incomplete or deeply deformed social revolutions in a number of countries indicate the decisive significance of socio-political leadership and, after the victory of the revolution, state power in the struggle for a socialist orientation.

The experience in progressive transformations that has already been accumulated today by countries with a socialist orientation is an important contribution to the history of mankind. In the socialist-oriented countries, the positions of the large bourgeoisie and landowners have been eliminated or significantly undermined, the state has commanding height in the economy, some of the peasantry is encompassed in cooperation and the private sector is under state control and subordinate to the resolution of nationwide tasks. The state carries out the leading role in the production and utilization of the social product. In a number of countries, the state sector is the principal producer and consumer of goods and services. The foundations of national planning have been laid.

For a number of objective and subjective reasons, however, the efficiency of the economic mechanism in the countries with non-capitalist development is still low. The improvement of this mechanism is essential in order to impart an irreversible nature to the socialist orientation. Researching problems associated with this is among the paramount tasks of scholars.

One of the central areas of scientific and technical work in Oriental studies is the study of the experience of the establishment and development of new social and economic formations in the socialist countries of Asia. Especial attention is devoted to research on Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam and Laos in the general laws and specific national features of the construction of the economic foundation of socialism and the summarization of the experience accumulated by these countries in creating the material and technical base of a new society, the implementation of socialist industrialization, the socialist transformation of the village, the transfer of the economy onto the rails of planning and the resolution of social problems in the socialist restructuring of society and cultural revolution. Our Orientalists are carrying out the development of problems of socialism in Asia in close contact with scholars from other socialist countries. It is proposed in the future to concentrate attention on thorough research of the features of the transitional period in the countries under study, and first and foremost in the realm of socio-political and cultural construction, as well as issues in the further reinforcement and development of integrated processes in the sphere of economic collaboration among socialist countries.

In recent years, Soviet Orientalists have made the study of central problems in the foreign-policy course of the liberated states of Asia and North Africa more active. This has made it possible to uncover in detail the role of the liberated countries in the struggle to avert nuclear war and for peaceful coexistence. At the same time, questions of international relations in the Afro-Asian region require more intensive attention. In light of the tenets of the new draft of the CPSU Program, the socio-economic preconditions of the non-aligned movement should be researched more deeply, along with its ideological and political sources associated with the interaction of national, regional and international interests. It is extremely important to organize the scientific forecasting of the prospects for the evolution of this movement and to determine its potentialities in the struggle to avert nuclear war and for universal and complete disarmament on a global scale.

Among the paramount tasks of Soviet Orientalists are deeper research on the significance of collaboration of the liberated countries with world socialism, and first and foremost with the Soviet Union. It is necessary therein to raise the effectiveness of scientific criticism of the anti-Marxist concepts of foreign Sovietologists who distort the policies of the USSR with respect to the countries of the East. It should be demonstrated, in particular, that the USSR and the other countries of socialism, as opposed to the imperialist states, has an objective interest in the independent development of the liberated countries and are constructing their relations with them on the basis of principles of internationalism. The union of socialist and liberated states rests on a solid foundation and is a long-term factor of international life. The relations of the socialist countries with the non-aligned states go beyond the bounds of general principles of peaceful coexistence. They are

constructed on the basis of anti-imperialism and the struggle against neocolonialism and for peace, democracy and social progress. Under conditions where imperialism and its agents are constantly creating a threat to the security of many liberated countries, the assistance rendered by the USSR and the other socialist states in the defense of national sovereignty and in opposition to imperialist policies of aggression and dictate has especial significance.

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Great tasks arise in the realm of Eastern studies that is called the "classic cycle" in light of the principal documents of the 27th CPSU Congress. These tasks are worthy of special discussion; here we will only touch on some issues. We will note, in particular, the importance of studying how the social and artistic experience of the Soviet Union and the countries of the bourgeois West are perceived in modern literature. Along with an analysis of the very essence of this phenomenon, it is necessary to uncover the specific forms of foreign influence on the literature of the Afro-Asian peoples and the reflections of the realities of the two worlds opposed to each other in the creation of the cultural figures of the Afro-Asian countries, and to describe the ideological and political struggle against the problems arising on this basis.

Under modern conditions, the international significance of social and cultural processes taking place in the East is growing steadily. It is necessary in this regard to continue work on studying the languages of the peoples of the East and to describe as yet unstudied national languages. The theoretical problems of social linguistics are in need of further development, taking into account the complex national-language, socio-political, cultural and ideological processes that are occurring in the post-colonial period.

The development of Oriental textual and source study and the research and publication of literary texts of the peoples of the Orient are called upon to raise the professional level of research and enrich our knowledge regarding the less-studied periods of the history of the Asian countries, as well as problems of the cultural development of peoples. Especial attention has been devoted herein to the scholarly publication of texts that are topical in light of the modern ideological struggle.

In the near future, the development of new directions in research should be begun and new or insufficiently developed scholarly specialties in this country should be created and replenished. These are such disciplines, for example, as social anthropology and cultural studies with regard to regions that our science is now occupied with, such as social psychology, the problems of family and clan relations and the like. All of this will require a substantial reconsideration of the structure of Oriental studies, a certain re-orientation of scientific personnel and the incorporation of new forms and methods of scientific research, including those based on mathematical methods and the use of computers.

Oriental studies, as we have noted, arose as, and remains, an integrated science. It has certain traditions of interdisciplinary research. But today

the discussion concerns another and higher level of such research, where for the scientific development of the key problems, a combination of the efforts of different groups of scholars is essential. Orientalists must conduct their inquiry in close contact with historians, legal scholars, political scientists and, of course, economists, developing the fundamental problems in the history and modern development of the liberated countries in conjunction with them.

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DEVELOPING STATES: PITFALLS ON SOCIALIST ORIENTATION PATH

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[Article by V.F. Vasilev: "Several Questions of Socialist Orientation"]

[Text] As indicated in the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress, one of the new and important phenomena of world development is the socialist orientation of a number of liberated countries. Soviet researchers have achieved undoubted successes in interpreting this problem as the problem of a choice of development path of a number of countries and peoples and the transition to socialism, bypassing the stage of the reign of a capitalist mode of production, and the problem of revolutionary strategy and tactics in the developing world. Much literature on this theme has been created in the USSR in the last 15-20 years. (Footnote 1) (Among Soviet research on the problems of socialist orientation we cite: "Nekapitalisticheskiy put razvitiya Afriki" [The Non-Capitalist Path of African Development]. Moscow, 1967; "Gosudarstvo sotsialisticheskoy oriyentatsii" [The Socialist-Oriented State]. Moscow, 1975; G.B. Starushchenko. Sotsialisticheskaya oriyentatsiya v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh" [Socialist Orientation in Developing Countries]. Moscow, 1977; A.V. Kiva. "Strany sotsialisticheskaya oriyentatsiya" [The Socialist-Oriented Countries]. Moscow, 1978; "Sotsialisticheskaya oriyentatsiya osvobodivshikhsya stran" [Socialist Orientation of Liberated Countries]. Moscow, 1982; "Teoreticheskiye problemy perekhoda k sotsializmu stran s nerazvitoj ekonomikoy" [Theoretical Problems of Transition to Socialism in Countries with an Undeveloped Economy]. Editor-in Chief A.P. Butenko. Moscow, 1983; V.I.F. Li. "Sotsialnaya revolyutsiya i vlast v stranakh Vostoka" [Social Revolution and Power in the Countries of the East]. Moscow, 1984; "Afrika. Strany sotsialisticheskoy oriyentatsii v revolyutsionnom protsesse" [Africa. The Socialist-Oriented Countries in the Revolutionary Process]. Moscow, 1984; "Politicheskiye sistemy v stranakh sotsialisticheskoy oriyentatsii" [Political Systems in Socialist-Oriented Countries]. Moscow, 1985. Works of a general Eastern-studies nature are also affiliated with it, in which a large place is devoted to an analysis of the revolutionary process in the Afro-Asian world: "Klassy i klassovaya borba v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh. T. III. Vybor puti" [Classes and Class Struggle in the Developing Countries. Vol. 3. Choice of Path]. Moscow, 1967; "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoye dvizheniye v Azii i Afrike. Na novom puti" [The National-Liberation Movement in Asia and Africa. On a New Path]. Moscow, 1968; R.A. Ulyanovskiy. "Sotsializm i osvobodivshiyesy strany"

[Socialism and the Liberated Country]. Moscow, 1972; also "Ocherki natsionalno-osvoboditelnoy borby" [Sketches of the National-Liberation Struggle]. Moscow, 1976; K.N. Brutents. "Sovremennyye natsionalno-osvoboditelnyye revolyutsii" [Modern National-Liberation Revolutions]. Moscow, 1974; "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy" [The Developing Countries: General Laws, Trends and Prospects]. Moscow, 1974; "Zarubezhnyy Vostok i sovremenność" [The Foreign East and Modern Times]. In two volumes. Moscow, 1974; N.A. Simoniya. "Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiya" [The Countries of the East: Development Paths]. Moscow, 1975; G.I. Mirskiy. ""Tretiy mir." Obshchestvo, vlast, armiya" [The "Third World." Society, Power, Army]. Moscow, 1976; "Zarubezhnyy Vostok i sovremenność" [The Foreign east and Modern Times]. In two volumes. Moscow, 1980; V.G. Khoros. "Ideynyye techeniya narodnicheskogo tipa v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh" [Ideological Trends of a Nationalist Type in the Developing Countries]. Moscow, 1980; Ye.M. Primakov. "Vostok posle krakha kolonialnoy sistemy" [The East After the Downfall of the Colonial System]. Moscow, 1982; G.F. Kim. "Ot natsionalnogo osvobozeniya k sotsialnomu" [From National Liberation to Social]. Moscow, 1982; "Vostok. Rubezh 80-kh godov" [The East. The Boundary of the 1980s]. Moscow, 1983.) The historical and theoretical sources of the raising of problems in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the materials of the Comintern have been researched; experience in development along the non-capitalist path to socialism in Mongolia and the Soviet border regions has been summarized; the ideological, social and political foundations and forms for deepening the revolutionary process in a number of countries of Africa and foreign Asia that have chosen a socialist orientation have been reviewed; attempts have been made to type-classify these countries; especial attention is being devoted to the study of processes taking place in the countries whose ruling powers declare their conversion to the positions of scientific socialism (as noted, some of these countries present a "quite real and important reserve" "for the future expansion" of the world socialist system and "can become links of that system"). (Footnote 2) (See: "Teoreticheskiye problemy perekhoda k sotsializmu stran s nerazvitoj ekonomikoy" [Theoretical Problems of the Transition to Socialism in Countries with an Undeveloped Economy], pp 3,5.)

At the same time, it is hardly possible to state that the theoretical problems of socialist orientation have disappeared. This is a very complex and comprehensive question, and one way or another socialist orientation is associated with the most general conditions and general laws of world social development, reflecting to the full the contradictions and transitional nature of the modern era and the sharp struggle of two world socio-political systems. Life has posed and will continue to pose new questions that will be added to earlier and, it would seem, already resolved ones: issues of dispute inevitably arise, a satisfactory answer for which can only be given by time.

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As a particular direction of ideology and socio-economic and political development, socialist orientation in the developing world, existing for roughly a quarter of a century, has acquired considerable scope. Three countries in West Africa (Guinea, Ghana, Mali) were the first to declare the

selection of this course at the boundary of the 1950s and 1960s. Since the beginning of the 1960s, Egypt, Burma and Algeria have announced their socialist orientation. The largest number of countries entered onto the path of socialist orientation in the 1960s and 1970s. This process is continuing in the 1980s as well. Over the latest period, about 25 countries proclaimed a socialist orientation. (Footnote 3) (This number is variable, and moreover there exist differences of opinion in the definition and employment of the criteria of socialist orientation. In our opinion, they should include the following countries: Algeria (since June of 1962), Angola (since 1975), Benin (especially since the middle of the 1970s), Burma (since March of 1962), Burkina Faso (since August of 1983), Ghana (in 1960-1966, then since the end of December 1981), Guinea (since the end of the 1950s to April of 1984), Guinea-Bissau (since the middle of the 1970s), Grenada (from 1979 to October 1983), Egypt (from the beginning of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s), Cape Verde Islands (from the middle of the 1970s), Iraq (from the 1970s), Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (from the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s), Congo (since the middle and especially the end of the 1960s), Mauritius (since the beginning of the 1980s), Madagascar (since the middle of the 1970s), Mali (from 1960 to 1968, then in the 1970s), Mozambique (from the middle of the 1970s), Nicaragua (since 1979), Sao Tome and Principe (from the end of the 1970s), the Seychelles (from the boundary of the 1970s and 1980s), Syria (since the middle of the 1960s), Somalia (from 1969 to the end of the 1970s), Tanzania (since 1967), Ethiopia (since 1974) and Jamaica (since the beginning of the 1980s). In 1984-1985, the ruling party of Zimbabwe announced its intention to enter a course of building a society in the country based on the principles of scientific socialism.) Now, by the middle of the 1980s, it is possible to speak of roughly 15-17 countries of socialist orientation in Africa, Asia and Latin America, of which the overwhelming majority are African countries.

The diversity of the practical forms for the realization of socialist orientation must be emphasized. The countries proceeding along this path are of different types. Notwithstanding the fundamental similarity arising from the commonality of their historical fates, they are at different levels of economic, political and cultural development. This is manifested not only in the forms of internal development (whether one discusses ideology, political organization or economic policies), but also in the specific features of foreign policy. Some countries declare their ideological platform to be scientific socialism (while this has recently been actually demonstrated by Ethiopia, for example). There are also those who are under the influence of scientific socialism, but nonetheless do not fully accept it. The foreign policy of socialist-oriented countries also varies--from close contacts with world socialism to attempts to take a position of distinctive balance between world socialism and world capitalism. This instance of differentiation, heterogeneity and distinction among socialist-oriented countries is usually emphasized in considering the general course of the evolution of socialist orientation. (Footnote 4) (See, for example: "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy" [The Developing Countries: General Laws, Trends and Prospects], pp 416-423; A.V. Kiva. Indicated works, pp 38-51; "Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya osvobodivshikhsya stran" [Socialist Orientation of the Liberated Countries], pp 148-150.)

But notwithstanding differentiation and existing internal distinctions, the countries of socialist orientation under current conditions should be considered, in our opinion, within the framework of a unified concept. The existence of different opinions regarding the definition of the boundaries of socialist orientation and the presence of undoubted distinctions among the countries that have chosen this orientation do not eliminate the fact that at its foundation, socialist orientation is a quite clear type of phenomenon, a unity in diversity, and opposes its antipode--a capitalist orientation--in a completely well-defined manner. The socialist-oriented countries continue to be a sort of single wave, and those of them that declare their adherence to scientific socialism are at the crest of that wave.

How should socialist orientation be described in essence? What are its parameters, its ideological, socio-political and economic features? What position does it occupy in the modern world?

As noted in the new draft of the Party Program adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress, the revolutionary-democratic ruling parties in the socialist-oriented countries "are conducting a policy of eliminating the sway of imperialist monopolies, tribal aristocracy, feudal lords and reactionary bourgeoisie and in favor of reinforcing the state sector economics, encouraging cooperative advance in the village and raising the role of the working masses in economic and political life. Guarding against the onslaught of imperialism, these countries are expanding collaboration and the socialist states. The course they have chosen meets the genuine interests and aspirations of the popular masses, reflects their striving for a just social order and coincides with the main direction of historical development." (Footnote 5) (Materials of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1986, p 136.)

Socialist orientation is a national-revolutionary or revolutionary-democratic course of development that advances a program for movement toward a socialist society as a society of social justice and a society without the exploitation of man by man. The regime of socialist orientation is accompanied by structural anti-imperialist (anti-colonial), anti-feudal and anti-capitalist transformations and their policy is based primarily on the working masses. The ruling powers of the regime accept at least some of the tenets of the theory of scientific socialism and derives certain experience from world socialist practice, the existence of which is a most important objective condition for the appearance and development of socialist orientation.

A socialist orientation arises as a deepening of the anti-imperialist (anti-colonial) struggle or as a consequence of the rejection (this frequently occurs in the form of a military overthrow) of bourgeois or quasi-bourgeois political and economic institutions that remain in this or that liberated country as a legacy of the colonial era and are considered by the progressive forces of society as unacceptable for national conditions. It is expressed in anti-exploitative, and especially anti-imperialist (anti-capitalist) inclinations and tendencies of the working classes and parts of the middle classes, widely disseminated in the liberated countries today, unfortunate and thirsting for improvement in their situation. At the same time, socialist orientation arises under conditions of poor development, and sometimes even

the absence of a national bourgeoisie, which could head up and lead the movement of the given country along the path of capitalism. As for the ruling powers of the socialist-oriented regime, they are usually produced by the lower or middle parts of the middle classes (these are most often petty-bourgeois or lower-class elements). They are quite well acquainted with the situation and aspirations of the oppressed masses of workers in the village and the city, and at the same time are quite well educated, in order to take up progressive social ideas.

The countries of socialist orientation, as all developing countries, remain in the world capitalist economy, although in a special position, and are subject to its laws. But they do not belong to the political system of world capitalism, occupying a relatively stable intermediate position in that stage.

On an objective natural-history plane, socialist orientation is a particular form of modernization of the productive forces and socio-economic structure of a backward society. This is accomplished through the development of state and, in the course of time, cooperative foundations in the economy of the country and the broad political mobilization of the masses organized on a state-centralized basis, to whom the regime appeals and on which it is based, as we have already noted. Insofar as socialist orientation arises in a post-colonial, economically backward and basically peasant society, it first and foremost resolves remaining unresolved national-liberation and general democratic tasks, especially in creating the elements of the new productive forces—a condition of escaping from backwardness. The resolution of these tasks, if it proceeds successfully, simultaneously signifies the gradual creation of preconditions for intrinsically socialist development, for a transition to which is required, as already mentioned, a corresponding restructuring of the political and ideological forces of the country on a new and higher basis. Although the socialist-oriented regime limits and monitors the development of private-economy capitalism, the uniqueness of domestic and foreign conditions for its existence and development does not guarantee the resolution of the issue of "who does what to whom." In principle, a backward process in the direction of the establishment of a capitalist type of development is possible, in which the state and social foundation is transformed into capitalist statism, while the broad appeal to the masses is reduced to trite populism.

We will dwell on some complex, insufficiently developed and, possibly, most contentious aspects of socialist orientation.

First and foremost, we will take its ideology. It is undoubted that in content, structure and stages of evolution, it is of a complex and overall composite nature. Its principal components are: some tenets of scientific socialism; reformist conceptions of socialism; and, that which can be called a traditionalist complex. The interaction of these components, their "resultant force," also determines the specific appearance of the ideology of socialist orientation in this or that country.

The fact that the socialist-oriented regime grasps a number of the fundamental ideas and tenets of scientific socialism or even in certain cases declares a

transition to the positions of Marxism-Leninism has, of course, an especial significance. From the point of view of the basic historical-genetic roots of the phenomena of socialist orientation, it is altogether difficult to consider it other than in light of the ideological (as well as the political) influence of world socialism and the theory and practice of scientific socialism. Whatever the role of the local footing or the effect of reformist ideas in this or that case, it is impossible not to see that socialist orientation receives its basic impetus first and foremost from world socialism. In certain countries its influence is openly acknowledged, in others under one's breath, and in others it just goes without saying: it all depends on the degree of development and the overcoming of local nationalism, as well as on the international situation of the country and the nature of its domestic and foreign policies. One way or another, it is obvious that without world socialism as the source of ideas and practical political experience (not to mention its objective protective functions), it is impossible to conceive of modern socialist orientation. It is therefore possible to speak of a certain ideological closeness of the countries of socialist orientation with world socialism.

The influence of scientific socialism on the ideological institutions of the ruling powers of the countries of socialist orientation and even the adoption of Marxist ideas by these forces, however, does not signify that all regimes of socialist orientation are completely Marxist. For countries with a socialist orientation, it is just as typical that Marxism is adopted there most often not in its entirety, not in a unity of theory and practice. Even several of the most advanced countries in this regard are at the initial stages of the effective assimilation of Marxism.

This type of incompleteness is often seen as the weakness of the leaders of the socialist-oriented countries. Of course, if the question is approached statically or in a comparison of the part and the whole, then maybe that is so. Considering the question in a historical dynamic, however, taking into account the nature of society and the level of development of the corresponding preconditions in it, it is impossible not to see that the very fact of the adoption of Marxist ideas by the leaders of the socialist-oriented countries signifies an important step forward: from bourgeois and quasi-bourgeois or pre-bourgeois ideology in the direction of the ideology of scientific socialism, and moreover, at the state level. A movement toward the broader and fuller adoption of Marxism can be generated on the basis of the adoption of individual parts of it. That is precisely the ideological process that is happening in a number of countries.

With regard to the socialist-oriented countries, consequently, we can speak of the incomplete and initial adoption of Marxism by its leadership, but not of anti-Marxism. (Footnote 6) (On the distinctions between "non-Marxist" and "anti-Marxist" positions of revolutionary democrats see, for example: K.N. Brutents. Indicated works, p 388.) In cases where their leaders declare a transition to the positions of scientific socialism, this must be regarded with an understanding of the complexity of the problem. "It is one thing to proclaim one's ideology as scientific socialism," emphasizes R.A. Ulyanovskiy, "and another to advance along the proclaimed path and implement in practice or at least begin to implement this ideology." (Footnote 7) (R.A. Ulyanovskiy.

National and Revolutionary Democracy.—NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. Moscow, No 2, p 16.) It must be taken into account that the process itself of assimilating scientific socialism under conditions of socio-economic backwardness and the poor development of the working class is a difficult, uneven and in any case prolonged process.

As has already been noted, the ideological component of socialist orientation is frequently reformist representations of socialism that in principle go back to Western social-reformism. Here it need only be emphasized that in this case the discussion concerns not the adoption or more so the copying of a whole system of views of the "democratic socialism" type, impossible in view of the cardinal differences of the developing countries and the bourgeois countries of the West. Experience has shown that "democratic socialism" of a Western type does not take in Afro-Asian countries. Reformism in the ideology and politics of certain countries of socialist orientation is manifested in a striving to smooth over internal and external social and class contradictions and the exaggeration of the nationwide basis to the detriment of the social one. This is expressed in practice in a tolerance of national exploitative elements and slowness in resolving socio-political problems that harm the interests of the workers. At the same time, socialist orientation at certain stages is tactically much more radical than "democratic socialism," insofar as it resorts to decisive actions aimed against the capitalist elements and colonialism and imperialism, as well as the institutions of the past engendered or supported by them (feudal, tribal etc.).

As for the third component of the ideology of socialist orientation--the traditionalist complex--its presence and influence is explained partly by the definite socio-political genesis of the leadership and partly by the fact that in the ideological life of the countries (as, strictly speaking, in all developing countries), a large proportion of traditionalist and nationalistic conceptions and values is retained. They can be "built-in" to official ideology, and can also have an indirect effect on it as a certain world-view and cultural environment.

It is impossible to approach the question of traditionalism and nationalism in the ideology of socialist orientation in an unambiguous manner. The traditions of the spiritual life of the peoples of Asia and Africa is a most rich and complex legacy of the centuries and millenia. It has imperishable elements of culture that all of mankind is proud of, there exists that which is still a "vital constructive force," furthering national and state self-determination and the self-affirmation of peoples. (Footnote 8) (B.S. Yerasov. "Sotsialno-kulturnyye traditsii i obshchestvennoye soznaniye v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh Azii i Afriki" [Socio-Cultural Traditions and Social Consciousness in the Developing Countries of Asia and Africa]. Moscow, 1982, p 3.) There are, however, also many conservative and simply reactionary elements that hinder the struggle to overcome backwardness and the country's sharing in the modern world achievements of science, technology and production. Something similar can be said of nationalism as well. Being aimed at the affirmation of national originality, it plays a constructive role, facilitates the spiritual liberation of the nation and reinforces political independence. But if it progresses to the eulogizing of exclusivity itself, ignoring progressive international exchanges, to spiritual

isolationism, it also becomes a brake on development. Underestimating the forces of tradition and ignoring the role and potentialities of nationalism leads to a separation from the real situation and a weakening of contacts with the masses "impregnated" with traditionalism. An inordinate accent on traditionalism and the nationalistic aspects of problems being resolved distorts and restrains social progress.

The following must also be emphasized. The general cultural and ideological synthesis of traditions and the modern, the past and the "modern-day" in the developing countries occurred, is occurring and will occur in the future. As for political ideology, here, along with the synthesis of the past and the present, there often simply occurs the utilization of traditions for modern ideological goals. In the majority of socialist-oriented countries, the chief source and substance of official ideology are, we assert, not traditions and their continuation and development (the traditional base with all of its great significance plays a secondary role here nonetheless), but the repercussion on modern problems and ideas introduced by the new times (the "modern day"), especially the appeal to ideas gleaned from the arsenal of modern socialism. The principal obstacle to the more widespread and deeper assimilation of these ideas is not so much traditionalism as such, as it is nationalism, strengthened in many cases by the effect of religion and the historically extant isolation of this or that country from the international community. And the tasks of the researcher in this sphere consist precisely of, first, finding the real relationship of the modern and traditional in the ideology of socialist orientation, second, separating ideological traditionalism as such from the practical utilization of traditions for modern political purposes and, third, drawing the line between traditionalism and nationalism, insofar as they are far from one and the same. (Footnote 9) (Questions of the correlation of traditionalism and modernism, nationalism and socialism, bourgeois ideology and Marxism in the developing countries are considered interestingly and deeply on the plane of interaction--interlacing, combinations, synthesis, mutual repulsion--in Chapter 13 of the recently published collective monograph of the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences called "Evolution of Eastern Societies: A Synthesis of the Traditional and the Modern" (Moscow, 1984).)

Whereas the official ideology of socialist orientation defines the goals and institutions of the regime, the politics encompass in essence all of its practical activity. Insofar as it is both an all-embracing sphere of activity and an approach to all aspects of the life of society (including ideology and, especially, economics), it is also important in an evaluation of socialist orientation as a course of development. The effectiveness and reliability of the course of socialist orientation is determined namely in the sphere of politics and political decisions and measures. Recall the classical dialectical formulations of V.I. Lenin: "Politics are the concentrated expression of economics," "politics cannot help but have precedence over economics," and "without a correct political approach to the matter, a given class will not retain its rulership, and consequently, cannot resolve its productive tasks." (Footnote 10) (V.I. Lenin. Complete Works. Vol 42, pp 278-279.)

The sphere of politics is always broad, but under conditions of socialist orientation the role, scale and activeness of this sphere is even greater. Quantitative changes are accompanied by structural and qualitative ones. The purposeful and conscious activity of the revolutionary political forces of the new state that have come to power are sharply strengthened, and the social process loses its earlier real or seeming spontaneity. The transformative activity and radical reforms in social life touch on the status and interests of all social classes and segments. A new state-party superstructure is created along with a system for organizing the masses. A unitary and usually one-party regime is introduced, established either constitutionally or to all intents and purposes. The army often plays a key role not only as the initiator of a turn toward socialist orientation, but as the integrator of the nation and the state and as the armed guarantor of the new regime. The complex problem of the development of democracy arises, the resolution of which either directly or indirectly affects the course and prospects of development.

The extreme complexity of the political tasks of socialist orientation should be emphasized: along with the intrinsically political tasks (such as the formation of a political vanguard, the establishment of its organizational ties with the masses, the transformation of state structure and administration), the proportion of tasks associated with transformations of the prior socio-economic structure is enormous. We spoke above of the anti-imperialist (anti-colonial), anti-feudal and anti-capitalist reforms that are carried out by socialist-oriented regimes. These "three antis" form the core of the political activity of the regime. But in practice, it is exceptionally difficult to implement transformations in these three different areas, moreover under conditions of extreme backwardness and frequently at the same time. A sober political reckoning is needed here based on an understanding of the necessity of the gradual nature of the transformations, a regard for the low economic level of the development of productive forces in the country and a display of tactical flexibility both within the country and in the sphere of international relations.

Methodologically important is the fact, as noted, that the socialist-oriented countries at this time occupy a relatively stable and special intermediate position. Their domestic political system moreover sometimes borrows some forms of social organization from the countries of world socialism, which creates a certain political community among them, and at the same time there is no such community among the countries of socialist orientation and bourgeois countries. A particular aspect of the policies of the socialist-oriented countries is the combination of social and national principles in them whose relationship changes.

By virtue of its multiple planned character, the policies are important in evaluating socialist orientation as a developing phenomenon. It is according to the policies that it is possible to judge first and foremost the successes or failures on the chosen path.

Two instances call attention to themselves in the policies of the countries of socialist orientation. First, they, as do the majority of other developing countries, take anti-imperialist stands in principle. This arises out of

their struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism and resistance to the interference of imperialism in their internal affairs. The positions of a number of socialist-oriented countries are very close to the positions of the countries of world socialism. At the same time, there exist quite substantive distinctions. Thus, certain socialist-oriented countries are sometimes inclined to a certain "equidistance" from world imperialism and world socialism. Depending on the situation, this "equidistance" can weaken or strengthen. Participating in the non-aligned movement, they at other times treat non-alignment as a policy of distinctive "neutrality." It should be taken into account that certain socialist-oriented countries are a unique type of "prisoners of geography": their foreign policy takes on the stamp of a neighbor with aggressive imperialist, racist or great-power chauvinistic regimes; economic and political weakness causes these countries in a number of cases to enter into doubtful compromises in questions of foreign policy.

In considering the economic problems of socialist-oriented countries, three instances must be emphasized, in our opinion.

The first is that the countries under consideration have inherited a backward and, in the majority of cases, an extremely backward and undeveloped economy. (Footnote 11) (On the term "undeveloped economy" see: Theoretical Problems of the Transition to Socialism in Countries with an Undeveloped Economy. The authors use this term in a limited fashion, as it is considered a politically specific (limited) group of Asian and African countries. In principle, in our opinion, there are no obstacles to the widespread employment of this term, including when the discussion concerns the whole group of socialist-oriented countries.) This fundamental fact in and of itself is disputed by no one. An underestimation of it and a diminishing of its significance, however, are encountered. (Footnote 12) (Among recent works, see: The Socialist Orientation of Liberated Countries, pp 41-42.) Economic backwardness and poverty--that is, the actually existing starting level from which the socialist-oriented countries must begin their trip--makes the resolution of the tasks that arise on this path more difficult. In the most favorable case, only oil-producing and oil-exporting countries and those with the opportunity of making use of the petrodollars of other countries are found.

The second instance is the fact that under conditions of an undeveloped economy, a multiple economy, and moreover pre-capitalist or with poorly developed capitalism, there are not enough internal natural and historical incentives that would determine movement in the direction of socialism. (Footnote 13) (Theoretical Problems of the Transition to Socialism in Countries with an Undeveloped Economy, p 79.) The incentives for movement proceed from the worldwide historical process. The modern era, as is well known, is the era of transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale. This circumstance, reflected in the national basis of the socialist-oriented countries, is realized herein economically through the acceleration of state-political factors of development with this or that degree of support for world socialism. This situation emphasizes once again the necessity of deeply considered and realistic economic policies for the socialist-oriented states along with the inevitability of the use of economic institutions and forms in these policies that are able, under the guiding influence of the state, to facilitate the maximum development of productive forces. Taking into account

the low starting level of the economy, the creation of new productive forces of socialist orientation can obviously take many decades. Posing the question of considerably more prolonged historical time periods for the period of socialist orientation than it seemed initially arises first and foremost from the complexity of the resolution of its economic tasks.

In an analysis of the economic tasks being resolved on the path of socialist orientation, the growth and complication of the requirements made on the economy of any country in connection with scientific and technical revolution [STR] should be kept in mind. The expansion and deepening of STR creates additional problems and difficulties for backward countries. STR has today become the most important arena of historical competition between capitalism and socialism. In this regard, the formulation of V.I. Lenin on the decisive role of labor productivity in the formation process acquires more and more importance: "The productivity of labor is, in the final tally, the most important and chief thing for the victory of the new social order... Capitalism can be finally defeated and will be finally defeated by the fact that socialism is creating new and much higher labor productivity. This is a very difficult and prolonged matter." (Footnote 14) (V.I. Lenin. Complete Works. Vol 39, p 21.) The task of achieving ever higher labor productivity based first and foremost on the continuous development and improvement of productive forces is being successfully resolved in the USSR and other socialist countries. It would be premature, however, to feel that it has already been resolved on the plane of competition with capitalism. The CPSU, as demonstrated by the work of the 27th Party Congress and the resolutions adopted by it, is aiming toward a more realistic evaluation of the socio-economic maturity of our society that has been achieved and is warning against easy depictions of the ways and time periods for the transition to the higher phase of communism. The strategy of accelerating the socio-economic development of the country developed by the party, reinforced by the broad-scale economic measures of the Soviet state, along with the unwavering implementation of the program directives of the party on the transition to the intensification of production are aimed at new qualitative growth in the productive forces of socialist society, ensuring a further powerful ascent in labor productivity.

A methodologically sober and realistic evaluation of socialist orientation and its immediate prospects is exceptionally important. Socialist orientation, of course, is not a socio-economic formation, but rather, as already noted, an intermediate stage of social development leading to a socialist future. The society that has chosen a socialist orientation still must proceed along a difficult and long path before it achieves the corresponding formational maturity, in this case the level of a socialist socio-economic formation. In any case, however, the success of this development is determined only when such a summary indicator of social progress as labor productivity reaches a level that is much higher than the current one. This will most probably occur when the technical base of the productive forces of socialist orientation becomes largely machinery with the inclusion of certain elements of STR on the basis of international cooperation and partial integration into technically progressive international production.

The third factor that should be kept in mind in considering the problems of socialist-oriented economics is that the countries that are proceeding along this path continue to lag in the system of the world capitalist economy. This signifies that they are forced to be subordinate to the international division of labor existing in that system and are under the direct influence of the cycles of development of the world capitalist economy, structural crises of capitalism and market conditions, they have to "catch its diseases." (Footnote 15) (*The Developing Countries in the Modern World. A New Force in World Politics and Economics.* Moscow, 1984, p 6.) Important consequences arise from this circumstance. First is the fact that the socio-economic program of socialist orientation is implemented in an international economic environment hostile to it. Although world socialism renders economic support to the extent of its capabilities to the young states, imperialism retains powerful tools of economic (and not only economic) pressure. By putting these tools to use, it can hinder the development and sometimes create strategic difficulties for the socialist-oriented countries so as to promote the undermining of the chosen path and the turn (or return) of these countries to the path of capitalism. Second, the very fact of the inclusion of the socialist-oriented countries in the world capitalist economy, being an objective phenomenon brought about historically and having every chance of being preserved in the visible future for the majority of them, signifies that these countries objectively cannot develop without the establishment of economic contacts with the capitalist countries that are optimal under the given conditions. It is true that world capitalism has striven and will continue to strive to weaken and undermine socialist orientation, especially using economic means of pressure. But it is also true that in the new extant correlation of forces in the world between capitalism and socialism, with the existence of a world socialist system and support from it, with growing solidarity with other developing countries within the framework of the struggle for a new international economic order and, finally, with the decisive assertion of the priority of one's own sovereign national rights--with all of these conditions, the socialist-oriented countries can themselves to a certain extent use economic contacts with world capitalism in their own national and social interests. These economic contacts (trade, assistance, loans etc.), as demonstrated by experience, have an optimal effect when they are developed along the line of relations between states or through international economic organizations. But the socialist-oriented countries, under conditions of a shortage of funds, must also make use of foreign private capital, including the creation of joint companies based on the partnership of nation-states and foreign interests, within certain limits and under state monitoring, or permit the activity of multinational corporations on their territory, especially when this can assist the creation of necessary types of production in the national interest.

Clouding the question somewhat, it can be said that whereas in the ideological and somewhat in the political sphere of the socialist-oriented countries, the chief influence remains world socialism overall, in the sphere of economics the paramount positions continue to be occupied by world capitalism. And whereas socialism both objectively and subjectively facilitates the reinforcement of a socialist orientation, world capitalism, being in principle a force hostile to it, can act both openly and covertly to weaken it, and

moreover in its most vulnerable place--the economy--the material foundation of any society.

The closeness of the purposes and the commonality of the ideals of the countries of socialism and socialist orientation are undoubted. "The party assigns great significance," says the new version of the CPSU program, "to solidarity and political and economic collaboration with all of the socialist-oriented countries... The Soviet Union, to the extent of its capabilities, has rendered and will continue to render aid to the peoples that have chosen this route in economic and cultural construction, training national personnel, raising defense capability and in other areas." (Footnote 16) (Materials of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pp 174-175.)

At the same time it cannot be forgotten that the problems that the socialist-oriented countries are running up against are complex, and the primary responsibility for progressive development rests on the people themselves and the leadership of these countries. "All people are creating, chiefly through their own efforts," note the new version of the CPSU Program, "the material and technical base necessary for the building of a new society, and are striving to raise the welfare and culture of the masses." (Footnote 17) (Ibid., p 174.)

* * *

Thus, socialist orientation in the developing countries is a progressive course based on the acute need for overcoming backwardness and the anti-exploitative inclinations of the oppressed masses, under the influence of the ideas and practice of world socialism. The course of socialist orientation is revolutionary in its thrust and its implementation is a difficult, contradictory and--as confirmed by practice--prolonged process. The theoretical importance of an analysis and regard for the specific nature of socialist orientation as a particular social phenomenon is determined by its scope, heretofore unknown to world history.

The progressive nature of the goals and policies of socialist orientation in and of themselves cannot be considered a guarantee for the preservation of this course and the achievement of the goals posed to it. In the complex domestic and international climate in which the development being analyzed is taking place, movements and "deviations" from the chosen course are possible and understandable, especially with the active interference of world capitalism. Also consistent at the same time is the "replenishment" of the group of socialist-oriented countries and the entry of new developing countries into it. History "dictates" the course of development in accordance with the conditions that take shape in the former colonial countries and in the world overall. This is the objective wisdom of history, and behind this wisdom stands the struggle of socio-political forces and their changing relationship under the conditions of the modern era--the era of the transition

from capitalism to socialism and communism and the historical competition of two world social systems.

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STABILITY, NON-ASSIMILATION OF ETHNIC CHINESE IN SE ASIA VIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 62-71

[Article by S.R. Laynor under the rubric "Problems of Methodology": "The Community of Hua Qiao [Overseas Chinese] in Southeast Asia: Research on the Ethno-Cultural Situation"]

[Excerpts] The extant ethnic situation in Southeast Asia is distinguished, as is well known, by a greatly specific character. (Footnote 1) (The history of the settlement of the emigres from China in the Southeast Asian region--the "South Sea countries," as they are called in traditional Chinese historiography—is the subject of the monograph of A.A. Bokshchanin "Kitay i strany Yuzhnykh morey v XIV-XVI vv." [China and the South Sea Countries in the 14th-16th Centuries]. (Moscow, 1968), while for the modern period there is the book of N.A. Simonin "Naseleniye kitayskoy natsionalnosti v stranakh Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [The Population of Chinese Nationality in the Southeast Asian Countries] (Moscow, 1959). Among the works of foreign authors should be singled out the basic research of V. Purcell. *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, London, 1965. For an evaluation of this work see: Sketches on the Foreign Historiography of China. *Chinese Studies in England*. Moscow, 1977, pp 65-72.) This advances, on a theoretical plane, a number of issues that await resolution. The approach presented in the article touches on only the ethnic and socio-cultural aspects of the functioning of the Hua Qiao community in the region.

I wanted to note from the very beginning that the ethno-cultural processes occurring in the region are often researched outside of a historical context. This approach is fraught with the possibility that the temporary framework of the phenomenon is unjustifiably narrowed and the origins of the processes are considered to be the place where they have already gathered force for a prolonged preceding period. As a result, the evolution and dynamics of the phenomenon are presented in a distorted form. With such an approach, such an important factor as historically extant ethno-cultural stereotypes and their role sometimes falls outside the field of view of the researcher. This is in particular the view of the Hua Qiao themselves as emigrants, which permits the explanation of much in their later social behavior. Going abroad, the first generations of resettlers considered the very fact of migration as a phenomenon of a temporary nature and considered themselves temporary newcomers to the country they inhabited (hence the term Hua Qiao, literally "Chinese

guest"). And if one turns to the initial stages of Chinese emigration from China to this region, it can be seen that it was seemingly conducted on two levels: in certain cases it was for colonization, the formation of trading posts and, possibly, pirate settlements, and the other was seasonal work. (Footnote 2) (See: A.A. Bokshchanin. Indicated works; "Nanyang Huaqiao Shiliue" [A Brief History of the Chinese Immigrants in the South Sea Countries].--MINPAC. Vol 4. Beijing, 1957, No 25-26; V. Purcell, op. cit.) Therefore, when from the middle of the 19th century a departure abroad from China acquired the nature of a broad-scale movement and attracted millions of people into its orbit, the traditional notion was preserved: people thought along the customary lines. And customary was the view of departure abroad as seasonal work and, consequently, as an exclusively temporary phenomenon. (Footnote 3) (Confirmation of the fact is the considerable re-emigration. At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, it was an average of 60 percent, and in certain countries (the United States, British Malaya and Singapore, Australia and New Zealand) 75-85 percent; See: S.R. Laynger. The Role of Re-emigration in the Formation of the Institution of Capitalism in China (End of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Centuries).--NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. 1973, No 3, p 133.) This approach was furthered by the fact that migration provoked by causes of an economic nature were assessed as an unfortunate phenomenon entailing the disparagement of social prestige. (Footnote 4) (As already noted by W. Eberhard, in large peasant families, when the issue of the necessity of the emigration of one of its members arose, the choice of the family almost always fell to the last or the next-to-last of the sons and in the most extreme circumstances--almost never!--the firstborn, who was called upon to inherit family-clan tradition and not be subject to emigration (W. Eberhard. Social Mobility in Traditional China. Leiden, 1962, pp 167-168.)

By virtue of the strength of the ties of blood relations and links with the land and the rule of family-clan relations, any individual considered himself a member of his own clan that had remained in China. (It is widely known that in those cases where the resettlers from the first migrant generations died abroad, they bequeathed their remains to the motherland, so that they be buried in the ancestral plot, while the order to maintain affiliation with one's clan was passed on to children born abroad like a relay baton.) (Footnote 5) (See: L.W. Crissman. The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese Communities.--Man. Vol. 2, 1967, No 2.) Even when these contacts were physically ruptured with the departure of the emigrant abroad, they were preserved on a psychological and cultural plane, which to a considerable extent conditioned further social behavior, including the negative attitude of the individual to the very fact of assimilation, insofar as the fellowship of Hua Qiao considered itself an endogamous community where marriages were concluded among its members.

Concurrent with the formation of the community itself, a parallel process of the formation of a well-defined graded system of group preferences occurred that touched on all aspects of the vital activity of the fellowship of emigrants--interfamilial relations, the religious situation and productive activity, including the economic-enterprise activities of its members. It was namely group interests and preferences that dominated, often having decisive

significance in the choice of this or that alternative. This circumstance should not be underestimated among the factors on a socio-psychological plane.

Considerations of social prestige operated as one of the regulating factors of social processes. They determined first and foremost the question of marriage choice, wherein the individual was guided here by group interests, and not personal ones. Mixed marriages were concluded primarily in those cases where it did not undermine prestige of the group (family, clan), but rather raised its social status--for example, through the establishment of marriage ties with representatives of the local elite.

The immigrant community itself, to the extent of its own enhancement, became a strong factor that opposed assimilation, reproducing ethno-cultural stereotypes. The spectrum of structures that made up this community also functionally played a similar role: clans associations and organizations of a clan type--associations of people with the same last name, religious organizations, associations of countrymen etc. The community of Hua Qiao is reaching such potential that it can not only monitor the development and scale of assimilation processes, but also, being well-defined structurally and hierarchically, assimilate representatives of other ethnic groups. And, consequently, cross-breeding does not always become a sign of the assimilation of the Hua Qiao--its result can be the SINIFICATION of representatives of aboriginal ethnic groups. (Footnote 6) (This is indicated, in particular, by Yu.V. Maretin, concerning the ethnic situation in Indonesia in the 18th-19th centuries: "The Chinese usually married local women, since immigration was masculine. Powerful Chinese elements were preserved, however, in everyday life, i.e. a SINIFICATION PROCESS OCCURRED AMONG THE INDONESIAN WOMEN, RATHER THAN THE REVERSE PROCESS AMONG THE CHINESE [emphasis ours.—Ed.]. See: Yu.V. Maretin. "Indoneziya.--Etnicheskiye protsessy v stranakh Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [Indonesia.--Ethnic Processes in Southeast Asia]. The situation was quite widespread where the Hua Qiao sent their children of mixed marriages for education in the traditional Chinese spirit to their clans in China itself. In the country of residence they were given over to Chinese schools and their education in the overwhelming majority of cases was also conducted in the spirit of Chinese cultural tradition. Naturally, the wives of the Hua Qiao--emigres from other ethnic groups--were accustomed to this.)

An important place among the factors that affect the course of assimilation processes belongs to the religious situation. It can either facilitate the ethnic consolidation and socio-cultural assimilation of neighboring ethnic groups (an example is Thailand) or, conversely, be a serious barrier that separates nearby ethnic groups (as, for example, in Indonesia).

The legal status of the Chinese immigrants, and in particular the naturalization factor (first and foremost the acceptance of the citizenry of the country of residence), affects the course of assimilation processes. The experience of Singapore, where naturalization problems for ethnic Chinese do not exist and where nonetheless the mixing process has really touched on only a minute portion of the Chinese community (which continues to remain endogamous), is sufficient evidence in favor of a conclusion that ethno-cultural assimilation lags the naturalization process and is evidence of the

known limited nature of this factor in the context of the processes of ethno-cultural assimilation.

It is appropriate to touch on the question of the situation within the Chinese community on the plane of its ethnic heterogeneity. The presence of various dialectical groups and groups of countrymen that are appreciably distinct from one another in the immigrant community is unfailingly considered to be a factor that does not facilitate the ethnic and cultural consolidation of this immigrant community. From the point of views of development trends, this circumstance is typified as a phenomenon of a destructive sort, as if it shatters the Hua Qiao community from within. Many authors have emphasized the instance of competitive struggle between individual categories of the immigrant bourgeoisie that belong to various dialectical groups and groups of countrymen. Apparently, the question of ethnic heterogeneity in the Chinese community requires a rethinking and additional corrections. Recall that in southern China, which was the natural habitat of the mass exodus of settlers, a situation existed for many centuries of the joint (more precisely--strip-farming) residence of several different ethnic groups (more or less related to each other) on a comparatively small territory. They not only each developed their own distinguishing (sub)structures through a certain originality, but also formed a well-known division of spheres of productive activity. In south China itself, as can be ascertained, a unique division of labor had already taken shape by the moment of mass exodus. In the course of forming the immigrant community in Southeast Asia, which was a sort of chip off of China itself, this historically extant tradition of the division of spheres of productive activity was transferred abroad. Because of the domination of family-clan relations and a strict system of subordination and hierarchical coordination in this environment that regulated the place of every member of the community, the phenomenon was natural wherein the professional orientation of a certain individual seemed, as a rule, to be not the result of his free choice, but quite narrowly defined (and predetermined) by group interests. Thus, the economic activity in which the individual dialectical groups and groups of countrymen involved in forming the Chinese community turned out to be in took shape, by virtue of the circumstances indicated above, to a considerable extent according to the principle of mutual supplementation. It was considerably later, on the boundary of the 19th and 20th centuries and especially in the 20th century, that the development process of socio-economic relations in the countries of the region was introduced into the economic sphere by new institutions, provoked first and foremost by the appearance of financial and bank capital and a large immigrant bourgeoisie and this, naturally, facilitated the social-class differentiation within immigrant communities and the growth of competitive struggle among individual subsegments of the bourgeois Hua Qiao belonging to various dialectical groups and groups of countrymen. This could not, however, have a substantive, the more so a determining, influence on the balanced system of labor division existing within the community. Thus, the ethnic diversity of the Hua Qiao community is one of the factors that imparts additional stability to this social organism and, consequently, consolidates the community overall.

The following significant fact should also be noted: by virtue of the fact that marriages are concluded within the framework of their own dialect groups and groups of countrymen, where each of them is a locally closed endogamous

subdivision, a dual series of endogamous barriers was created on the path to assimilation, established both by the community and by the dialect group, which as a result served as an additional element of ethno-cultural consolidation for the immigrant community.

Among other factors that facilitated the unity of the Chinese community must be mentioned the presence of specific organizations of a traditional nature in its structure--the multitude of secret societies. The existence of these organizations strengthens the extent of diversity in the immigrant community and serves as an additional factor of its resistance to ethno-cultural diffusion. (Footnote 7) (See: S.R. Laynger. "The Secret Societies of the Hua Qiao: Evolution and Social Essence.--NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. 1985, No 3; same. "Formy sotsialnoy organizatsii khuatsyao (po materialam yaponskikh issledovaniy" [Forms of Hua Qiao Social Organization (According to Japanese Research Materials].--Social Organizations in China. Moscow, 1981, pp 280-302.) We do not shed much light on the situation in uncovering the socio-cultural aspect by justly describing the noted organizations as Mafia-type structures, "cesspools" of the social dregs. (Footnote 8) (See, for example: V.Kh. Vasiliyeva. The Role of Chinese Secret Societies in Life in Malaysia and Singapore.--"Protsessy deklassirovaniya v stranakh Vostoka [Processes of Declassification in the Countries of the East]. Moscow, 1981, pp 232-242.) This question is deserving of more detailed consideration.

Over the course of historical development in the Southeast Asian region, a situation has taken shape where the role of intermediaries between the indigenous population and the colonial powers has fallen to the Hua Qiao, and they have occupied a kind of social "niche" created by the structure of colonial society. (Footnote 13) (See: N.A. Simoniya. "Torgovo-rostovshchicheskiy kapital v Azii" [Trade-Usurious Capital in Asia]. Moscow, 1973, p 22.) The situation was aggravated by the fact that the colonizers inflamed inter-ethnic dissension in the region, which in turn facilitated a strengthening of ethnocentrism and nationalism within the Chinese community and its isolation from the local population. The growth of disproportions in the economic situation of the indigenous population and the Hua Qiao community and the strengthening of processes of social and class differentiation in the region also sharpened the trends of ethnic division, deepening the cultural, social and psychological isolation of this immigrant group.

The development and acceleration of negative ethnic stereotypes in social consciousness--both among the local population and among representatives of the Chinese community--is an undoubted indicator of the complexity of the phenomena of social adaptation and ethno-cultural assimilation. They include a group preconceived notions and judgments about a specific ethnic group and individual representatives of it, as well as preconvictions, prejudices and derisive nicknames for ethnic groups--ethnologisms. Arising as a consequence of certain inter-ethnic processes, they begin to play an active role in them themselves, facilitating a deepening of international conflicts, the isolation of ethnic groups discriminated against on a social and cultural plane and growth in nationalistic inclinations and ethnocentric tendencies among them. (Footnote 14) (As noted by I.S. Kon, "whatever the paths of ethnic stereotypes that took shape, with the course of time they acquire the nature of a norm that is passed from generation to generation as something

indisputable and that goes without saying... These preconvictions also enter organically into the makeup of the culture of class society like all of its other norms" (I.S. Kon. Psychological Prejudice (The Socio-Psychological Roots of Ethnic Preconvictions).—NOVYY MIR. 1966, No 9, p 201).)

The rejection of a foreign ethnic organism by a social setting--of immigrant dispersion--leading to the consolidation of the latter, to a significant extent predetermined its social dynamics and the strategy and tactics for survival developed by the community, an integral component of which was dedication to success. This latter played the role of a compensating mechanism role here, where success served as a factor of social compensation. The more insurmountable the ethnic dividing barriers and the less successfully cultural assimilation and social adaptation progressed, the more powerful the aspirations for personal overachievement, compensating for their social inferiority, became among representatives of the immigrant community. (Footnote 15) (In speaking of the impulse for development which injects representatives of immigrant groups into society, G. Eisermann indicates: "It is easy for foreigners to become the bearers of new expectations and values, the creators of new social roles." They find application for their efforts and capabilities for the greater part in the sphere of economics. "Pretty often, emigrants who came to the new motherland completely without money make a significant contribution to the accumulation of capital" (see: G. Eisermann. Die Bedeutung des Fremden fur die Entwicklungslander.—Soziologie der Entwicklungslander. G. Eisermann (Hrsg.). Stuttgart—Berlin—Köln—Mainz, 1968, pp 134—135).) These aspirations were supported to the utmost by the community, corresponding to its group dedication to success. It should be noted that the whole system of group preferences was also stimulated by the inclination of the individual toward personal success, which not only did not oppose the interests of the group, did not contradict them, but rather qualifies as an element of success for the whole reference group. (Footnote 16) (On this see: L.W. Crissman, op. cit. The feature noted above is characteristic not only of Chinese immigration, but to a greater or lesser degree is typical for many Asiatic societies. The Chinese immigrant community is distinguished not by the presence of these contacts themselves, but their dominance in the complex of social institutions of the Hua Qiao community.) And the personal success of the immigrant, his family and his clan was thought of in terms of a "return of face" (recall that migration was associated with a "loss of face").

Their diversity, having, in our opinion, a general and total nature, also has an effect on the ethno-cultural situation both within and without the Hua Qiao communities. This is the nature of the general laws that appear as a sort of dynamic synthesis of a multitude of alternatives for the social, cultural and economic development of this social organism. The development of Hua Qiao society at its various levels proceeds namely through the realization of this universal principle. Permeating all of the structures of immigrant society, diversity determines their evolution to a great extent. This specific feature has a multi-faceted nature and serves as a factor that strengthens manyfold the vitality of the community and its low susceptibility to ethno-cultural diffusion. How is this phenomenon of diversity revealed?

- 1) On the social plane--the presence within the community of a multitude of mutual supplementary and mutually pervasive models--social structures; the combination of structures of an overt type and closed and latent ones--in the form of secret societies. It is also a diversity of social roles that can be combined in the same individual. One and the same person--"one with many faces"--can be the exploiter and the exploited, the bourgeois and the hired worker.
 - 2) On the ethno-cultural plane--heterogeneity of society, the presence in its structure of several dialect and countrymen communities as its substructures. This is supplemented by the presence of an ethnic "train" of the community in the form of half-breed groups--a unique type of "ethno-cultural bridge" between the community and the aboriginal social group.
 - 3) On the religious plane--syncretism, characteristic of Chinese religious consciousness and making it possible to co-exist under the aegis of one community of Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism. (It is possible that this syncretism to a great extent eases the permeation of ideas of Christianity into the upper reaches of the Chinese community.)
 - 4) On the juridical-legal plane (taking here just one aspect, the naturalization factor)--a multitude of statuses and the presence of a whole spectrum of possible alternatives in the majority of the regions of the country (with the exception of the countries of Indochina); the citizens of the Peoples' Republic of China; the citizens of Taiwan; people without citizenship; people with dual citizenships. (Sometimes almost all of the indicated variants can be present within the framework of a single family.)
- 5) On the economic plane:
- a broad spectrum of co-existing economic structures of a traditional and non-traditional nature, which give Hua Qiao capital more freedom of maneuver and more stability. (Footnote 17) (See in detail: S.R. Layner. Forms of Social Organization..., pp 280-302.)
 - the multi-aspectual nature of the operational economic activity of the community.
 - the multi-sector nature of major capitalist associations of Hua Qiao, giving capital the opportunity of "flowing across" from certain sectors to other, from certain spheres of the economy to others, in times of crisis.
 - the combination of capitalist methods of economic management with non-capitalist (pre-capitalist) and traditional-patriarchal ones (the broad network of family enterprises is a well-known phenomenon).
 - the supplementing of the open economy with a shadow or latent one that is based on the functioning of a fine-tuned network of secret societies in the region (the latent economy is understood to mean various types of contraband operations, narcotics trade, speculative operations, including speculation on the stock market, black market, rackets etc.)

--economic integration, ingrowth in the economic organism of the country of residence with the preservation of certain elements of economic independence and elements of a duality that are objectively characteristic of Hua Qiao capital as capital of immigrant origins. One of the general features of the consequences and specific manifestations of the latter can be considered the known participation of emigrant capital in economic construction in China itself--a phenomenon with a more than century-long history; south China, the natural habitat of the mass exodus, is the traditional sphere for the infusion of Hua Qiao capital. (Footnote 18) (See in detail: S.R. Laynger. The Role of Re-emigration..., p 132; O.Ye. Nepomnin. "Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaya istoriya Kitaya, 1894-1914" [Socio-Economic History of China, 1894-1914]. Moscow, 1980, pp 190-191.)

6) On a general cultural plane--the unwritten code of value orientations developed by the community included at its foundations belief in the Chinese cultural tradition and adherence to it. One of the essential elements of the latter is the reverence for education and culture, as well as knowledge, the possession of which opened the way to raising the social status of the individual in China and his transition to a higher social stratum, that is traditional in Chinese thought and proceeds from Confucianism--"wen." This circumstance, traditional in nature, apparently played a role in the ideological support of the Hua Qiao community--in the form of its ruling elite--for a policy of accumulating knowledge as a distinctive form of cultural "capital" that guarantees a strengthening of the social and economic positions of the community and its stable growth. (Footnote 19) (How much significance is ascribed to this circumstance can be judged from the social fact that the community opened Chinese schools in the countries of the region. In many cases, the functioning of the higher educational institutions created using community resources published a periodical and artistic literature in Chinese. Many Hua Qiao sent their children (often through the charitable funds of the community and the clan) to study in China, where a number of higher educational institutions were also created especially for training their personnel. Furthermore, the Hua Qiao youth were sent (and continue to be sent) to study in Singapore. In accordance with the requirements of big business, a considerable scale of young people of the community were sent to study at the best colleges and universities of Western Europe and the United States.)

Do the circumstances cited above testify to the absence of assimilation processes of an ethno-cultural nature in the Hua Qiao environment? Not at all. Who do these processes affect and to what extent?

First, that inconsiderable portion of the immigrant community that lives in a condition of scattered dispersion, as well as the Hua Qiao from the lower strata that live on the periphery of immigrant society, are drawn into the orbit of natural assimilation processes. In both cases, assimilation eases the weakness of contacts with the community or the fact that those ties are almost completely lost.

Assimilation also affects the specific subsegment of the upper circles of immigrant society that establishes marriage ties with representatives of the

local elite for the purpose of raising social status. (Footnote 20) (G.W. Skinner. Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand. N.Y., 1958.) Furthermore, there exists a unique type of "outsiders" that do not equate their interests with the interests of the community, having completely severed ties with them and consciously chosen a path of assimilation with the aboriginal ethnic groups. Representatives of this group can be encountered among various strata--both among the working Hua Qiao and, to a considerable extent, among the intelligentsia and people in free professions. In recent years, this subsegment has been supplemented by representatives of the student population. Finally, among some parts of the intelligentsia, functionaries, clerks and certain representatives of business circles, a tendency toward assimilation is noticeable--not, however, with representatives of the aboriginal population, but with people of European or American origins. (Footnote 21) (A.M. Reshetov. "Singapur. Etnicheskiye protsessy v stranakh Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [Singapore. Ethnic Processes in the Southeast Asian Countries]. Moscow, 1974, p 244, 250.) Hence the appearance of Anglicized or Americanized Hua Qiao who have split from the community and its traditions and are living in Western fashion (this phenomenon is more typical of Singaporean society and its subsegment of Anglicized Chinese).

Another phenomenon should be noted as well. For a certain group of immigrants, closely tied to the local elite, assimilation can be interpreted not as the result of the development of the ethno-cultural situation, but exclusively for the purpose of self-preservation and is of a demonstrative nature. Naturally, such an assimilation for show has little in common with natural ethno-cultural processes, and is in essence a profanation of them and can be qualified as a phenomenon from the realm of social mimicry.

In researching the social and cultural situation in the region, the Hua Qiao community is usually considered as the subject of the action with regard to the object--the foreign ethnic social environment. In this approach, the environment seems a) passive with regard to the subject of the action--the Hua Qiao community--and b) ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Neither the one nor the other corresponds to reality and are just costs of the research technique. The social environment, moreover, is also the subject of action with regard to the Hua Qiao community, which requires its separate consideration by the researcher and assumes a specific historical approach and a differentiated analysis of individual components of the environment. Only then does the active influence of the environment on the course of the ethno-cultural processes become clear. It becomes apparent, for example, that such a religious feature as the presence of Islam in a number of countries predetermines the impossibility of assimilation for aboriginal Muslims with the Hua Qiao community. The corporative closed nature of Indian society, which is just as much an endogamous society as the Hua Qiao community, acts in an analogous manner--as an anti-assimilation factor.

Summing up the above, it is possible to assert the following. Over the course of several centuries of existence in the Southeast Asian region, the Hua Qiao community has developed an effective mechanism for self-regulation and its own type of "antibodies" that permit it to counteract the processes of assimilation and, in turn, oppose them with growing consolidation. Consolidation on an ethno-cultural basis and the resistance of the society to

erosion are an immediate consequence of the fact that ethnic communities with differing and sharply distinct fundamental parameters of cultural substrata are far from always able to merge and form an integral ethno-cultural organism. And that is why assimilation can actually affect only insignificant components of the community, which in the end cannot have a substantive effect on the very existence of the Hua Qiao as foreign ethnic community, as well as a decisive influence on the ethnic situation in this region. The ethno-cultural tendencies noted act in concert with objective processes for the ingrowth of the immigrant Hua Qiao society into the social fabric of the country of residence—processes of social adaptation and economic integration.

The influence that Chinese historical and cultural tradition had on the formation of social institutions and the social structures of the immigrant community was noted above. The Chinese ethno-cultural substratum, however, was subject to continuous influence on the part of another social environment. Being deformed under its influence, the Chinese "core" by degrees and unnoticeably altered in substance, acquiring some new qualities. The specific nature of this most complex process, far from complete today, consists of the fact that the indicated transformation occurs with the retention of a traditional Chinese covering, with a seeming coincidence to Chinese cultural tradition. This process of deformation and transformation of the Chinese "core" signified, in essence, nothing more than the birth of a new quality as a result of the collision and mutual permeation and influence of two cultural potentialities—the Chinese and the non-Chinese. (Footnote 25) (The birth of a new quality with the retention of the traditional national form, generally speaking, is typical for any community of immigrants. Relative to the community of Chinese immigrants, this was noted by Soviet and foreign researchers. Thus, for example, Ye.V. Revunenkova, after the Malaysian scholar Wang Gung-Wu (see: Malaysia. Ed. by Wang Gung-Wu. London, 1964), wrote: "It is impossible for the prolonged coexistence with other peoples far from the motherland—the source of their culture—not to have an effect, at least to an inconsiderable effect, even in an isolated society. This is even appreciable IN THE EXISTENCE OF AN ORGANIZATION OF A NEW SOCIAL TYPE IN THE VILLAGE THAT OUTWARDLY RETAINED A TRADITIONAL CHINESE APPEARANCE" (my emphasis--S.L.) (Ye.V. Revunenkova. Malaysia--Ethnic Processes in the Southeast Asian Countries. Moscow, 1974, p 218). I touch on the same idea—the acquisition of a new quality by the immigrant Hua Qiao community that cannot be reduced to Chinese cultural tradition—in the article "The Organization of People with the Same Surname Among the Hua Qiao: Some Questions of Genesis" (see: the Ninth Scientific Conference "Society and State in China." Theses and reports. Part 3. Moscow, 1979, pp 152-162.)

The social dynamic, in our opinion, is one of the features of this new quality that is typical of the Hua Qiao to a large extent. The unique synthesis of the cultures of East and West has imparted a substantial impetus to the development of immigrant society, making many of its representatives bearers of the "spore" of social modernization. This was manifested, in particular, during the Shanghai bourgeois revolution of 1911-1913, when the Hua Qiao who had returned to China, accompanied by bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic ideas progressive for the times, participated in the capitalist restructuring of the country. (Footnote 26) (See: S.R. Layner. The Role of Re-emigration...)

The discovery of this new quality by the Hua Qiao community signified for the Chinese immigrants the discovery of additional resources for survival in the complex social, cultural and demographic situation that arose in the countries of residence. The birth and acceleration of this quality, a direct consequence of the extreme conditions of existence of the Hua Qiao community, in essence signifies the formation of a particular specific population with all of its country's variations--a Hua Qiao population as a new ethnic and social community inseparable from its ethnic Chinese prototype. Being genetically, culturally and historically linked with its country of origin, this latter can with some basis be considered a quite independent (and to a certain extent autonomous with regard to the country of origin) social organism that possesses certain qualitative features and is developing according to its own specific laws.

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RISE, FALL, NEW PHASE OF INDONESIA'S OIL-BASED ECONOMY NOTED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 78-83

[Article by V.Ya. Arkhipov: "Oil in the Indonesian Economy"]

[Text] The petroleum industry as a modern sector arose in Indonesia at the end of the last century and the beginning of this one as a result of the massive investment of foreign capital, which has since that time determined its place in national production and the rate and features of development. Being most dynamic and capital-intensive, this sector nonetheless did not always develop evenly. In coming into being, it passed through both periods of ascents and prolonged slumps. Before the Second World War, Indonesia (then Dutch India) was one of the largest oil producers in the world: it was in fifth place in oil production after the United States, the USSR, Venezuela and Iran. The intensive development of this sector was interrupted by the Second World War.

Since then Indonesia, by virtue of the action of both international and domestic factors, was already unable to return to its former position in the oil market. The postwar era was marked by major discoveries of liquid fuel deposits in various regions of the globe, first of all (within the framework of the non-socialist world) in the countries of the Arab East. Moreover, Indonesia suffered acute economic difficulties in the first two or two and a half decades of independent existence.

Notwithstanding the weakening of the Indonesian position on the world oil market in the 1950s and 1960s, the significance of the petroleum industry for the country itself not only did not decline, but on the contrary increased sharply both then and in subsequent decades. Against an overall unfavorable economic background for Indonesia in those days, the petroleum industry was an important exception, and even increased its pace in this situation. Here are numbers that testify to this: in prewar 1940, 7.9 million tons of oil were produced, in 1950 6.8 million, in 1960 20.6 million, in 1965 24 million, in 1967 25.3 million and in 1968 34.9 million. (Footnote 1) (See: V.Ya. Arkhipov. "Ekonomika i ekonomiceskaya politika Indonesia, 1945-1968" [The Economy and Economic Policies of Indonesia, 1945-1968]. Moscow, 1971, p 318, Table 36.)

Table -- Indonesian Oil Production

Year	(1)	Total Production (Crude Oil)				Product Sales (%) (*)	
		(2)	(3)	(4)	Share, %	(7)	(8)
		(5)	(6)				
1968	38	602	220	+18	—	—	—
1969	78	742	271	+23	—	83	14
1970	139	854	312	+15	—	81	13
1971	233	891	325	+4	—	84	14
1972	286	1081	396	+22	2.1	87	13
1973	393	1338	489	+23	2.3	87	12
1974	807	1375	502	+3	2.4	85	14
1975	1047	1306	477	-5	2.4	84	16
1976	830	1508	550	+15	2.5	88	16
1977	870	1685	615	+13	2.7	87	17
1978	860	1636	597	-3	2.6	84	19
1979	1080	1594	580	-3	2.5	77	22
1980	2080	1577	577	-1	2.5	72	25
1981	3060	1602	585	+1	2.7	7.1	27
1982	3924	—	488	-20	—	66	34
1983	3900	—	518	+11	—	67	33

(1)--Foreign investment in oil exploration and development (millions of dollars);

(2)--per day (thousands of barrels);

(3)--per year (millions of barrels);

(4)--growth compared to preceding year (%);

(5)--share of world production, (%);

(6)--share of OPEC production, (%);

(7)--export;

(8)--domestic consumption.

--Export and internal consumption do not total 100 percent due to variations in the reserves and imports of petroleum products.

(Source: Southeast Asian Affairs 1983. Singapore, 1983; Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol 20, 1984, No 2, p 29.)

Before the coming to power of President Sukarno, that is, before 1966, there was no single line to state oil policy: encouragement of the activeness of foreign capital was combined with measures for limiting its privileges and sphere of activity. The steps aimed at strengthening participation of state capital in oil production were of fundamental significance. These directives were subsequently subject to substantial alterations, when the current regime came to power. Nonetheless, without depending on the nature of the state structure of Indonesia and the political and economic course of its governments, all of them have in principle been well-disposed to the broad-scale activeness of foreign capital in the oil-producing industry, figuring that they could thereby, using the tax mechanism, provide for large foreign-currency and financial receipts for the state budget. Oil has become the

principal and decisive source of financing for the economic development of the country. This situation, however, is no so much the result of a specific and purposeful domestic policy as much as it is the consequence and reflection of external processes and the rapid growth of oil prices in 1973-1980.

The data of the table demonstrate that since the end of the 1960s, the extent of activeness of foreign oil companies in the country has grown substantially. Over 1968-1973, the volume of their capital expenditures in exploring for and producing oil have increased by more than 10 times. Oil production has grown from 220 million to 489 million barrels a year, that is, by roughly 2.2 times. Beginning in 1974, that is, with the entry of the world into energy crisis, foreign investment in production and especially in prospecting for oil in Indonesia has been truly unprecedented. Over 1974-1983, foreign oil companies invested over 19 billion dollars in oil production in Indonesia. A considerable portion of this capital was used for oil exploration, that is, with the aim of expanding oil production. In the 1977-1983 period, 4.6 billion dollars were expended for this purpose, or 29.4 percent of all foreign investment in the petroleum sector.

Foreign oil companies were unable to meet at once the appearance of the world energy crisis through an increase in the production of Indonesian oil; it did not increase in 1974-1975. But as early as 1976-1977, a new spurt in the assimilation of petroleum resources occurred that provided an increase in production of 27 percent over these two years alone. In 1977, the largest quantity of petroleum in the history of the Indonesian oil industry was extracted--615 million barrels (about 82 million tons). Overall, it is possible to ascertain a reinforcement of the international position of Indonesia as an oil producer. Since the beginning of the 1970s, an almost unswerving increase in its share of world production has been observed, especially in the oil production of the OPEC countries (see Table).

The 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were a time of rapid overall growth in the Indonesian economy. In this regard, domestic demand for oil and petroleum products increased. In 1969 more than 4/5 of the oil produced was shipped abroad, while in 1983 only a little more than 2/3 was. Oil has remained primarily an export product nonetheless, the overwhelming portion sold on foreign mass markets and the chief source of foreign receipts. The chief consumers of Indonesian oil are Japan and the United States, who purchase an aggregate of from 79 to 93 percent of its total export. Indonesia exports not only crude petroleum, but petroleum products as well.

The reduction in the volume of oil production and export after 1977 in no way signified a decline in foreign-currency income for Indonesia. On the contrary, even after this it continued to increase rapidly as a consequence of the new spurt in world prices for liquid fuels. Whereas in 1969 the price of one barrel of Indonesian oil was \$1.73, in 1977 it was \$14.10 and in 1980 \$32 a barrel. Since the end of the 1970s, Indonesia has begun to ship liquified natural gas. In 1980, foreign-currency income from it was equal to 2.9 billion dollars. In 1981, the share of oil and petroleum products in the overall value of Indonesian exports totaled 78 percent.

The financial aspect of the functioning of the oil-producing industry for the Indonesian state is exceptionally important. Taxation and the imposition of various other fees on the oil companies became the income item and the principle source for covering the expenditures in the state budget. Whereas in the 1960s the indicated receipts totaled only 20 percent of state income, and in the middle of the 1970s it was 56 percent, at the beginning of the 1980s it was about 70 percent. (Footnote 2) (Southeast Asian Affairs 1983. Singapore, 1983.)

The rapid economic development of Indonesia in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was to an extremely significant, and perhaps decisive, extent based on foreign-currency income from oil. In 1970-1981, the economic growth rate of the country was almost 8 percent on average. Over the indicated 12 years, the gross national product grew by more than 2.3 times in constant dollar terms and, in current prices, reflecting first of all the enormous growth in oil prices, by 16.1 times. (Footnote 3) (Nota keuangan dan rancangan anggaran pendapatan dan belanja negara tahun 1984/1985. Jakarta, 1984, hal. 206.)

Income from oil (and to a lesser extent from natural gas) has allowed the Indonesian state to invest large amounts of capital in various sectors of the national economy through budgetary channels, which has led to a considerable increase in industrial and agricultural production, an expansion of domestic markets and an improvement in the state of the national economy overall. An economically important phenomenon was the rapid establishment and reinforcement of a position of national private enterprise and the investment of large amounts of capital in various sectors of the economy in the 1970s and the beginning in the 1980s. Favorable foreign market conditions and demand for Indonesian products, especially oil, on the world market along with an expansion of domestic markets opened up possibilities for enormous investments of foreign private capital not only in the oil-producing sector, but other sectors of the economy as well. The stability of the Indonesian regime has aided the well-disposed attitude of foreign creditors--foreign states and international and private finance and credit organizations--toward it.

In 1980-1981, the economic and foreign-currency situation of Indonesia remained exceedingly favorable with regard to the ever increasing world price level for oil, as on this basis a considerable expansion of investment and various spheres of the national economy was planned.

Being a major crude petroleum exporter, Indonesia until recently had at its disposal only small petroleum-distillate capacity and was forced to import a considerable a varied assortment of petroleum products for its own needs, primarily from Singapore, where the refining of Indonesian petroleum took place. The import of petroleum products, naturally, was a direct and considerable deduction from the foreign-currency oil income of Indonesia. In 1983, work was completed on expanding three oil-distillate refineries--in Cilacap, Balikpapan and Dumai; a complete halt to the purchase of petroleum products in Singapore and the expansion of their own export in the near future is proposed. (Footnote 4) (Indonesia Times. 22 Feb 84.)

Since 1982, however, the country has entered into a new and apparently protracted phase characterized by the effect of such negative trends as a substantial reduction in growth rates, a decline in capital investment and, consequently, a narrowing of the scale and a slowing of the time periods for the transformations of the economic structure noted earlier, a fall in export volume and the like. The gross national product increased by only 2.2 percent in 1982--this is the lowest indicator since the end of the 1960s. For the first time in many years, the share of agricultural products in the gross national product did not decline, and the proportion of the refining and especially the extraction industries in it actually declined. (Footnote 5) (Nota keuangan..., hal. 206-207.) Oil production dropped by 20 percent (Footnote 6) (Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol 20, 1984, No 3, p 290) and exports fell by almost 20 percent, while imports grew insignificantly--by less than 4 percent. Especially impressive was the increase in the deficit in the current balance of trade accounts--13.2 billion dollars versus a 4.5-billion-dollar deficit in 1981 and a surplus of 0.5 billion dollars in 1980. (Footnote 7) (Nota keuangan..., hal. 175, 180.) The country's foreign-currency reserves declined.

This unfavorable situation arose under the influence of the economic slump in the developed capitalist states, which brought about a reduction in their demand for raw materials, especially energy. The country had no real possibilities to compensate for the resultant losses through the formation of the shipment of other export commodities, the more so as market conditions on their markets were also unfavorable. A reduction in world oil imports is associated not only with the current stagnation of a cyclical nature in the capitalist economy, but also with the effect of a series of more persistent and long-term trends that were a consequence of the world energy crisis: the developed countries were able to achieve a reduction in the energy consumption of production and transportation and the more efficient consumption of energy resources; liquid fuel was supplanted by alternative energy sources.

In order to weaken the acuteness of the economic problems that has arisen, the Indonesian state has resorted to a series of measures aimed first of all at the accumulation of internal reserves--personal savings and tax receipts. At the same time, it has made efforts to develop the infrastructure more actively and has simplified investment rules. According to official data, in 1983 the gross national product grew by 4.2 percent. (Footnote 8) (Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol 20, 1984, No 5, p 2.) Since the second half of the year, an appreciable increase in foreign-currency reserves has begun, partially with regard to the return of a significant share of capital extracted on the eve of the devaluation of the rupiah carried out in April. A gradual growth in several types of oil export later began to be noticed; this trend was preserved in 1984 as well. According to official data, over the first eight months of 1984, export receipts from them have totaled 3.8 billion dollars. Over the same eight months, more than 3.6 billion dollars of liquified natural gas was shipped. All of this has made it possible to compensate for the continued decline of foreign-currency income from oil. According to preliminary data, the economic growth rate in 1984 was higher than in 1983, and approached the rate established by the five-year plan in effect (1984/85-1988/89).

The shifts noted that have been observed in the Indonesian economy should not, however, be considered evidence of a possible rapid return of the country to the favorable economic situation of the 1970s, insofar as that is possible, as already noted (in any case, in the upcoming decade) only with the restoration of world petroleum market conditions to the level of the middle of the 1970s. The leadership of the country itself feels that Indonesia should expect difficult years of struggle to overcome the difficulties.

* * *

The confirmation and consolidation of the Soeharto regime has brought to life a new policy in the sphere of the oil industry. A policy of encouraging and supporting foreign capital in general and in this sector in particular was proclaimed. As a result, foreign capital grew more active on an even larger scale. The data cited above on the dynamics of oil production in Indonesia testify to this. Its increase under conditions of a rapid growth in oil prices has given the foreign monopolies gigantic profits. It must be kept in mind herein that a significant portion of oil and natural-gas export receipts, bypassing the state foreign-currency budget, goes into the safes of foreign companies and is either transferred abroad by them in the form of profits or is reinvested. Even according to official data (it must be supposed that the data is minimized), the income of foreign companies from Indonesian oil over 1979-1980 is expressed in an enormous total--8.6 billion dollars. Under the terms of the agreements of recent years, the oil extracted or the net profits are divided between the foreign oil companies and the Indonesian government in the ratio of 15:85 in favor of the latter. However, insofar as the operating expenses of these companies are covered by the oil, their share of the total profit is actually considerably higher. For example, the American Caltex Company, producing almost half of the oil in the country, deducted only 55 percent of the net profit for the Indonesian government in 1980. (Footnote 9) (BIKI. 24 Dec 81.)

In recent years, the foreign oil companies have begun to devote particular attention to the assimilation of offshore deposits. This has been furthered by shifts in the technology of oil production, making it possible to conduct efficient drilling operations even in deepwater maritime regions. Geological survey has shown that the offshore waters of Indonesia contain large petroleum reserves. The conditions for drilling are favorable here: shallow and calm seas and a water temperature that is high all year long. It has been calculated that the preparation of the offshore Indonesian oil fields for development will take 2.5 times longer than those in the North Sea. (Footnote 10) (Ooi Sin Bec. The Petroleum Resources of Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur, 1982, p 12.)

The foreign oil companies resorted to searching for offshore oil after an agreement was concluded at the insistence of the government of Indonesia to adopt as the juridical basis of their activity the principle of "the division of product" and the appropriate contracts were signed that envisaged the division of oil produced and not profits. After a certain period of vacillation over 1966-1968, 13 foreign companies entered into contract relations with the Indonesian powers. The Sinclair Exploration Company, later merged with Atlantic Richfield (ARCO), started drilling operations in the area

of Aryun in the Java Sea in September of 1966 and at the beginning of 1969 obtained oil from a depth of 1,400 meters--2,600 barrels a day. In 1970 Union Oil of Indonesia discovered a field in the area of Attaka, to the east of Kalimantan, and Independent Indonesian-American Oil (Iaapco) discovered one in the Sea of Japan (the Tsinta Field) to the southeast of Sumatra (the Kitti Field) with a productivity of the oil strata from 3,000 to 7,500 barrels a day. By the end of 1970, the recently created Pertamina oil company concluded a total of 30 agreements with foreign companies on the division of product. By 1974, practically all of the offshore areas of Indonesia were divided up. In 1974 the offshore fields generated 18 percent of national oil production. (Footnote 11) (Ibid., p 13.)

In the 1970s the scale of oil exploration and production was considerably greater than in preceding decades. Over seven years, from 1970 to 1976, 10 times more deposits were discovered than in 1960-1969. (Footnote 12) (Ibid., p 14.) New oil accumulations were discovered both on the major islands and on the continental shelf.

The decline in oil production at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, when world demand for it was still great, was caused by a decrease in the productivity of many old fields. As opposed to the countries of the Near East, the majority of the accumulations discovered in Indonesia were distinguished by small size (an average of less than 20 million barrels), and the discovery and placement in operation of new fields is essential to maintain a high production level. In 1977, when oil production in the country was at its highest level, almost half of the oil came from such sectors, the reserves of which, in the opinion of specialists, were already substantially depleted. The prospect of a reduction in production drew near, which is what actually occurred.

The decrease in overall oil production was a consequence not only of the depletion of accumulations, but also a reduction in the scale of oil-exploration operations. In the middle of 1975, the state company Pertamina, having accumulated inordinately large loans abroad, suffered major financial shocks as a result. In order to pay off the large debt, the government began to seek new income immediately. which was obtained through the replacement of the existing agreements with the oil companies with new ones that envisaged a higher share of deductions in favor of the state. The foreign companies, considering the new agreements an obstacle to the expansion of oil-exploration activity, sharply curtailed its scale in 1976-1977. As a result of the new jump in oil prices at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the scale of oil exploration in Indonesia was once again increased.

By today, the period of Indonesian reliance on the utilization of oil resources in its economic development to the extent that was typical for the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s has ended. This does not signify, however, that the role of the petroleum factor in the national economy is declining. In all likelihood, a great deal will depend on the state of the world market for oil and the amount of Indonesian foreign-currency income it creates, notwithstanding the diversification of the national economy and export that has occurred since the 1970s, until the end of the century.

Moreover, on the world market the price of oil has fallen sharply--by roughly three times from the end of 1985 to the middle of 1986.

It is unlikely that Indonesia will be able to increase appreciably, especially in real terms, income from oil exporting in this decade. Everything depends on the conditions of foreign marketing, the requirements of the domestic market and, of course, the production capabilities of the country. But we have already noted that in Indonesia the old and richest oilfields have been depleted, while the new ones entering service are distinguished by their small size. In 1983, oil production was 13 percent less, and export in physical terms was roughly 43 percent less, than the record year of 1977.

Under these conditions, in the opinion of specialists, a halt in the growth of the physical volume of oil exports is possible. In the version most favorable to Indonesia, this volume will total, on average, from 1.6 to 1.8 million barrels a day by the beginning of the 1990s. As for the influx of foreign capital to the oil-producing sphere of Indonesia, there is basis to surmise that it will continue. As a result, oil production in this decade can increase, but not by more than 1-2 percent a year.

The prospects for the export of Indonesian oil in the next decade, specialists feel, are also not very promising. The volume of oil shipped will not increase sharply not only due to the retention of unfavorable foreign-market conditions, but as a consequence of the diversion of an ever greater share of the oil produced to satisfy the needs of the domestic market. (This trend has been well tracked by the data in the Table.) A price rise for petroleum products on the local market, however, caused, in particular, by the abrogation of state subsidies, as well as the decline in economic activeness overall, has led to a decline in the rate of its consumption within the country (up to 3-4 percent a year in the middle of the 1980s). It is intended that in the future, growth in consumption will be 4-5 percent annually. (Footnote 13) (D. Dapice. Dealing with the 1980s: Indonesia and the World Economy.--Paper Presented at the Conference on Indonesia Held at Medford, Massachusetts, October 1983.)

In striving to economize oil and gas for export needs by reducing supplies for the domestic market, the Indonesian government has decided to accelerate the use of alternative energy sources (natural gas, coal). In the course of fulfilling the fourth five-year plan, the share of oil in the energy resources going for internal consumption is projected to decline up to 80 percent. Great hopes are placed on the Bukitassam Coal Field in south Sumatra, where the level of production is projected to increase from 200,000 to 3 million tons over the 1983-1988 period. Coal reserves are also being assimilated in western Sumatra and eastern Kalimantan.

The Indonesian government will compensate for the inevitable losses associated with a decrease in oil-export receipts as before through an increase, and moreover a substantial one, in the export of other types of products and on the basis of an even greater influx of foreign capital.

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UN RESOLUTIONS, PAST, PRESENT STATUS OF JERUSALEM DISCUSSED

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[Article by D.M. Sarkisov: "The Problem of Jerusalem at the United Nations"]

[Text] One of the central points of the whole set of Near-East problems and the unending Near-East conflict is the question of Jerusalem. This question--part of the Palestinian problem--in its modern form arose as a direct consequence of the aggressive policies of the Israeli ruling circles with regard to the Arab countries. In 1948-1949 Israel seized territory that according to a United Nations resolution of 1947 should have been part of an Arab Palestinian state, including the western part of Jerusalem. According to that resolution, this city should have had international status and be under international control. During the 1967 war, Israel occupied, along with the adjoining territories of the neighboring Arab countries, the West Bank of the Jordan River, including the eastern part of Jerusalem and its environs.

The unique nature of Jerusalem is explained by the originality of the ancient city and the concentration of "holy places" in it--religious, historical and cultural monuments that have paramount significance not only for the countries immediately involved in the conflict, but for all of human civilization and the three world monotheistic religions--Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The international nature of the city is also manifested in the architecture of the structures erected by the representatives of various nationalities. (Footnote 1) (Of the many dozens of structures of cultural significance located in Jerusalem, it is customary to single out those with the greatest religious reverence and call them "holy places"; the remaining cultural places are called "buildings and sectors of religious significance" in UN documents.) Proceeding from this originality of the city, the UN General Assembly and its specialized institutions, in their recommendations and resolutions, assign particular significance to the future of its status and the provision of security for the monuments that have international significance that are located both in Jerusalem itself and outside it, as well as the demilitarization and neutralization of the whole zone and the international legal consolidation of free access to the "holy places."

The problem of Jerusalem is first and foremost a political one. Its settlement is complicated by the fact that Tel Aviv has repeatedly declared

its pretensions for the whole city; a special session of the Knesset was held that declared Jerusalem to be the "sole and eternal" capital of Israel. Meanwhile, a just solution to the Jerusalem question should take into account the legal requirements of all interested parties. Such a solution is possible only by removing Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied since 1967, creating an independent Arab Palestinian state and ending the state of war and establishing peace in the Near East.

As is well known, Palestine and Jerusalem, having been the object of struggle for centuries among various states of the East and European countries and having entered the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the 16th century (Footnote 2) (See, for example: I. Gray. A History of Jerusalem. London, 1969, pp 260-294; N.A. Dulina. "Osmanskaya imperiya v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh (30--40-e gody XIX v." [The Ottoman Empire in International Relations (in the 1830s and 1840s]. Moscow, 1980, p 54; The History of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1959, pp 645-646; V.N. Vinogradov. ["Holy Places" and Mundane Matters (Anglo-Russian Relations on the Eve of the Crimean War].--NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA. 1983, No 5, pp 136-153, No 6, pp 129-144.), was occupied by British troops at the end of the First World War. Their commander, Gen Allenby, proclaimed the preservation of the "status-quo" of Jerusalem in the name of Great Britain in December of 1917. The following principles of "status-quo" were declared: the defense and protection of the "holy places" of the civil and religious interests of all religious communities as well as buildings and territories of religious significance, and freedom to exercise worship by the representatives of all religions in accordance with their traditions. (Footnote 3) (Al Tibawi. Jerusalem through History: A City of Three Faiths.--Time. Vol 11. N.Y., 1973, p 3; I. Gray. Op. cit., p 289.) These principles were fixed in the text of the British mandate for Palestine, confirmed by the League of Nations in July of 1922. Jerusalem became the administrative center of the British mandate territory of Palestine and remained such until May 15, 1948. The repression of the British powers could not restrain the rise of the liberation struggle of the Arab people of Palestine seeking independence. This struggle unfolded with new force after the conclusion of the Second World War. Recognizing the inability of England to administer Palestine by the old colonial methods, the British government tried to find a compromise solution to the problem. In the summer of 1945 an Anglo-American Commission on Palestine was formed that worked out the so-called Grady-Morrison Plan, according to which the creation of a cantonal state in Palestine was proposed. Jerusalem and Vifleyem would therein be placed in a separate enclave administered by a British high commissioner. The Arab states categorically rejected the Grady-Morrison Plan, insisting on the granting of independence to Palestine.

In its actions in the Arab East, England tried to make use of the Zionist movement, which had gained in strength and consciously placed itself at the service of British Near-East policy, as a support. The development of events in Palestine during the Second World War and especially after its conclusion demonstrated that the calculations of England for a union with Zionism and the creation there of a "Jewish national seat" was not justified. The crisis of British colonial policy in Palestine was considered by the Zionists to be a favorable moment for a transition to the implementation of their long-nurtured plans to seize Palestine and turn it into a Jewish state.

Having become convinced of the impossibility of resolving the Palestinian question with their own resources, the British government handed it over for UN consideration in April of 1947. The General Committee of the 1st Special Session of the General Assembly, created on April 28, 1947, handed over the issue for the discussion of the First Committee, which was in charge of political issues of security. The committee adopted a resolution recommending to the General Assembly that a Special UN Commission on the Palestinian Question (UNSCOP) be created among representatives of 11 UN member states.

According to the plan worked out by UNSCOP, which became UN Resolution No 181/II on November 29, 1947, Jerusalem was singled out as an independent entity—*corpus separatum*—under international administration, in which, aside from the city itself, would be included the surrounding towns and cities. Among them, the easternmost was Abu Dias, the southernmost Vifleyem, the westernmost Eyn Karim and the northernmost Shufat. In this version, the Jerusalem zone made up 1 percent of the territory of Palestine; some 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews lived in the zone. An enclave that considerably exceeded the territory of Jerusalem in its municipal boundaries and occupying roughly 260,000 square kilometers was subject to internationalization, while the chief "holy places" of Jerusalem were located in an area of 4 square kilometers. Despite the fact that Jerusalem was singled out by UNSCOP from the context of the Palestinian problem, the real prospects for determining the future fate of this unique city in this case depended on the adoption of the resolution of the General Assembly on the Palestinian problem overall.

At a UN General Assembly session on November 29, 1947, the plan was approved with 33 votes in favor, 13 against and 10 abstentions. At the same time, the General Assembly obligated the UN Trustee Council to complete the development of the status of Jerusalem for the next session without detriment to the basic principles of the international regime planned in General Assembly Resolution No 181/II, and to immediately bring it into being. The resolution envisaged that Jerusalem would enjoy special international status and be administered in the name of the United Nations. The aim of the status was proclaimed as "to defend and protect the spiritual and religious interests of the three unique and great monotheistic religions connected with the city, to ensure the maintenance of religious peace and to encourage the peaceful development of mutual relations between both Palestinian peoples on the holy ground." (Footnote 4) (The United Nations. Official Report of the First Special Session of the General Assembly. Vol. 2. add. 2, supp. 13. New York, 1947, p 72.) One of the most important aspects of the future status of Jerusalem would be its complete demilitarization and neutralization, as well as the forbidding of activity of any semi-military organizations or formations in it.

A battle was waged around the question of the status of Jerusalem in the United Nations during which every imperialist power tried to obtain certain advantages. The plan for the internationalization of the city was supported by the Vatican and several other governments of those countries of Europe and Latin America where the positions of the Catholic Church were upheld. France and the Vatican, as early as when UNSCOP, created by the General Assembly, began to prepare proposals for the future structure of Palestine, began a broad international campaign for the purpose of seizing positions in

Jerusalem. The Vatican therein proposed that the territory assigned by the United Nations to the international zone not be limited, but that a principle of "functional internationalism" be adopted, which proposed the establishment of international monitoring of all "holy places" on the whole territory of Palestine. The Vatican received the assurances of the American president that the United States supported the idea of the internationalization of Jerusalem. (Footnote 5) (Storia e politica. Anno 21. Milano, 1982, fasc. 1, pp 57-98.) It must be said, however, that the United States, although they voted for the resolution mentioned above, insisted on the temporary trusteeship of the United Nations over the city from the very beginning of military action between Israel and the Arab states, supposing that this would help them establish control over the administrative center of Palestine and in that manner spread their influence over the whole country. The American delegation introduced a proviso to the resolution for this purpose on the transfer of Jerusalem to the trusteeship of the United Nations until a form of self-government was created in the city that was "acceptable to both states." (Footnote 6) (P. Manuel. The Realities of American Palestine Relations. Washington, 1949, p 346.) In creating obstacles to the intentions of the Catholic states in the United Nations, England also did not object openly to the resolution (it abstained from the voting on the draft resolution), planning to hand Jerusalem over to its protege--King Abdallah of Jordan. At the same time England, considering this region to be an important point in its colonial system, tried to hinder the strengthening of American influence here.

The USSR and the countries of peoples' democracy, proceeding from the real situation extant in Palestine at that time, voted to divide it into two independent states and, consequently, to establish international administration over the Jerusalem zone with the proper regard for the civil rights of the population of the city and the granting of the opportunity of resolving internal issues to it on the basis of self-administration.

Taking into account that in 1947 Jerusalem was in the Arab zone, the Zionists had a positive attitude toward the idea of the internationalization of the city. This was dictated first and foremost by the fact that they intended to use the implementation of the resolution for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in the future.

As a result of the war of 1948-1949, Israel seized part of the territory designated for an Arab state in the UN resolution, as well as a number of Arab towns and cities on the territory allocated to the "international zone of Jerusalem," including the "New City." The Jordanian Army occupied the eastern part of the city (including the "Old City"). On November 30, 1948, an agreement was signed between Jordan and Israel according to which the city was in fact divided into two parts. The line of demarcation dividing the city was a "no-man's land, and the UN staff observing the fulfillment of the Arab-Israeli truce agreements was located in the southern part of it. In spite of UN Resolution No 181/II, the aggressors created a municipality in the western part of Jerusalem that acted in accordance with Israeli laws. Many Israeli state institutions were transferred to the western part of Jerusalem even before its declaration as the "eternal capital of Israel." Israel also violated the truce agreement with Jordan that prohibited the entry of large military forces or heavy equipment into Jerusalem. Israel's seizure of part

of the territory of Jerusalem intended for the creation of the Arab Palestinian state was met with decisive resistance by the League of Arab States and the world community. Neither the great powers nor other states agreed with the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. (Footnote 7) (The exception was the Netherlands. During the British mandate the Dutch representation in Palestine and Jordan was located in Jerusalem. In May of 1953 the new Dutch envoy submitted his letters of credentials to the Israeli president in Jerusalem.)

The unauthorized actions of Israel did not remove the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem from the UN agenda, and on December 11, 1948, having considered the situation in Palestine, the General Assembly, in Resolution No 194/III, designated a Palestinian Coordinating Commission made up of representatives of the United States, Turkey and France, and charged it to present the next, 4th, session of the Assembly with proposals for a relatively permanent international regime for the Jerusalem region, keeping in mind ensuring "maximum autonomy" for the religious communities and "the special international status of the Jerusalem region." The coordinating commission formed a special committee on the Jerusalem question. In the course of discussions by the committee of this problem with representatives of Israel and the Arab countries (except Jordan), the latter supported the UN General Assembly resolution on the establishment of international administration in Jerusalem, while the Israeli representative tried to avoid a direct answer concerning the internationalization of the territory. Instead, Israel agreed to "functional internationalization."

The lack of acceptance of territorial internationalization by the Israeli government and its readiness to agree only to UN control over the "holy places" is explained by the fact that the overwhelming majority of them turned out to be in the sector of the city occupied by Jordan. Israel tried to bury the UN resolution on the creation of an international Jerusalem enclave within the borders defined by UN Resolution No 181/II, and in that way legalize the seizure of the western part of Jerusalem by Israel. At the same time, the proposal for "functional internationalization" was an attempt to mollify the influential Christian circles in the United Nations to a certain extent.

On September 1, 1949, the coordinating commission approved the draft of the Committee Act that envisaged the establishment of a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem region, and handed it over for the consideration of the 4th Session of the General Assembly. According to the draft, the power of the UN commissar was extended basically to such issues as foreign relations, the protection of the "holy places," the demilitarization and neutrality of the Jerusalem region and the assurance of the rights of "religious groups of the population." The city remained divided into Arab and Jewish zones with a line of demarcation between them: the scope of the local powers extended to all administrative issues with the exception of those in which there was an international vested interest and questions under the jurisdiction of the UN commissar, designated by the UN General Assembly. The draft document envisaged the creation of a deliberative body for the Jerusalem region--a General Council--whose functions would include coordinating the activity of citywide services, preparing economic recommendations and the like. The

creation of an international tribunal and a so-called combined tribunal for the maintenance of law and order in both parts of the city was projected.

Although the accompanying report of the coordinating commission indicated the "flexibility" of the draft it proposed and the "acceptability" of any practical solution to the Palestine problem, it in essence signified an acknowledgment of the fact of a division of Jerusalem between Israel and Jordan, and it expressed a departure from the founding resolution of the General Assembly that envisaged the creation of an international enclave in Jerusalem. The draft also reduced the authority of the UN commissar. It was subjected to criticism by the proponents of internationalization.

The draft also did not satisfy the requirements of the the proponents of functional internationalization, since its implementation would lead to the actual exclusion of Jerusalem from the political life of the neighboring countries, that is, Jordan and Israel. As a result the draft, although it was also supported by the United States, France and England, was declined without further consideration at the 5th Session of the UN General Assembly at the end of 1949. At this session, the Australian delegation proposed increasing the complement of the coordinating commission from three to seven UN members and empowering it to review and supplement the proposals in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution No 181/II. The representatives of Bolivia, Holland, Chile and Cuba expressed a desire for a more well-defined preparation of the future status of the "holy places" of Jerusalem and an elaboration of the additional rights of the UN commissar. The Soviet delegation supported the proposal of Australia in principle with a proviso that envisaged the abolition of the coordinating council, and that in its place the completion of the work on the draft of the status of Jerusalem be entrusted to the Trustee Council. The Australian draft was accepted. Voting for it were the USSR, France and all of the Arab and Muslim states. The United States, England and Israel voted against it. Resolution No 303/IV, adopted on December 9, 1949, included the clause that lay at the basis of the preceding resolutions of the General Assembly on the Palestinian problem. The Trustee Council was charged with finishing the development of the status of Jerusalem, omitting the unacceptable clauses without detriment to the basic principles of an international regime for Jerusalem as projected in General Assembly resolution No 181/II. (Footnote 8) (UN Report (A/1289) of 14 Jun 50, p 1.) The coordinating commission announced the cessation of its activities.

The Trustee Council held a special session from December 8 through 20, 1949. The resolution it adopted indicated that the transfer of Israeli government institutions to Jerusalem made the implementation of the international status of this city more difficult. It was proposed that Israel rescind all of the steps it had taken earlier and restrain itself from any actions that could hinder the realization of the General Assembly resolution. The government in Tel Aviv ignored the appeal of the council.

Trustee Council Chairman R. Garreau, striving to preserve the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem and at the same time making use of the clause of resolution No 303/IV of December 9, 1949 that the Council was granted the right to review the status, advanced a new plan: it envisaged the transformation of Jerusalem into an "economically free zone." R. Garreau

proposed the division of the territory of the city into three parts: an Israeli zone under the administration of the state of Israel; a Jordanian zone under the administration of the Hashemite Kingdom; and, an "international city" under the collective supreme power of the United Nations and under the administration, observation and jurisdiction of the Trustee Council, which would designate a governor for the "holy places." This person would in turn receive the right to preserve the "holy places," as well as the religious institutions in any part of Palestine outside of Jerusalem, in the name of the United Nations. His plan was rejected not only by Israel and Jordan, who did not agree to the internationalization of the city even in such a weakened form, but by the Trustee Council itself, since this plan was a departure from Resolution 303/IV as it did not envisage an international regime over all of Jerusalem. Sweden next took the initiative in advancing proposals for functional internationalization at the United Nations, supported in voting by the United States and England. On April 4, 1950, after discussions in the Trustee Council, the status of Jerusalem was confirmed, conforming overall to the draft of April 21, 1948 but without a clause on the economic union between the Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, as well as depriving the governor of Jerusalem of the rights of protection and access to the "holy places" on the territories of Jordan and Israel. The corresponding draft resolution, presented by the Political Committee, did not obtain the necessary 2/3 of the votes at the 5th Session of the UN General Assembly.

Under conditions where the Western powers, who then controlled the majority of the United Nations, tried to provide for their own interests in Jerusalem, the Soviet government refused to support UN General Assembly Resolution No 303/IV on the permanent international control of Jerusalem, since it in essence did not satisfy either the Arab or the Jewish population of Jerusalem and all of Palestine. (Footnote 9) (See: Ye. Dmitriyev. "Palestinskiy uzel" [The Palestinian Problem]. Moscow, 1978, p 186; E. Eugene Bovis. The Jerusalem Question, 1917-1968. California, 1971, p 89.)

After 1950 and right up until the Israeli aggression of 1967, the question of the status of Jerusalem was not raised at UN sessions. The extant situation (the division of the city) lasted 19 years. The line of division passed through those places where the military actions between Israel and the Arab countries were halted in 1948. The complex political, economic and social problems of the in-fact dismembered city remained unresolved.

The war of 1948, concluded by truce, did not alter the expansionist policies of the Israeli government, and these policies posed the annexation of all of Jerusalem as a paramount task. (Footnote 10) (Ye.M. Primakov. "Anatomiya blizhnevostochnogo konflikta" [Anatomy of the Near-East Conflict].--Moscow, 1978, p 54.) During the Israeli aggression of 1967 against the Arab states, the defense minister of Israel at the time, M. Dayan, declared: "We have returned the second part of our capital of Jerusalem, so as never to be parted from it again." (Footnote 11) (Quoted from: R. Praff. Jerusalem: Keystone of Arab-Israeli Settlement. Washington, 1969, p 35.)

On June 27, 1967, the Knesset quickly passed three laws that were intended to serve as the "legal basis" for the annexation of East Jerusalem. The first of these granted the opportunity of extending the power of the laws of Israel to

"any part of Eretz Israel (Footnote 12) (This is what the Zionists call all of the territory of the former Palestine.); the second extended the borders of any Israeli municipality onto the territory mentioned in the first law; the third law--"The Defense of Holy Places"--envisioned various punishments for the damage to the "holy places," but skirted all of the important issues touching on their administration. The day after the adoption of these laws, a decree of the government in Tel Aviv was promulgated on the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel and the extension of Israeli law to the whole city. (Footnote 13) (N. Blishchenko. International Law and the Crisis in the Near East.—MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. 1969, No 1, p 47.)

In view of the fact that Israel, in violation of international law and the principles of the United Nations, annexed East Jerusalem and took steps to change the geographical, demographic and historical nature and status of the city, the organs of the United Nations—the General Assembly, the Security Council—have year in and year out tried to influence Israel and achieve its withdrawal from the occupied part of Jerusalem. At the 5th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on June 4, 1967 at the suggestion of the Pakistani delegation, Resolution No 2253 (E-U) was adopted by 99 votes, which condemned the annexation of Jerusalem and called upon Israel to refrain from the annexation of the Arab part of the city, where some 65,000 Arabs reside. On June 14, 1967, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No 2254 (E-U) in which not only was regret expressed with regard to the refusal of the Israeli ruling circles to carry out the previous resolution, but the demand was made of Israel to abrogate all measures taken earlier and in the future to restrain itself from any actions aimed at altering the status of Jerusalem.

In September of that year, the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations at the time, U Thant, on the question of Jerusalem was considered; the report emphasized that as a result of Israeli actions "the Arab way of life, Arab traditions and the Arabic language will suffer irreparable harm." (Footnote 14) (Ibid.) Resolutions of the Security Council were specifically devoted to Jerusalem, in which all of the legislative and administrative measures of Israel such as the expropriation of land and colonization were deemed null and void. The necessity of protecting the unique spiritual values of the city were especially emphasized in Security Council Resolutions No 465 of March 1, 1980, No 476 of June 30, 1980 etc.

Israel ignored all of these resolutions. Moreover, on June 30, 1980 the Israeli Knesset again adopted a law ("fundamental law") "legalizing" the annexation of Jerusalem. The UN Security Council, having emphasized that the acquisition of territory by force is impermissible in international relations, approved Resolution No 478 on August 21, 1980 with 14 "yes" votes and one abstention (the United States), which resolution did not recognize the Israeli "fundamental law" making changes in the nature and status of Jerusalem. The resolution calls upon those states who opened diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to leave there (this request was fulfilled by all of the states).

The excesses of the Israeli occupiers of East Jerusalem continue to be supported by the United States. Recently, for example, the U.S. representative made use of the right of veto in voting on a Security Council

resolution that condemned Israel for provocation organized by Knesset deputies at the Muslim holy Al-Ayaksa mosque. (Footnote 15) (PRAVDA. 2 Feb 86.)

A number of Security Council resolutions devoted to the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the cornerstone Resolution No 242 of November 22, 1967, directly concern Jerusalem as well. Their precise execution would facilitate the settlement of the Palestinian problem overall and the status of Jerusalem in particular. Israel, however, has not even begun to think of fulfilling them.

The Security Council Resolution that envisages the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all of the occupied territories, notwithstanding its shortcomings (Footnote 16) (There was no mention of the necessity of a political solution to the Palestinian problem, i.e. the creation of an independent Arab Palestinian state, but just a mention of a "just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees."), has become in essence the accepted international legal basis for seeking a just settlement of the Near-East conflict. The necessity of its fulfillment is emphasized by all that have a vested interest in the establishment of peace in the Near East. Naturally, the fate of East Jerusalem should be resolved in the context of the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all of the Arab lands occupied in 1967.

The Soviet position on the Jerusalem question proceeds from the fact that East Jerusalem is a part of the Arab territory of Palestine occupied by Israel in 1967. Consequently, all clauses of international law and all UN resolutions on the territories seized by Israel during the 1967 war and the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the annexed Arab lands extend from it. This approach to the issue is reflected in the foreign-policy initiative of the Soviet Union which it advanced on September 15, 1982. The USSR at that time advanced well-defined proposals whose implementation would lead to a just and lasting peace in the Near East. A peaceful settlement can and should be based on principles that correspond both to general principles of international law and to the specific resolutions of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly that touch on a settlement for the situation in the region. At the appropriate point in the indicated proposals on the future status of Jerusalem, the Soviet Union expressed specific concepts regarding the resolution of the question of Jerusalem. The USSR, in particular, insists that "the eastern part of Jerusalem, which was occupied by Israel in 1967 and where one of the chief Muslim holy places is located, should be returned to the Arabs and become an integral part of the Palestinian state. Free access to believers to the places of worship of the three religions should be ensured in all of Jerusalem." (Footnote 17) (PRAVDA, 16 Sep 82.)

The question of the status of Jerusalem remains one of the most important ones in the struggle of the Arab peoples for the liberation of the lands occupied by Israel and the satisfaction of the legal national rights of the Palestinian people and against American imperialist support for the aggressor. We note, for example, that much attention was devoted to the question of Jerusalem at the Summit Conference of Arab Nations that took place in September of 1982 in Fez. Four of eight fundamental points in the plan for a political settlement in the Near East developed at the conference concern Jerusalem. The plan envisages the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all of the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including the Arab section of Jerusalem, the elimination of

Jewish settlements there and the establishment of the capital of an independent Palestinian state. The plan indicates the necessity of ensuring the freedom of religious practice at "holy places" and proposes the provision of a guarantee of this on the part of the Security Council and its monitoring during the transition period. It is important to note that the principles proposed by the Arab countries at the conference in Fez for the peaceful settlement of the Near-East and Palestinian problems basically coincide with the positions of the Soviet Union on this issue.

A new initiative of the Soviet Union, advanced on June 29, 1984 on the convening of an international conference on the Near East under the aegis of the United Nations and with the participation of all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people, is a further development of earlier Soviet positions. Among the key issues for a settlement, three are singled out in the Soviet proposals that directly concern the problem of Jerusalem: returning East Jerusalem to the Palestinian state, recognizing the religious significance of the city and ensuring the rights of the representatives of other religions. The convening of an international conference on the Near East under the aegis of the United Nations would facilitate the democratic resolution of the Jerusalem problem. The United Nations could be the guarantor (or one of the guarantors) of the implementation of its settlement across the board.

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WESTERN AFRICANIST'S DEVELOPMENT THEORIES CITED, CRITICIZED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 140-148

[Article by S.F. Misiri: "Problems of Economic Consolidation in the Countries of Africa as Treated by R. Green"]

[Excerpts] At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, after a slump in the world capitalist economy, the African countries were seized by a deep economic crisis that was aggravated by a drought of many years which brought the food problem to the utmost extreme in the majority of them. Several countries were actually on the brink of economic catastrophe. Social instability grew on the continent. Many national and general African programs of development were disrupted or put off for an indeterminate period: among the latter, it is enough to mention the Lagos Plan and the Program for the Industrial Development of Africa in the 1980s. The bankruptcy of a number of theoretical concepts and models of African development was revealed.

The acuity of the problems before the countries of the continent brought about broad discussions on the sources of the crisis and ways of overcoming it. In the course of them, a certain confusion was detected in the scientific circles of the West: in published research, a fundamental place was devoted to analysis of the causes and mechanism of operation of the current crisis, while positive programs for surmounting the consequences of the recession were lacking. In any case, actions of a short-term and palliative nature were proposed. Evaluations of the prospects for the development of the continent, of which there was no shortage in the 1970s, now became much more guarded. (Footnote 1) (An example could be the annual and special reports of the World Bank, IMF and UNCTAD at the beginning of the 1980s: World Bank Annual Report, 1982. Washington, 1983; IMF. Annual Report. Washington, 1982; UNCTAD Trade and Development Report. N.Y., 1982; Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. Washington, 1981.)

In the stream of foreign economic literature devoted to the crisis in Africa, attention is drawn to the work of prominent African scholar Reginald Green. The name of this scholar is well known beyond the academic sphere. He is well known in business circles in the West that have interests in Africa, in various international organizations and in the sphere of diplomacy and politics. The author of a multitude of publications, R. Green is among the galaxy of economists-practitioners such as A. Seidman, T. Killik, F. Stuart

and Ya. Livingston who have worked in Africa for many years as economic consultants, instructors at institutions of higher learning etc. An American by origin, R. Green was an associate for many years, and is now a professor, at the Sussex Research Institute of Development Problems (Great Britain). He has worked in more than 30 African countries, including as an economic consultant to President J. Nyere in Tanzania. The activity of R. Green in this post acquired widespread fame, insofar as he was the initiator of many of the undertakings of the Tanzanian leadership in the sphere of economics and participated in the development of a policy for the development of the state sector, measures for overcoming crises and the development of policy alternatives that thrust the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank onto Tanzania. R. Green was also an adviser to a considerable number of international organizations, including UNCTAD, the Group of Advisors on Economic Issues, the World Council of Churches, the Catholic Institute of International Relations and the United Nations Institute on Namibia.

A number of R. Green's progressive ideas have already been reviewed in Soviet economic literature. In the 1960s R. Green, in conjunction with A. Seidman, proposed the concept of inter-African economic integration. This idea was later embodied in the development programs of many African states, the Organization of African Unity and the UN Economic Commission for Africa. In 1974, at the Multinational Firms in Africa Conference, organized jointly by the African Institute of Economic Development and Planning (AIEDP) and the Scandinavian Institute of African Research, the scholar criticized theories that proved the inevitability of support for multinational corporations in the development of the countries of the continent, and proposed a system of measures that were deemed to counteract the expansion of the international monopolies. (Footnote 2) (See in detail: Foreign Concepts of African Economic Development. Critical Analysis. Moscow, 1980, pp 32-33, 61, 87, 103.)

The concept of economic consolidation has been expounded by R. Green in works written at the beginning of the 1980s.

* * *

In analyzing the sources of the crisis and its effect on the world economy, Green emphasizes that the North should have just as much of an interest in overcoming the recession in the South as the South itself does. He asserts that scenarios for the escape of the South from the crisis can easily be composed. The problem is that the North, on which the state of affairs in the South largely depends, will not even discuss these scenarios unless they correspond to its own interests. As an example, Green cites the fate of the program to establish a New World Economic Order (NWEO), the discussion of which began as early as 1974: "Looking back, it is possible to ascertain that the program was without foundation from the beginning: this was especially apparent with the strengthening of the 'new world economic disorder.'" And the matter is not only so much that the crisis altered the whole pattern of priorities. Essential for a discussion, and more so for the establishment, of the NWEO, the countries of the West reconsider their positions on the development of the "Third World," including "the importance of supporting the development of the South and their own economic resurrection." (Footnote 3)

(R.H. Green. "Things Fall Apart": The World Economy in the 1980's.--Third World Quarterly. Vol 5, London, 1983, No 1, p 90.)

R. Green sees one of the key tasks of the policy of consolidation as reducing dependence on the influx of resources from without, i.e. in the implementation of a "self-sufficiency" policy. However, paradoxical as it may be, national economic integration first requires an increase in imports, as it is namely a shortage of the latter that is the main obstacle to the full utilization of existing potential. (Footnote 7) (R.H. Green. "Things Fall Apart...", p 87; idem. From Deepening Economic Malaise..., pp 17-18; idem. African Economies in the Mid-1980's—"Naught for Your Comfort But That the Waves Grow Higher and the Storms Grow Wilder."—Recession in Africa. Ed. by J. Carlsson. Uppsala, 1983, p 178.) Green notes that with the implementation of a policy of national economic integration (self-sufficiency), the loss of the ability to import can have much greater negative consequences than in an economy oriented toward export. At the same time, this does not signify that the self-sufficiency model is incorrect. Only "at first this strategy is very vulnerable to external influences." The consistent implementation of consolidation in the future should considerably weaken dependence on the import component. (Footnote 8) (The author cites the example of pernicious consequences of the reduction of imports undertaken in one African country. According to his calculations, the decline in production in industry due to the shortage of imported components on a cost basis was four times greater than the volume of resources "economized"; the payments for credit and imported fuel and foodstuffs began to devour 75 percent of export receipts; the drop in production in the machining industry entailed a decrease in taxation income, growth in the budget deficit and inflation and the activation of "black markets"; the standard of living declined sharply (see: R.H. Green. African Economies..., p 179.) At the same time, the necessity of relying on imports should not become absolute. Preference should be given to import-conserving technologies in particular in the new economic construction.

R. Green assigns greatest significance to developing agriculture, especially in light of the worsening food problem. A strategy of agricultural upgrading, in his opinion, should begin with the classification of agricultural producers to ascertain which of their categories will respond most efficiently to the proposed incentives and will make the greatest contribution to increasing agricultural production. In determining these categories, their readiness to accept risk should be taken into account, along with such factors as the ecological situation, the degree of access to various types of services, the proximity to markets for selling and even the ethno-psychological features of this or that group of producers. Depending on the specific conditions, the priorities in individual countries can vary. Overall, however, the chief target of the strategy should be rural poverty and semi-subsistence farming. (Footnote 14) (Ph. Daniel, R.H. Green, M. Lipton. A Strategy for the Rural Poor.—Journal of Development Planning. N.Y., UN, 1985, No 15, p 122-123.)

Green is opponent of the idea of privatization advanced by the World Bank as a prescription for economic revival in Africa. The bank's approach, he feels, does not withstand criticism for several reasons. First, it incorrectly sets state and private enterprise off against each other, since "in many cases the sole alternative to state initiative is private foreign capital." Second, the

depth of economic recession in no way correlates to the degree of freedom of action of market forces in this or that other country. The relation between these phenomena is much more complex. It is therefore incorrect to link economic recession with the activity of the state sector, as the Bank does. (Footnote 18) (Accelerated Development..., 1983, pp 6, 37.) Furthermore, "it is impossible to feel that relying on the private sector is preferable, especially on the plane of rendering services to the poorest peasants and workers at prices acceptable to them." He emphasizes the social functions of the state sector and its important role in providing for the "basic needs" of the population. In many cases (for example, the buying up of agricultural products or food supplies), the transfer of the functions of the state to private hands will signify direct losses--both on the level of enterprise profitability and on the macroeconomic and social levels. (Footnote 19) (Ibid., p 6; R.H. Green. African Economies..., p 183.)

At the same time, notes Green, one cannot make a fetish of the role of the state sector. Much work is required on discovering the key spheres that are designated for the activity of the state and for raising the efficiency and profitability of state enterprises. It is possible that several functions can be expediently transferred to private enterprise. Careful preliminary analysis is essential for this, however, since the "cost" of a shift in the boundary between the state and private sectors is very high. (Footnote 20) (Accelerated Development..., 1983, p 37.)

Green considers the creation of a balanced system of economic incentives an important task. He stresses that it is impossible to reduce everything to the manipulation of prices and wage scales. There exist many other controls that are still insufficiently utilized (the selective commodity satisfaction of demand; the provision of basic services, including increased access to education, health care and water supply; the granting of credit etc.). Price regulation should be supplemented by measures for managing material flows within the framework of the national economy. Relying on the market alone in many cases leads to considerable imbalances. Green includes the supply of commodities to rural areas, the systematic territorial distribution of oil products and the rational utilization of foreign-currency funds among the important spheres that especially require state regulation. (Footnote 21) (Thus, for example, in a situation where an accumulation of savings is occurring among the population with an insufficient commodity coverage of demand, it is expedient to import expensive consumer products: in these conditions, this can have a greater return than the investment of foreign currency in the sector of material production and services (R.H. Green. African Economies..., pp 188-190.)

The orientation of economic development toward intra-African collaboration is called upon to play an substantial role in consolidation. In the opinion of the scholar, however, regional economic integration should begin with cooperation in the sphere of material production and transportation and not with the expansion of material exchange, as has occurred in the majority of regional groupings in Africa. Experience proves that such an approach, as a rule, leads in the end result to the breakdown of integrated groupings due to the efforts of the partners to substitute imports in mutual trade with the

simultaneous increase of their own exports to the region. (Footnote 22) (R.H. Green. From Deepening Economic Malaise..., p 27.)

It is typical that R. Green, who was one of the leading specialists developing the concept of "basic needs" for Africa in the middle of the 1970s (and, on a broader plane, "alternative development") (Footnote 28) (See in detail: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA. 1985, No 8, p 63.), later spoke less and less about the need to redistribute income in favor of the poorest classes. Furthermore, in one of his recent works, he directly indicates the low efficiency of such a policy in modern Africa, arguing that under conditions of an overall decline in purchasing power, the possibilities for altering the level of income for this or that population group are very inconsiderable in practice. The sole way is increasing production, enlivening the economic situation and converting to "new development," which in and of itself will have a certain effect on the plane of raising the incomes of needy groups. At the same time, R. Green is already now recommending that increased attention be paid to the "most vulnerable groups" of the population. (Footnote 29) (Lately this term has become popular and is often encountered, for example, in World Bank documents. They have in mind those groups of the population that in a crisis situation (including under conditions of drought and other ecological disasters) suffer to the greatest extent. These are first and foremost the poorest segments, as well as women, children and the elderly, especially in rural areas.) Particular attention to the situation of these groups should be furthered, in the opinion of R. Green, not only by humanitarian concepts, but by the tasks of easing social tension as well. (Footnote 30) (R.H. Green. From the Deepening Economic Malaise..., p 32.)

What are the prospects, according to Green, for further economic development in the African states? The answer of the scholar is ambiguous.

On the one hand, he expresses the hope that "the economic disease in Africa south of the Sahara can be overcome." The growing comprehension of various circles, including African leaders, of the flows of the current crisis and its mechanism speaks in favor of this in particular. It is true, R. Green notes, that there exists an uncertainty concerning some important aspects of the problem and that this complicates the compilation of reliable forecasts. Thus, it is unclear how seriously the economic potential of a number of countries has been disrupted, and to what extent it will be "consumed" by the payment of old and new debts. These and other vague points make possible only a very approximate evaluation of the time needed for full renewal: from 1 year to 5-10 years in various cases. (Footnote 31) (Ibid., p 38.)

On the other hand, R. Green declares his lack of confidence in the future of Africa, which he perceives in quite gloomy tones. There exist, he feels, three negative socio-economic models to which many of the countries of the continent can turn: 1) the use of export income for the maintenance of a narrow segment of the ruling elite, which remains in power first and foremost thanks to external support (Zaire); 2) the granting of full freedom of action to national private enterprise, with regard to which a "black market" begins to reign in the economy (Uganda); and 3) "populist" regimes that consider the best way out of economic difficulties as reversing the whole development

process (the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea). (Footnote 32) (R.H. Green. African Economies..., pp 200-201.)

* * *

Green's plan of action, in its comprehensive and well-thought-out nature, undoubtedly stands out among the non-Marxist economic literature devoted to the crisis situation on the African continent. The measures he proposes have touched a chord both in Africa and in the world community overall. Thus, the influence of the ideas of R. Green are sensed in the economic programs of the Conference on Coordinating the Development of the South of Africa and those of a number of African countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe and others.

In one of the latest bulletins of the Research Institute of Development Problems in Sussex devoted to discussing the economic situation of the African countries south of the Sahara, the growth of agreement in Western academic and business circles concerning impending measures that could extract Africa from the crisis is noted. It is typical that even the World Bank has substantially eased its position compared to the initial proposals set forth in the well-known 1981 report "The Accelerated Development of Africa: A Plan of Action." (Footnote 33) (See: Towards Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action. IBRD. Washington, 1984.) Although conceptual differences of the representatives of various schools and practical organizations with regard to long-term prospects remain in principle, the unity of views concerning short-term measures is apparent. It is important to emphasize that this consensus is based to a considerable extent on ideas that are close to those of R. Green advanced within the framework of his concept of economic consolidation. (Footnote 34) (Sub-Saharan Africa: Getting the Facts Straight.—IDC Bulletin. Vol. 16, 1985, No 3, pp 1-8.)

A soberness of view is characteristic of R. Green; he is realistic in evaluating the difficult economic situation in Africa and openly expresses his doubts in cases where the ways for solving problems have still not been found. The program he has proposed for the creation of an internal mechanism for getting out of the crisis and the subsequent "new development" to a certain extent opposes the strategy of neocolonial exploitation. He is far from appeals for self-sufficiency herein, showing how deeply the countries of the continent are integrated in the system of the world capitalist economy and dependent on the influx of resources from without for their development.

At the same time, it is impossible not to note the bourgeois limitations of the views of R. Green and the reformist thrust of his recommendations. He sees himself in the role of some kind of "intercessor" who proposes measures that are deemed to introduce harmony in the relations between the center and the periphery of the world capitalist economy. In this sense his ideas, distinguished by greater realism than, for instance, the Brandt Report or the concepts of the New World Economic Order of the end of the 1970s (which he has repeatedly criticized), in essence do not differ from these programs.

The pragmatic orientation of the views of R. Green impart to his program a certain hint of market competitiveness. Such important tasks as ensuring the leading role of the state sector, the satisfaction of basic needs and the

redistribution of resources in favor of the poorest segments of the population, as well as questions of the effectiveness of state policies, he considers on a purely utilitarian plane. Thus, he considers raising the role of the state sector in production and the active state regulation of the economy to be essential but temporary measures--essential in view of the fact that market forces cannot currently extract Africa from the crisis.

R. Green justifies the necessity of redistributing resources in favor of the poorest segments and providing for basic requirements first and foremost for pragmatic reasons, and not for the purpose of achieving social justice as such. He feels that this course facilitates the growth of agricultural production and purchasing power and, consequently, an expansion of demand for domestic products overall, i.e. it stimulates economic revival, eases the consequences of stagnation or reduction of real income and averts dangerous social upheavals.

Green does not cite differences between the capitalist- and socialist-oriented countries. Among the possible models for the evolution of African states that he considers, we therefore do not find those countries that are implementing progressive socio-economic transformations, such as, for example, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Angola. R. Green justifies his position by the fact that the "economic situation of the African countries with the most diverse of strategic and political and economic institutions are equally depressed." (Footnote 35) (Recession in Africa, p 129.) This these is perhaps correct in evaluating today's economic situation, but is hardly acceptable in considering problems of economic policy and development prospects.

Apparently, it is namely a departure from ideology and the problems of socio-political orientation that does not permit R. Green to paint a more expansive picture of the future evolution of the countries of Africa. Nonetheless, this does not diminish the overall scholarly and practical significance of the ideas of this scholar.

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TWO REVIEWS OF COLLECTIVE WORK ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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[Reviews by Yu.G. Aleksandrov, B.I. Slavnyy [first review] and Ya.G. Mashbits [second review] of book "Razvivayushchiyesya strany v sovremenном mire: yedinstvo i mnogoobraziye" [The Developing Countries in the Modern World: Unity and Diversity]. Moscow, Chief Eastern Literature Editorial Board of Nauka Publishing House, 1983, 304 pp, editors-in-chief: I.V. Aleshina, I.D. Ivanov, V.L. Sheynis; authors' collective: I.V. Aleshina, I.A. Yegorov, I.D. Ivanov, V.I. Maksimenko, O.D. Ulrikh, M.A. Cheskov, V.L. Sheynis.]

[Text] This work has attracted the attention of specialists on the development problems of liberated countries first and foremost through its inquiring thrust. Proposing an intrinsic understanding of the process that acquires its shape and motive forces before our eyes, the authors make reference to the disputes that are underway among scholars and politicians. The work therefore is sharply topical and current but discursive as well; in a way it invites the reader, together with the authors, in argument with them, through consistent approximations, to develop a position that is more adequate on a scholarly and practical plane than that fixed in this book. In this refusal of pretensions of perfection, an openness to criticism and the expression of differences of opinion we see the merit of the work.

The name of the book, it seems to us, reflects not only its idea and substance, but also the paradoxical nature of those difficulties that the authors run up against: in the process of working on the book, the diversity of personal characteristics of the individual authors was manifested first and foremost, and their unity to a lesser extent. This diversity came to the surface while the unity was submerged. Outwardly the book looks varied in style, and sometimes even contradictory, and only at the level where the principal elements of its design are constructed in a logical series does the work really achieve a unity. But this level is too deeply hidden, it is concealed from the reader, it must be extracted, thought out, designed. We will try to do at least some of that work.

The macroformational model advanced in the book focuses a kind of unity of the temporary and spatial principles of the dispersal of reality. Thus, the fact of the affiliation of the East both in the present and the past to a secondary macroformation (which includes all of the historical types of exploited

societies) indicates its position on the axis of historical time. The spatial localization of given societies is established within the framework of another system of coordinates, which can theoretically be called "East--West." This spatial-time concretization of the situation of Eastern societies permits, the authors feel, "the determination of the preconditions of the formative commonality of the developing countries, as well as an indication of the apparent non-systematic nature of their allocation to any particular socio-economic system other than capitalism and socialism" (p 12). This statement is extremely instructive of the overall mood of the thinking of the authors of the work: they explain and uncover the significance of these or those situations from the point of view of their political and ideological resonance, but do not reveal the link between these situations themselves and do not demonstrate how they are combined in a unified system.

So then, the unity of East and West is explained by the exploitative nature of the social structure reigning in them. Before touching on the issue of the causes of disparities in the social organizations of the two regions of the world, we will turn to the problem of the diversity of the developing countries. This diversity is associated primarily with the specific dynamic of economic growth and, consequently, there is no need to determine its nature in formational categories. Not being formational, however, the explanation of this diversity can be completely theoretical, by way of example, fulfilled in the categories of political economy. (Footnote 4) (See, for example: Ph. Aydalot. *Dynamique spatiale et développement inégal*. Paris, 1976. The French economist proposes a political-economic theory for differentiating the developing countries, while he treats their unity not on the basis of the intrinsic formational nature of the countries taken individually, but proceeding from their affiliation with the world capitalist formation. From the laws of this formation he extracts a unity not only of the developing countries, but of the developed ones as well.) On page 95, the authors note a certain kind of similarity of the formational definition of the preconditions of the differentiation process, but they do it without confidence. As a result, section 2 of the book outwardly looks theoretically autonomous and unrelated to the logical system being developed in the book. This is all the more vexing as it is written, in our opinion, interestingly.

We will return to the explanation of the causes of the distinctions existing in the social organizations of East and West under conditions of the unity of their macroformational nature. The authors propose that in the countries of the West the macroformation was and remains represented by "pure" formations (slaveholding, feudalism, capitalism), while in the East it is structures that are "not articulated" on the basis of any specific method of production. The very fact of the "non-articulated nature" of the social structures of the East is explained in the book as follows: economic development there did not play (as opposed to the West) a determining role with regard to social, cultural, political etc. development. There is, as far as can be discerned from the text, a particular causality in this that is characteristic of the East alone; it is defined in the book as a "socio-genetic code."

The authors, however, apparently do not fully trust the explanatory capability of this hypothetical causality (by the way, its substance is nowhere made explicit) and in parallel with it advance the thesis, traditional in domestic

studies, of the special "routine nature" of the productive forces of the East (p 11). It is namely this routine nature that appears, if we follow the text literally, as the principal cause that determines the "non-articulated nature" of the formation in the East on the basis of some unified method of production. It is typical herein that the thesis of the routine nature is not at all equivalent to a conclusion on the poor productivity of the Eastern economy. (Footnote 5) (The idea of high productivity of the traditional Eastern economy in recent years has been more and more widely disseminated in Soviet science. See the works of A.P. Kolontayev and A.M. Petrov. We note that in the 18th century this was indicated by A. Smith and F. Keynes.) The discussion can only concern the low rate of evolution of the tools of labor, i.e. the element of productive forces that has occupied a subordinate position in the system of social production characteristic of the East. The concept of the "routine nature" is herein described not as productive forces overall, but only one aspect of them that is itself negative to that evolutionary role played by the tools of labor in Western countries in comparative descriptions. The thesis of the routine nature is the more so unconvincing as the authors themselves, on page 197, come out against a narrow treatment of productive forces, insisting on the inclusion of not only the means of production and manpower in them, but also the natural factor and scientific knowledge. In this manner, declaring on the first pages, fundamentally important for the whole book, the routine nature as the principal cause of the "non-articulated nature," the authors contradict their own concepts.

The contradiction becomes even clearer if one compares the given position with the authors' intention proclaimed on page 6 to overcome the chief flaw of the concept of independent development, consisting of the fact that "the developing countries constitute a commonality in it not on the basis of their internal formational nature, but... through their distinction from other societies." Other societies are understood to mean the West, and the sense of reproach toward the concept of dependent development consists of the fact that Eurocentrism has not been surmounted in it, that, in other words, its category is in essence the negative of Western categories that reflect Western realities.

Thus, in its current form the macroformational model consists of two competing explanations of one and the same phenomenon (a non-articulated nature). We have already discussed one of them (the routine nature of productive forces). The other explanation (the socio-genetic code) looks like a metaphor borrowed from evolutionary theory. In any case, it sends the reader beyond the solution of one mystery (the non-determinant nature of the superstructure spheres of the economy) to another mystery (the presence of a special "code"). We think that the idea of a code is a postulate, or an axiom not proven within the framework of the given concept, but very important for an understanding of its essence. It is namely in the context of it that the key tenets of the work become clear. We note again that the authors unfortunately are not concerned with elucidating the reader on the internal logical progression of the concept. It seems that this is an important shortcoming of the book.

The introduction by the authors of the postulate of a special "socio-genetic code" in the East predetermines to a decisive extent, in our opinion, the non-historical nature of the basic notions of the concept of the secondary

macroformation. This conclusion can appear unexpected: after all, outwardly the concept looks just like a historical one, treating the present as directly caused by link with the past, wherein not only the colonial one, but the precolonial one as well. If one individually analyzes the sense of the individual theses more carefully, however, it is impossible not to note that the concept is in essence a development process for the East as if devoid of that core that in the West was composed of economic evolution. All of the consequences arising from the acceptance of the thesis of the non-determinant nature of the superstructure by the base are not always perceived by the authors themselves; on page 238 they declare that in the developing countries that supposedly "income acts as a class-forming factor, where the accumulation of non-labor (for example, land rent) and labor (the savings of small producers, hired workers) income open up access to control over the means of production." This proposition permits a two-fold interpretation: the political-economic sense of it is that the abundance of human labor relative to all other types of resources leads to the fact that the person, with limited capital at his disposal, can obtain the right to have manpower at his disposal; the sociological sense can be understood as the fact that class structure in the developing countries reflects not so much the relationship of individual segments to the means of production as the difference in incomes.

To the greatest extent, the non-historic nature of the concept of the macroformation is revealed in the idea of the struggle of two "principles"--property and collective. This idea has become, in our opinion, one of the central ones of the work. It integrates the concept of the macroformation, expressing the social nature of the systems of East and West, it extracts alternatives for definition, uncovering the reciprocal nature of the socio-economic transformations in the East, and, mainly, it makes it possible to resort to a theoretical interpretation of such a phenomenon, so important for the political and socio-economic development of Eastern reality, as the quantitative growth of the population masses, torn from the traditional social context and not finding a place for themselves in the modern sector. Along with the authors, we are at the initial stage of interpreting this phenomenon, and therefore, it seems that the conclusions of the authors are not as important (they see a progressive social force in these masses) as their logic. We will try to track this logic.

We will begin with a consideration of how the work treats the property principle. The authors do not follow its generally accepted treatment (of property as a means of production), but rather supplement it with special intuitively understandable content which can roughly be defined as the estrangement of the person, his transformation into a state serf etc. On page 84 it is noted that the social processes that occurred in China during the Cultural Revolution and in Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge are a specific form of realization of the property principle in developing society. But on page 246, in discussing the events in Uganda at the beginning of the 1970s and in Iran after 1979, the authors emphasize that "a certain positive work, which consists of the 'cleansing' of social relations from surviving forms of private property..." is being carried out in these countries. Thus, the property principle in the modern world turns out to be connected both with pre-capitalist forms of exploitation and with capitalism in its national and world aspects and, finally, with non-capitalism (China, Kampuchea).

The list of social systems itself, which in the work is embodied by a unified property principle, testifies to the fact that the authors understand "principles" to mean not so much the interaction of specific historical forces as the struggle of some kind of absolute moral values and anti-values (of the "good--evil" dichotomy type). Speaking theoretically, the property principle is associated with an absolute evil, and collectivism with an absolute good. The collectivist "principle," according to the authors, is indelible in the developing world, while local and foreign capital cannot conclusively "digest" its multitude of carriers (p 23). There is no need to fear herein that the realization of this "principle" in practice will lead to regression: the point is that under the new conditions (i.e. once again under the external conditions to which the concept of dependent development refers) the given "principle" does not freeze "at the level of the one and only traditional and retrospective alternative to capitalism" (*ibid.*).

We are trying to understand why the authors saw only one of its potentialities in the collectivist principle--a progressive one revealing itself in battle with property, the exploitation of man by man and the like. There is another possibility associated with it--one that is archaic, spontaneous and especially dangerous under the modern economic and technological conditions of the developing countries, where the collectivist masses turn out to be separated from social production--that is not noted by the authors. Naturally, we are not contending here with the convictions of the authors or the specific evaluations of the socio-economic and political content of these or those events in the developing world; our reproach is that the theory of macroformation turns out to be non-historical overall, and this is revealed with especial force in the non-historical nature of the categories of the two "principles." Collectivism, for example, is one and the same and unchanging at least over the extent of the whole secondary macroformation. The authors rely on its persistence (p 22), and we propose that the ability of the given "principle" to survive two macroformations can hardly be explained by its irrational "vitality" and the adherence of the people of the East to the "legacies of the ancestors" alone.

In our opinion, the genuine dialectic of both the "principles" and their interaction can be revealed only as derived from the development of social production with its characteristic causality. Understanding that such a train of thought is seemingly blocked for the authors of the concept under review (since it turns out to be a contradiction with their convictions, even though they are unclearly expressed), we nonetheless would like to fix our point of view here. The transition from the appropriation of the products of nature within the framework of the primary macroformation to social production based on the investment of enormous expenditures of collective labor--here is what seems to be the explanation of the vitality of the collectivism of the East. This explanation also does not require references to a particular spiritual store of the people of the east or to their particular (compared to the West) adherence to tradition. Everything is reduced to the conditions of social production or, more precisely, to the optimal forms for the application of human labor: in the West, these forms have been individual from ancient times, while in the East they have been collective. (Footnote 6) (See our article: Yu. Aleksandrov, B. Slavnny. Man in the System of Productive Forces of the

Precapitalist Eastern Societies.--AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1984, No 4, pp 23-26.) But, accepting this hypothesis, we cannot in this manner consider collectivism within the framework of the secondary macroformation as a simple remnant of primary collectivism. The latter alters its essence in a cardinal fashion, changing from a factor of social mediation of the process of distributing the accumulated "gifts of nature" into a factor for the social organization of people in the production process. Thus, within the framework of the precolonial community, collectivism does not freeze at the level of "traditionalist retrospectives," but rather reflects the development process that society has undergone.

Collectivism undergoes mutation in the opposite direction, in our opinion, under the modern conditions of the developing countries. The peasants, forced into the city by resettlement, are only partly integrated into the existing forms of economic activity. A considerable contingent of them forms a community of Lumpenproletariat and marginal types organized on collectivist principles. But here is exactly where the negative tendency embodied in the collectivist principle is manifested: these masses turn out to be alienated from the development process and have an attitude of non-acceptance or even hostility toward it. Their ideals express the need not for progressive social changes, but for the restoration of the past (or clear aspirations are sometimes not yet defined among them). They are in fact sooner hostile to modern society as a civilization than to capitalism as a formation (Footnote 7) (For the idea of the necessity of making a distinction between civilizations and formations in the study of the East see: "Evolyutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremenennogo" [Evolution of Eastern Societies: A Synthesis of the Traditional and the Modern], p 15.); the latter they equate with the dissemination of the spirit of small trading, Western forms of life and consumption, the expansion of an alien culture and the like.

It seems that the non-historical treatment of the idea of the struggle of the two "principles" in the end result is furthered by the causal principle cited in the book that the authors define as the "socio-genetic code." This principle undoubtedly contains great explanatory capabilities, but at the same time entails theoretical costs. Chief among the costs is the fact that the concept of formations is deprived of its core: progression and regression turn out to be relative, mutually reciprocal and even difficult to distinguish. Such are the consequences arising from the train of debate adopted, although it must be acknowledged that this reflects not only the thought patterns, but also the contradictory processes that are occurring in our time in the developing countries. We would also add that the authors declare the concept of non-formationism "overcome" in domestic studies (p 7). The concept of the macroformation, moreover, demonstrates to us its own form of "non-formationism" of the East or, in other words, the specific nature of the formational processes in society for which the socio-genetic code hypothesized by the authors is immanent.

In conclusion we would like to note the unexpected and even somewhat paradoxical nature of the scientific results obtained by the authors of the book based on the employment of the concept of the secondary macroformation in analyzing the social processes of the East. Their dynamization of the spatial

dimensionality of society ("the non-articulated nature" of the methods of production, the East-West dichotomy), to the detriment of its time parameters, in fact does not turn out to supplant this second aspect of the concept or even diminish it. On the contrary, in our opinion, it is namely time that has advanced to the forefront, but only with the proviso that this time has turned out to be cyclical or even circular, but not linear. The collectivist "principle," comprised of remnants of the past in the second macroformation, has become a precondition of the future tertiary formation in the constructions of the authors. Thus, the circle of development actually closes: the past closes with the future, i.e. the process in a circular trajectory, and not in linear or sequential fashion. This scientific result seems to us to be the more important and instructive in that it was obtained objectively, seemingly independent of the intentions of the authors. Furthermore, it seems that they are not even aware of it and it can be reconstructed only by way of penetrating into the internal logic of their work, far from always clear and far from always visible on the surface.

* * *

The macroformational approach proposed by the authors of the book under review is a good foundation for interdisciplinary research on the genesis of socio-economic backwardness and the search for alternative ways of overcoming it. This problem is an important part of research on the political economy, sociology, specific economy, demography, history, political science, culture, economic and social geography, national studies and ethnography of the developing countries.

The book also convincingly demonstrates the fruitfulness of an enlarged--macroformational--approach for revealing the typological integrity of the social organism of the developing countries with their characteristic "socio-genetic code" of evolution. But whereas their own type of "genetics" is typical of developing countries, also undoubtedly typical of them is their own socio-economic "anatomy." It is namely that, along with the "genetic code of colonial heredity," that determines many of the aspects of their commonality and the functioning of their domestic socio-economic structures. The principal features of this "anatomy" herein are in these or those combinations that are characteristic of all developing countries. It is namely this that provides a grounding for their allocation into a certain typological group in the worldwide economy. And while within the framework of the macroformational approach the commonality of the developing countries is furthered by its internal formational nature (p 6), it is also closely connected with the presence of common features in the socio-geographic "anatomy" of the developing countries and the persistent nature of the disposition and territorial concentration of the economy and the population in them.

The authors note that within the framework of the commonality of the worldwide historical process between East and West, even at the dawn of mankind, there arose deep socio-economic distinctions. In discussing the diversity of the developing countries, it is also important to emphasize that the historical, economic, socio-political, ethno-cultural and geographic distinctions among them and within them are incomparably stronger than in the group of industrially developed capitalist countries. An objective analysis of this

diversity, especially in polyethnic countries (and they comprise the majority in the developing world) requires their thematic and interdisciplinary study at the level of regions and countries, and for some of the larger of them, by economic regions or historical realms. The national-studies and regional principles in the study of the macroformational diversity of the developing countries should occupy its own proper place in researching the problems of the developing world. The book under review also comes to this conclusion. Taking into account the specific originality of each country, macroformational analysis, it seems, can objectively uncover the scale and potential of the alternative nature of the choice of a model of socio-economic development. The range of this choice is quite broad--from "local" subimperialism and the strengthening of monopolistic tendencies to the implementation of deep structural transformations in the economy and socio-political life, including the choice of a socialist orientation.

The inclusion of the whole body of developing countries in the secondary (private-property) formation reflects not only the deepening differentiation, but the growing polarization of the developing countries. All of this undoubtedly "is built into" the macroformational approach, which up to this time has not been employed in practice in researching the problems of the developing world. The trailblazing nature of the monograph under review is displayed by the creative use of this approach.

An undoubted merit of the work can also be considered the fact that it makes broad and interesting use of typological approaches. For example, the classification of the developing countries according to the types of preference for foreign investment (pp 51-52) is proposed, and a number of other typologies are introduced. This is all the more important as questions of typology apropos of the developing countries have been poorly developed. Typological research is an important direction in the interdisciplinary study of the developing world, which can be accomplished on the methodological basis of macroformational analysis.

There are some contentious assertions that are encountered in the monograph, and not all issues receive a developed analytical treatment.

The impression could be created that the macroformational approach proposed by the authors could completely replace the concepts, widely disseminated in Soviet literature, of mixed economies (including "stable" ones), dependent development and a multiple-criteria approach. In point of fact, these three concepts of the genesis of the socio-economic backwardness of the developing countries have every basis to be developed in conjunction with the macroformational approach. Not one of these has been exhausted yet or employed in the analysis of the various macro-regions in the developing world.

The question of the internal dualism of the socio-economic structures of the developing countries in the formation process (p 21 and others) is treated in a somewhat traditional manner in the book. The authors justly equate it with the reproductive mechanism of the colonial period (p 19). But the "bisectional" or "bipolar" model of socio-economic structures and their inherent socio-economic space can adequately reflect the whole complexity of the developing world and its deepening differentiation and polarization. The

dichotomy of the "traditional" and the "modern" sectors and the introduction of the "state sector block" are all an unjustifiably approximate generalization and an inordinate simplification of what is complex. It is apparently more correct to speak of the multiple nature ("pluralism") of the socio-economic structures. This, by the way, also corresponds to the diversity under the real conditions of differentiation of the developing world. Having taken a confident step forward in posing the question of a macroformational approach, the authors of the monograph could have departed from the traditional "dual" concepts of the socio-economic structures of developing countries more decisively.

The work repeatedly notes the importance of an analysis and strict accounting for the interaction of external and internal factors of socio-economic development. This interaction determines many substantively important aspects of the macroformational originality of each developing country. At the same time, apparently, the proposition that "in the post-colonial period, endogenous and internal factors... advance to the forefront" (p 6) is completely precise and unambiguous. The external factors, and they include the transnationalization of the economy of many countries of the developing world, retain or even strengthen their significance.

It is well known that the system of productive forces is formed of somewhat interconnected and interacting structures, including historical (genetic), sectorial, social, administrative and territorial ones. All of them are important, but not all of them have received equal illumination in the monograph. Territorial structure, which of all the others is distinguished by great persistence and inertia, largely determining the backwardness of the whole reproductive mechanism in developing countries, was especially unlucky. Unfortunately characteristic of the work under review (as well as for the majority of the publications on the problems of the developing countries) is a unique type of "territoriality," an inattention to the spatial aspects of socio-economic development. The study of the socio-economic mechanism "along vertical lines" without its analysis "along horizontal ones," non-spatially, diminishes the research. This also relates to research on the genesis and modern tendencies of capitalist development, which is taking place, as is well known, in depth and in breadth. It is namely this that remains "outside the frame" of the monograph under review.

Either distortions of general or abstract positions or an insistence on factual accounts are frequently encountered in works on the problems of the developing world. A distinguishing feature of this book from other works of this type is the fact that a deep study of theoretical positions is combined with the use of extremely extensive and diverse concrete material in it.

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BOOK ON ASIAN, AFRICAN MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL REVIEWED

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[Reviews by N.G. Kireyev [first review] and M.A. Cheshkov [second review] of book "Upravlencheskiye kadry i sotsialnaya evolyutsiya stran Azii i Afriki" [Managerial Personnel and the Social Evolution of the Countries of Asia and Africa] by R.G. Landa. Moscow, Chief Editorial Board for Eastern Literature of Nauka Publishing House, 1985, 223 pp with bibliography and index of names]

[Text] This book is the first generalized research in Soviet literature of the administrative segment of the state sector in the countries of Asia and Africa. The author has uncovered and analyzed the general traits that typify the state of this segment and its specific nature in countries of various orientations. He has demonstrated that the social category he is studying reflects the reigning social ties in the given society, noted its function as a most important source for the formation of the ruling elite and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and revealed its contradictory nature--at once the unequal connection with the various classes of a mixed-economic society and, regardless of them, the merging of a technical-economic and political-administrative approach in its activities in solving the main problems.

The originality of the position and behavior of the state managerial segment in the capitalist-oriented countries is explained by R.G. Landa not simply as their adherence to the ideas of Westernization and bourgeoisieisation (this also partially exists in socialist-oriented countries), but first and foremost as the influence, neocolonial in spirit, of the world capitalist system on it; at the same time, he takes into account the traditionality and indivisibility of its ties with the precapitalist exploiting classes. The author also takes into account such a factor as the historical features of the formation of the classes of capitalist society in the East, and first and foremost the influence of capitalism from above, through the state managers, as well as the parasitism of officialdom at the overlap of the private and public sectors.

R.G. Landa devotes attention to the fact that the social causes of the objectively progressive role of public-sector administration in socialist-oriented countries are in its links with the working classes and segments, in revolutionary democracy, in the bankruptcy of neocolonialism that is revealed in this or that country, the local bourgeoisie and other exploiters. By the way, the active involvement of state workers in the struggle against these

phenomena is an important precondition for averting the "depoliticization" of the managerial segment and the avoidance of the political renaissance of its representatives. Experience demonstrates that a continuation of the complex and confused class struggle under conditions of a mixed-economy society gives rise to new contradictions in the social thrust of public-sector activity and the possibility of zigzags in the development of the socialist-oriented countries. "The commonality of the tasks of national development and the interests of the working classes," writes the author, "is the basis of socialist tendencies in the evolution of the public managerial sector."

The structure of the research is well-thought-out and well-founded. In the introduction, aside from the grounding of the choice of theme and a survey of sources and literature, the concepts of the elite, the bureaucracy and the administration of the public sector advanced by Soviet and foreign authors are investigated in detail. The overall successful attempt to discover a fourth--revolutionary-democratic--direction which, as the author notes, is as yet confirmed only in Afro-Asiatic literature on the public sector and the bureaucracy, is a new feature of the monograph of R.G. Landa compared to his predecessors in evaluating directions in the study of this theme (and among them should be cited first and foremost M.A. Cheshkov, who has analyzed more than 350 works of foreign authors of a neocolonialist, national-state and leftist-radical bent). The book devotes especial attention to the approach to the problems of management in the public sector on the part of the communist parties and the Marxist researchers of the countries of the East.

The first chapter--"General Problems in Studying the Administrative Segment in the Public Sector of Asian and African Countries"--reviews public-sector administration in Asian and African countries as a particular mass social category. Its social functions are analyzed, which in a mixed-economy society objectively fulfill the task of integrating the social structure in accordance with overall development trends. The book also notes the interrelationships and multifaceted links of administrative personnel in the public sector with the ruling elite of the Afro-Asian states, wherein two principal trends in all of these links are emphasized--the overall national and the class ones.

In the second chapter--"The Public-Sector Administrative Segment in the Social Structure of Afro-Asian Society"--the author defines the place and role of the administration in the hierarchy of public-sector employees and considers the negative phenomenon of bureaucratization. The analysis in this chapter of the class contacts and class orientation of the administrative sector makes a definite contribution to research on problems concerning political coalitions and the tactics and strategies of leftist forces. The question of the position and role of public-sector managers under military regimes is illuminated separately. This issue, however, deserves a more detailed and comprehensive analysis, it seems.

In the third and fourth chapters, the author gives an interesting comparative analysis of two development paths for societies at the transition stage from traditional structures to modern ones through the prism of the activity of the administrative and management segment of the public sector, its objective contribution to social evolution and its socio-political potential, i.e. in a socio-political aspect less developed in Soviet research than others.

In the third chapter--"The Ruling Classes and Public-Sector Management in Countries of Capitalist Development"--the diverse and overall progressive role of the public sector in the matter of transforming backward precapitalist relations and institutions and the inclusion of the peasantry and petty producers entangled in feudal prejudices and dependent on the lenders in modern types of production is described in detail. At the same time, the chapter clearly demonstrates the negative role of neocolonialism, striving to even make use of such a progressive policy as the nationalization of the economy of young liberated countries, it would seem, for its own purposes, and first and foremost to strengthen control over these countries on the part of the multinational corporations. The question of the dialectical interconnection between the public sector and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that forms in its midst, the growth of which is especially accelerated as a result of the accumulation of wealth at the apex of the private sector, is illuminated in interesting and quite thorough fashion.

The fourth chapter--"The Public-Sector Administration in Socialist-Oriented Countries"--notes in detail first the important role of the state sector in these countries as the chief tool and channel of social progress. The author researches the state sector in specific examples of the most varied of countries, emphasizing its significance as a mechanism of revolutionary transformations. At the same time, R.G. Landa, in a separate section, analyzes the difficulties and contradictions of social evolution of public-sector managers under socialist orientation. He writes that modern activity provides many examples where it is namely public-sector administrators, with considerable power concentrated in their hands, that degenerate, close ranks with neocolonialism and, becoming accomplices of "their own" and foreign capital, greatly further a departure from socialist orientation or even, concurring with it in word, hinder its implementation in deed.

In the conclusion, the author poses the question of the possibility of forecasting the socio-political position of the public-sector administrative segment based on a determination of its social genesis, ideological tendencies and dominant directions of development. It seems that this approach is extremely constructive and merits further development. The discovery of the revolutionary potential of this segment, its participation in the revolutionary process and its sensitivity to global political-class shifts in the international arena should also be acknowledged as a powerful aspect of the monograph. The influence of the indicated social groups on the development of the political processes in society and the choice of orientation can be exceedingly effective, and the contribution of the author is that he attracts attention to this problem.

At the same time, the book emphasizes the dependence of the socio-political position of the public-sector administration on specific historical features and the dedicated nature of the state sector of this or that country, as well as on the specific nature of its class contacts and internal and external orientation. The author does not pretend to resolve the problem of forecasting the social behavior of managers, but largely facilitates this and indicates its paths and components. He directs attention in particular to the fact that the "administrative-management segment of the public sector, being

frequently an element and a reserve of the ruling elite, is to no less an extent its tool, support and, sometimes, even a cloak or a scapegoat" (p 182).

The scope of the review does not even permit an enumeration of all of the interesting theses that merit attention in the book of R.G. Landa. This, naturally, does not signify that the theme itself has been exhausted. For example, a more detailed analysis of such issues that are illuminated rather inadequately in the book as the discovery of the social base of the management segment and its transformation to the extent of the development of each specific society, the mechanisms of its degeneration and the like is awaited in the future. But these are issues of national or regional research, and this book undoubtedly lays a good foundation for them. At the same time, it has independent scientific significance not only for the theoretical summarization of the given problem on the scale of two continents, but also for its concrete development of the materials of various countries of the East, and first and foremost the Arab ones.

R.G. Landa's monograph is one of the latest books appearing under the editorship of the recently deceased Aleksey Ivanovich Levkovskiy. The influence of the editor-in-chief is felt not only in the author's treatment of a number of theoretical issues (including those on which disputes are still ongoing among Oriental-studies scholars, economists, historians and sociologists), but in the great attention to the study of the corresponding materials from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. At the same time, I would like to note the absence of any sort of theoretical narrowness on the part of the author in his approach to the phenomena analyzed. His approach can be described more as an attempt to synthesize, combine and mutually supplement the achievements of different theoretical developments accomplished by Soviet Oriental-studies scholars. In particular, the concepts of a "multi-economy society" and "duality" of the economy and society of the modern East are boldly combined in the monograph.

I would also like to direct attention to another aspect of this work. It devotes much attention, moreover with references to new works of Marxist scholars and revolutionary democrats of the East, to the ambiguous and contradictory nature of the activity of the state and the multilevel and heterogeneous nature of its functions in various countries and even in a single country under various circumstances. Nuances of state policy can best be seen in the behavior and actions of state managers, which, proceeding from the most varied of conceptions, can transform and conserve traditional structures, use the state sector both in the interests of private capital and to the detriment of it, do all of this both at the dictate of neocolonialism and in spite of its pressure, facilitate progress in one sphere and simultaneously hinder it in another. R.G. Landa's book, in concentrating attention on these issues, thus stimulates the development and more careful study not only of the social nature of the state, but the very mechanism of its interference in the economy and social life and the logic and general laws of the actions of this mechanism and the new social phenomena, groups and concepts engendered by it. It is apparent that the further enrichment of the general description of all of these phenomena and their more detailed analysis will largely depend on the successes of Oriental studies.

* * *

If I correctly understand the author's concept of the social nature of state managers as it is presented in this book, then it can be basically reduced to the following: This social segment accomplishes important social functions, first of all the management of the economy and especially the state sector; it participates--in one way or another--in the system of state power; it has contacts with various classes of "transitional society"; in the end result it is a secondary, i.e. non-class, segment with a high degree of independence; it is drawn into the bourgeoisisation process overall, the mechanism of which is complex and whose directions are diverse. Understanding the nature and form of this social formation in a fundamentally different way, I feel that the concept proposed by the author is fully "workable," insofar as it explains many actual phenomena (for example, bourgeoisisation) and uncovers some theoretical problems of this community (for example, its social functions). This does not mean, however, that the concept is invulnerable in all regards.

I will begin with how the book combines the state managers and state ownership (the state sector). (Footnote 1) (These two concepts--"state ownership" and the "state sector" (as well as "institution")--are very inadequately separated in the book.) From the author's point of view, this segment is by nature and function a management one, and a completely realistic line is excluded from this research --the transformation of managers into active (and not juridical) agents of state ownership, into personifiers of it. I feel this is not an omission, but a consequence of a definite and fully conscious approach of the author. The point is that R.G. Landa connects the state managers with the state-capitalist institution--a theoretical construct that is a "combination" of the state and capital (A.I. Levkovskiy), i.e. either has no political-economic content or, when it does, it is reduced--in one form or another--to capital. If the author accepts the first--non-political-economic--treatment of this socio-economic foundation of state managers, there is simply nothing to be said about industrial relations; therefore, the relations of managers with hired employees and workers in the state sector, as well as the problem of their possible exploitation, recedes to the background (p 15) or is reduced to the relations of the classic capitalist and his employees (p 60). Proceeding from the second treatment of state ownership, the author should accept the thesis on the initial, and this means, automatically required bourgeoisisation which, however, he disputes (pp 25-26). That is namely why the author does not need a "progression" from state ownership to the state managers for RESEARCH (I emphasize) purposes, and the state-capitalist institution exists as something external with regard to the state managers. The author was able to take a different route--from the state managers to state ownership, explaining in particular (it is true, from the subject) the trend toward independence in the state-capitalist institution (p 30). Nonetheless he did not take this route either, since in his "system of coordinates" and for his purposes it is much more important to demonstrate the link of the state managers with power and social functions than with state ownership.

The relations of this segment with state power are defined by the fact that political power is reserved for the ruling elite and economic power for the private property owners, while state managers are no more than instruments of

policy (p 36). I would note, however, that in modern developing countries it is difficult to separate the ruling elite from the state sector: this separation corresponds more to a model of old (classic) capitalism, but not capitalism of the state-monopoly era. The author is correct in his criticism (including that directed at me) when he repudiates the thesis of state power and state ownership as an indivisible complex, but he is hardly correct in rejecting the unity of this concept (p 13). It seems that a divided unity can be quite definitely revealed, if we correlate the ruling elite and the state managers with two aspects of state ownership: the titular-ownership (or more broadly—volitional relationship) and the functional-ownership.

The author justly insists on the significance of the social functions carried out by the state managers for an understanding of their nature, as well as on the necessity of dividing the functional and class aspects in this social formation (p 16). I would add that the substance of the social functions is worth expanding on, noting also their qualitative distinction from the analogous functions (planning, regulation etc.) of state managers in societies of developed capitalism: in developing countries the objectives of the realization of these functions are national integration, autonomy, overall development, i.e. objectives of a much higher order of complexity and, apparently, manageable to a considerably lesser extent. The unaccustomed complexity of these functions in developing countries assumes their isolation from society, since they almost inevitably become the subject of assimilation and monopolization on the part of their bearers. The monopolization of social functions reveals the management path toward control over the most important means of production within the framework of state ownership, which also contains the possibility of the mutation of this corporation of executors ("instruments") into a class formation (or a formation of a class type). In justly separating these functions from the class nature of state managers, the author does not show their complex interconnection with a "class nature" and in that manner once again—for the second time—does not make use of the opportunity of tracking this type of class transformation of stage managers. In this point are concealed great opportunities for the discovery of historical analogies of the given method of class formation (through the monopolization of social functions) in modern developing countries. They should be sought in pre-class societies, as noted by F. Engels and studied by Soviet historians and political economists—L.V. Danilova, Yu.I. Semenov, L.S. Vasilyev, R.M. Nureyev et al. The opportunity of accommodating this method of class formation within the framework of the Marxist theory of formations—at the overlap of the primary and secondary and secondary and tertiary macroformations—is also revealed herein.

Considerably more interesting, in my opinion, is the analysis undertaken in the book of the social links of the state managers with various classes, and first of all with the bourgeoisie. It is true that in spite of his intentions and this approach, the author somewhat accelerates the bourgeoisisation process of these groups. In some cases, the facts he cites do not make it possible to draw conclusions he is leading up to: for example, it is hardly possible to talk of the bourgeoisisation of the Thai military by referring to data showing that their genetic (according to origins) link with the bourgeoisie was at least half as weak as their links with officialdom (civil and military) as well as with the petty bourgeoisie—at least three and a half times weaker

than their genetic contacts with the bureaucracy (p 193). The convergence of the "ruling class" of Tunisia with the "middle bourgeoisie" on the basis of these facts--even taking into account the provisos made by the author--seems doubtful: roughly a quarter of the lower segment of this class is connected by occupation with the bourgeoisie, roughly a third with officialdom and another third with the intelligentsia (p 72); the upper segment is 70-percent associated with occupations of the intelligentsia, 25 percent with officialdom and only 3.5 percent with the bourgeoisie; true, genetically this higher segment was formed half from people of bourgeois and landowner origins and roughly a third from the families of officialdom (p 38). In those cases where business links at the level of the state sector and the private sector are considered (pp 131-132), the conclusion regarding the "bourgeoisisation" is well-founded only with a precise determination of the nature of the state sector, which we do not find in the work. As difficult as it is to equate the "bureaucratization of the intelligentsia" with growth in the class influence of the bourgeoisie (p 75), the conclusion that the links between all classes and even the self-reproduction of state managers is an expression of bourgeoisisation is quite incomprehensible (pp 79, 81).

The work also poses the fundamental question of the representation of this or that class in the state-manager sphere. The author notes with justification that the mechanisms of class representation are intersected by other--religious, ethnic, regional etc.--contacts (pp 104-105). I would say this: class representation is mediated by representation of societies of another sort--non-class ones--which not only make extremely complicated the expression of the interests of various classes in that social segment, but also, it could be said, reduce the degree of representativeness and in that manner strengthen the independence of the state managers. Proceeding from his premise of the classes in a transitional society as imperfect (pp 17-18), the author not only cannot completely develop his thesis on the independence of the state managers, but also cannot arrive at the conclusion of the problematic nature (more precisely--the probabilistic nature) of the representation of these classes or class coalitions that have not formed or taken shape. Then the process of the bourgeoisisation of the state managers will look not like an "iron law," but a tendency.

It must be acknowledged, however, that this vision of representativeness and bourgeoisisation does not completely correspond to the concept of a transitional society and the classes characteristic of it: with all of the provisos, this concept is oriented toward a situation of a transitional nature with a specific, i.e. capitalist, thrust. Without doubting the presence of a bourgeois "vector" of development, I doubt the substantiation of the reports of the evolution of the developing countries altogether, and class genesis in particular, toward unambiguous capitalist ("bourgeoisisation") development which the author accepts, although with hesitation (p 198).

If one agrees with this--"situational"-- treatment of transitionality, then the idea of a multitude of state-management classes in developing countries turns out to be a trivial feature of the transient and passing traits of these classes, substituting a homogeneity of the bourgeois class and its secondary, or productive, formations (a bureaucracy that has become bourgeois, a political elite of managers). Such a concept is also reinforced by the fact

that the concept of the managing classes is often replaced with the categories of ruling formations—a social bloc (p 36) or ruling class coalition (pp 46, 106). In other words, an important thesis of the fundamental multiple nature of the managing classes in a transitional society—the references to politics (power)—proves to be inadequate.

Moreover, the thesis of the multiple nature of the managing classes is heuristic—it can "work" (and most effectively, in my opinion) within the framework of the concept of transitionality as an expression of a certain type of society (Footnote 2) (Some Soviet Indian-studies scholars, for example A.P. Kolontayev, are arriving at this concept today) with its persistent specific general laws—general laws of class genesis in particular and especially the formation of the ruling classes. Based on the interaction among various institutions (the institution of the state, private capital, petty trade), a commonality of a number of managing classes is formed. I would emphasize that the commonality of these classes does not exclude, but rather assumes—as long as the institutions are preserved—the multiple nature of its components. The denial of commonality due to the heterogeneity of its composition is incorrect, as is the report of the integral nature of the elements forming it or the links among them.

These compositional, or rather constituent, but inexhaustible elements of the compositions of the ruling-class community are the essence of the bourgeois classes and class formation based on the institution of the state and state ownership. The latter is not a quasi-class—and on this plane R.G. Landa's criticism of my version of the concept of the elite (p 48) is well-founded. I do not feel it is possible, however, to equate this class formation—directly or indirectly (based on productivity, as is done in the book)—with the bourgeoisie. By the way, the author also permits this equation, first of all, without adequate grounding (he does not reveal the nature of state ownership), and second, contradicting—although in a concealed manner—the concept of the "state-capital institution" and the more so "state capitalism," insomuch as the managing class of this type is closer to the dual depiction indicated above than to the homogeneous managing class of the bourgeoisie, deprived of the features of transitionality (including the multiple nature and diversity of its elements).

It seems that this book does not remove, but rather leaves open, the "cursed" questions of the theory of state managers, and the agents of state power and the state sector altogether. These questions—first of all concerning the nature of state ownership and the type (primary or secondary nature) of the given formations—retain their significance regardless of the scale of growth of capitalism and especially of the private sector in the developing countries. The researchers of state-monopoly capitalism, after all, run into analogous problems when they introduce the concept of "state capital" and in this manner pose the question of the primary nature of state managers. The category of "state capital" in this case frequently turns out to be an eclectic combination of the concept of "capital" and tax categories, however, which provides a basis for seeing state managers as a secondary formation. Those who see nothing but a form of corporate capital in the state sector (G.K. Shirokov, N.G. Kireyev et al), as well as those who reduce state managers to an administrative-bureaucratic segment, should give some thought

to the dead end taking shape in the future. Unfortunately, this work does not extract the problem of the nature of state managers (their primary or secondary nature) from the dead end; in my opinion, it does not arm the researcher to a sufficient extent to oppose the tendency--predominating today in domestic literature on the developing countries--toward the "bourgeoisation" of non-bourgeois elements and the reduction of the theory of developing society to a theory of one form of capitalism.

Nonetheless, the work produced by R.G. Landa is undoubtedly exceedingly useful, setting forth for the reader an analysis of a subject that is really poorly studied, and calling for an expansion of the field of research. The first step in this direction, apparently, should be the development of national "profiles" of similar management groups with a regard for their existence at various levels (national, local). For this it is essential to summarize the materials of scattered surveys, placing the mass statistical information contained in biographical publications at their base. Then it will be possible to establish the interconnection between the maturity of such groups and the general levels of development (see the hypothesis of the author on the reciprocal link between these factors--p 135). Another direction projected by the author (in connection with the concept of the "international bourgeoisie"--p 135) should be oriented toward the study of both the inter-country contacts of these groups on a regional scale and in the world context (in their relations with world institutions of the type of the World Bank, the IMF and other organizations of a world type). Finally, there exists the possibility of making use of already existing techniques of statistical research (for example, those of A.A. Iudina and N.A. Sidorov developed based on Pakistani materials) and their placement "on-line."

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BOOK ON PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM IN 3 ASIAN COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 199-201

[Review by A.S. Shin of book "Proletarskiy internatsionalizm i razvitiye sotsialisticheskikh stran Azii" [Proletarian Internationalism and the Development of the Socialist Countries of Asia], Moscow, Chief Editorial Board for Eastern Literature of the Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1983, 516 pp, indices of names and geographic names; combined international editorial board: Bulgaria--N. Tsarevski; Hungary--J. Bognar, M. Shimay, B. Talas; GDR--H.-P. Fitze, V. Lulay, I. Getel; Mongolia--Sh. Bira; Poland--V. Baltserak, S. Koylo; USSR--G.F. Kim (editor-in-chief), (F.I. Kulikova (deputy editor-in-chief), I.S. Kazakevich, V.D. Tikhomorov; Czechoslovakia--J. Tsesar, M. Kubeshova]

[Text] This monograph is the result of the creative collaboration of social-studies scholars of Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. The authors have placed before themselves the task of showing, based on the example of Mongolia, Vietnam and Korea, the significance of the principles of proletarian internationalism in the historical fates of the socialist countries of the East and considering the process of enriching the content and forms of realization of these principles and their principal traits and manifestations at the modern stage of development of the world socialist system. These problems are analyzed with a regard for the contribution that the socialist countries under review are making to the development of world socialism and the revolutionary process overall.

The monograph, constructed both according to historical-problem and national-studies principles, begins with an analysis of the specific features of the initial stages of revolutionary transformation in three countries and descriptions of the policies of proletarian internationalism that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries conduct in relations with these countries. The authors note that as a result of the victory of revolutions in these countries, a national-democratic form of transition to socialism has been established, typical of which from the very beginning has been the leading role of the revolutionary party following the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the union with the socialist system and the state or group of states of triumphant socialism (p 25). The ideas and policies of proletarian internationalism and the assistance of the Soviet Union and other countries for the victorious working class has created the possibility of bypassing or

substantially reducing the capitalist stage of development and entering onto a path leading to socialism for the peoples of Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam.

The authors of the monograph emphasize that in any country, a revolution is preceded by a revolutionary situation and that revolutionary situations took shape in each of the countries considered. A thesis that merits attention with a reference to the experience of North Korea is advanced that in the modern era the growth of a revolutionary situation into a victorious revolution is also possible under conditions where not all of the components of this situation have matured (for example, the dissatisfaction of the masses with existing institutions, their protest for this or that reason has still not acquired the nature of mass demonstrations, they are of a covert nature, but under favorable conditions they are ready to burst out). It is important to keep in mind, the authors feel, that some insufficiently developed or lagging material and subjective preconditions of socialism in this or that country exist on an international scale and that this opens up the possibility of a transition onto a socialist development path, bypassing capitalism, for the peoples of the East (p 29).

Those pages of the monograph where the general and original traits of the revolutions in Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam (pp 33-57) are considered are read with great interest. The conclusion of the authors that "common to the countries of the East in which a peoples' democratic revolution has triumphed is the practical incarnation in one form and extent or another of the union of the working class with the peasantry in an international aspect" (p 35) is topical. Connected with this conclusion is the thesis that with a deepening of the revolution in Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam, a strengthening of the positions of the working class and an increase in the political consciousness of the laboring masses, the organs of national power, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard, gradually began to go over to the implementation of the tasks and functions of the dictatorship of the working class (p 56). This experience can with time be used creatively by the ruling vanguard parties of the workers heading up the socialist-oriented countries today.

The conclusion contained in the book on the fact that raising the efficiency of the development of Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam at the general democratic stage was furthered not only by the Marxist-Leninist policies of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries, but also by the circumstance that the ruling parties of the countries under study consistently conducted an internationalist policy unwaveringly taking into account the necessity of a unity between the national and the international (p 97) sounds topical.

The authors of the monograph also justly devote much attention to such an important aspect of proletarian internationalism as the assistance of the Soviet Union, and later of other socialist countries, in defending the conquests of the revolution and the socialism of the peoples of the countries under study. The victories of the Mongolian, Korean and Vietnamese peoples in the wars unleashed against them by the interventionists and internal reactionary forces were furthered, along with the heroic struggle of these peoples themselves, by the enormous military, political, economic, diplomatic

and other support of the USSR and other socialist countries and the movement of international solidarity of the progressive forces of the world (pp 89-90).

The book's materials convincingly testify to the fact that at the stage of the immediate construction of the foundations of socialism in Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam, proletarian and socialist internationalism has been one of its key overall general features and at the same time a most important component of other of its general features and an indispensable condition for their realization in the socio-political, economic, cultural and ideological spheres (pp 101-164). The authors justly emphasize herein that the general laws of the construction of socialism do not eliminate specific national features, but rather act in forms that are closely connected with historical traditions, the specific features of the socio-economic structure and culture and other local factors.

The monograph devotes much attention to uncovering the role of the ruling parties in the development of national cultures and the reworking of public consciousness. The significance of preserving the verity of Marxist-Leninist teaching on the part of the revolutionary vanguard in the struggle against petty-bourgeois nationalist tendencies in the parties themselves and among the masses, as well as against the depreciation of the role of internationalist factors by the much older portion of personnel, is especially emphasized.

The book studies the thesis of the increasing role of socialist internationalism in the forward development of the fraternal countries, including Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam. One of the fundamental reasons for this is the necessity of uniting the advantages of socialism being built with the achievements of scientific and technical revolution and the efficient utilization of its results (pp 280-291). In reality, not every socialist country, especially those that were former colonies or semi-colonies, can shoulder the independent creation of integrated automated types of production based on utilizing major world scientific and technical discoveries, the formation of the automated inspection and control of production using computers, the discovery and utilization of new types of energy, the creation and employment of new types of structural materials and the like. The development of the world socialist community has demonstrated the effectiveness of multifaceted collaboration in resolving the indicated tasks. The most developed socialist states herein render all-round assistance to those members of CEMA that are in need of it.

The book considers the question of the dialectical unity of national and international tasks in the strategy, tactics and activity of the ruling Marxist-Leninist parties and studies the thesis of the mutually conditional nature of the international duty of the socialist countries. The authors emphasize that growth in the role of the socialist countries, including the Asian ones, as the subject of proletarian internationalism and their contribution to the struggle for peace, the reinforcement of the might of the world socialist system and the development of the world revolutionary process are indissolubly associated with this.

I would like to express several observations. The book was first and foremost unable to avoid repetitions. This is probably to a certain extent inevitable

in view of the combination of historical-problematic and national-studies principles in it. Many of these repetitions, however, could be eliminated with more careful editing. On page 167 it is asserted that in the countries passing through the capitalist stage, one of the tasks of cultural revolution becomes overcoming the substantial distinctions between cities and villages. In my opinion, by the way, cultural revolution can only facilitate the overcoming of these distinctions, but cannot overcome them. The book contains several other imprecisions of an individual nature.

Overall, the book under review is an important and topical piece of research that enriches our conception of the dialectical interaction of national and international factors in the revolutionary process.

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BOOK ON 'NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER' REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 201-203

[Review by S.A. Bylinsky of book "Novyy mezhdunarodnyy ekonomicheskiy poryadok i strany Azii" [The New International Economic Order and the Countries of Asia] by N.M. Khryashcheva, Chief Editorial Board of Eastern Literature of Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1984, 248 pp]

[Text] The movement to restructure international economic relations or, as it is often called, for a new international economic order (NIEO), has become active to a considerable extent thanks to the efforts of the developing countries. It reflects a new stage in the national-liberation struggle--a shift of the center of gravity from political liberation to the achievement of economic independence.

Currently, however, this movement is not having its best days and after an appreciable uplift in the middle of the 1970s is experiencing a definite slump. The undoubted causes of this are "a worsening of the international climate and a growth of tension in international relations, as well as the world economic crisis that developed that was not so much cyclical as structural in nature," as the monograph under review justly notes (p 233).

But however thorny the path of democratic restructuring of international economic relations, it would have been incorrect, in researching this problem, to fall into inordinate pessimism, reducing everything to subjective factors. Behind the acts of state figures, the conclusions of scholars, the positions of countries and groups and the collision of points of view and official platforms, it is essential to see the objective world economic conditions that lie at the basis of the restructuring of international economic relations.

It is customary to consider that the program of the developing countries for a restructuring of international economic relations was formed in 1974 at the 6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly. At the initiative of the young states, it adopted the "Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" and an "Action Program." These documents brought together essentially all of the demands of the developing countries in this realm that they had advanced earlier, and a number of new positions were formulated as well. The basis of a transition from the scattered efforts of these countries to the formulation of a comprehensive NIEO program and the

struggle for its realization was in this manner established. These and a series of other international documents were carefully analyzed in the book and interesting conclusions were drawn from them.

The author's evaluation of such an important document as the "International Development Strategy of the 1980s" is, in our opinion, worthy of attention. In noting several of its positive aspects, N.M. Khryashcheva arrives, however, at the conclusion: "As a result, the International Strategy of the 1980s has become digression and a weakening of the demands of the developing countries in the realization of the goals of the N.I.O., inserting elements of future bourgeoisisation into the concept of a new order" (p 190). Although it is a step forward compared to the strategies of the last two decades, the author's conclusion in favor of the thesis indicated above seems weighty.

The restructuring of international economic relations is a global problem. The forces of imperialism and the national-liberation movement supported by the socialist community collide in the struggle for its realization. But at the same time, the approach to the problems of the NIEO on the part of individual developing countries is different, which furthers their strengthening differentiation. This fact is not new in and of itself. Nonetheless, up until now in Soviet literature there has not been any research in which the roots of these differences on the example of the Asian countries have been demonstrated as deeply as in this book. The author should perhaps, however, be reproached that his field of view fell primarily on the ASEAN countries and India.

The book notes that "Asia, at the sources of the NIEO movement, is experiencing, apparently, one of those complex periods characterized by a certain stagnation or slump. This is testified to not only by the absence of appreciable progress in establishing a NIEO overall, but also by such factors as the appearance in Asia of definite separatist trends... a manifested trend of an appeasing and not a radical approach to the program of the new international economic order" (p 214).

The pages of the book that are devoted to an analysis of the socio-economic problems of the ASEAN countries and their positions on the NIEO are read with especial interest. It is well known that ASEAN is thus far the only group in Asia where appreciable progress is observed in the integration processes. This circumstance eases the determination of a general course of behavior for the ASEAN countries within the framework of the NIEO movement. The active role of the ASEAN in a number of areas of the NIEO is noted in the book (for example, as relates to the "integrated program" for raw materials). In the chief area of the NIEO, however, which should be considered monitoring the activity of the multinational corporations, the ASEAN countries hold a deeply pro-Western position. The author proposes that the specific nature of the approach of the ASEAN countries consists of the fact that they are urgently trying to resolve the problems of the NIEO on the basis of bilateral relations with the West. The conclusion seems well-founded that ASEAN is the right wing of the NIEO movement and that the policy of this group can be described as reformist and bourgeois-pragmatic. "Thus, the development of unilateral 'special' relations of the ASEAN countries with the imperialist states is fraught not only with growth in the influence of the latter on the economic

life and integration processes in the countries of the association. The imperialist powers link the development of these relations to a greater and greater extent with the prospects for influencing the participation of the ASEAN countries in the NIEO movement and with efforts for a certain isolation of the countries of the group from the movement of the 'Group of 77' and support for the ASEAN countries coming forth with the most rightist positions" (p 201).

A largely different approach is characteristic of India. Its attitude toward the "integrated program" for raw materials, which over the course of a certain period has become the core of the demands of the developing countries for a NIEO, has always been characterized by moderation. The position of India overall on a restructuring of international relations, however, is more progressive than the position of the ASEAN countries. At the same time, the author emphasizes the following particular features that typify the Indian platform. First, an attempt to link the concept of interdependence with the problem of a structural restructuring of the developed capitalist countries. Second, a desire to utilize the concept of collective support for intrinsic forces to expand collaboration within the framework of the whole "third world," insofar as it were possible for India, with a relatively developed industry, to assume a leading position (p 210). Also interesting is the critical analysis made by the author of the concepts of the problems of the NIEO of a number of Indian economists, who, in particular, are undertaking efforts to unite the theory of "interdependence" and the "basic human needs" with Gandhiism.

Also not escaping the attention of the author was the fact that political factors are beginning to play an ever greater role in the struggle for a NIEO. In this regard, the strengthening of the role of the non-aligned movement in the struggle for a restructuring of international economic relations has a positive significance. At the same time, the politicization of the NIEO movement reveals ever more clearly two differing approaches to this problem in the "Group of 77." One path is compromise. The advocates of this direction consider the struggle for a NIEO as an opportunity for the upper-level redistribution of world incomes. But there also exists a realistic alternative--a radical (although not beyond the bounds of bourgeois democracy) restructuring of international economic relations.

The reader also finds a critique of some Western research and theories on NIEO problems in this work. The course of realization of the NIEO program in a number of specific directions is analyzed in detail (in the realm of raw materials, the trade of finished goods, monitoring the activity of the multinational corporations, technology transfer, the realm of currency and finance relations etc.). At the same time, the conclusion that the concessions of the West in the realm of settling the foreign debt of developing countries are of a symbolic nature (p 132) looks somewhat simplistic. As is well known, in the 1980s the developed capitalist countries agreed to the settlement of considerable sums of the foreign debt of a large number of developing countries. This procedure, however, is actively utilized by imperialism as a powerful means of pressuring the debtor nations.

In making compromises on individual issues, the West is trying to ease the confrontation with the developing countries and, making use of the differences of opinion among them, split the NIEO movement. Therefore, the course of the struggle for a democratic restructuring of international economic relations will largely depend on the unity of action of the liberated states. They will be able to achieve the goals posed for them only as the result of an uncompromising struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism and international monopolies.

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